



Q4 2023

Cyber Risk & C-SCRM Exiger



RECENT POLICIES SUPPORTING C-SCRM EFFORTS

Executive Order 14017 – (February 24, 2021) *Securing America's Supply Chains*. Directs each department in the administration to assess potential supply-chain risks within their jurisdiction and develop strategies to mitigate or overcome these.

Executive Order 14028 – (May 12, 2021) *Improving The Nation's Cybersecurity*. Lays out several key points that all organizations and government agencies must adhere to protect themselves from cyber threats. It defines critical software and sets up a system for information sharing to help organizations protect themselves from cyber threats.

Executive Order 13873 – (June 09, 2021) *Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain*. Directs the federal government to strengthen efforts to prevent foreign adversaries from exploiting vulnerabilities in the ICT supply chain and protect the vast amount of sensitive information being stored in and communicated through ICT products and services.

NIST SP 800-161r1 – (May 2022) *Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Systems and Organizations*. Provides guidance to organizations on how to identify, assess, and mitigate cybersecurity supply chain risks at all levels.

Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management Guide – GSA – (May 2022) This guide is intended to provide agencies with a high-level description of Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (C-SCRM) and resources for acquiring products and services that align with C-SCRM best practices.

NIST IR 8276 – (February 2021) *Key Practices in Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management: Observations from Industry*. Provides a set of Key Practices that any organization can use to manage cybersecurity risks associated with their supply chains.


PUBLIC LAW 115-390—(DEC. 21, 2018) Strengthening and Enhancing Cyber-capabilities by Utilizing Risk Exposure Technology Act" or the "SECURE Technology Act. Requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to establish a security vulnerability disclosure policy, to establish a bug bounty program for the Department of Homeland Security, to amend title 41, United States Code, to provide for Federal acquisition supply chain security, and for other purposes.

Federal Acquisition Security Council (FASC) Final Rule – (September 27, 2021) Implement the requirements of the laws that govern the operation of the FASC, the sharing of supply chain risk information, and the exercise of the FASC's authorities to recommend issuance of removal and exclusion orders to address supply chain security risks.



NEW US GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE REQUIRES ENHANCED SOFTWARE VETTING CAPABILITIES

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- EO 14028 directs NIST to develop guidelines for creating and publishing Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) in Federal procurement processes
- NIST SP 800-218 provides guidelines for using SBOMs as part of a secure software development
- The US National Telecommunications and Information Administration defines a set of minimum elements to be included in an SBOM
- The Office of Management and Budget memorandum M-22-18 issued on Sept 14, 2022, requires agency CIOs and CAOs to obtain self requires self-attestation from software producers before using software products

- US agencies are required to obtain a self-attestation from the software producer.
- U.S. agencies will be required to obtain from their software producers SBOMs and documented processes to validate code integrity



VARIOUS CONNECTIONS BETWEEN CYBER RISK AND SUPPLY CHAIN RISK

Right now, these are generally separate risks, with very specific overlaps. The shared concern, however, is risk exposure from the supply ecosystem

More attention on
the supply chain of
technology products
and providers

Cyber is a type of
supply chain risk

The supply chain is a
vector of cyber
attacks



CYBER RISK AT DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE SUPPLY CHAIN



Enterprise/Agency

Network compromise
Leaked / stolen credentials
Business email compromise



Supplier/Vendor

Data breach
Ransomware / wiper virus
DDoS attack



Product/Parts

Open source quality
Malware
Firmware backdoor



Sector/Portfolio

Concentration of suppliers
Patterns of shared products
Interdependencies



TECHNOLOGY SUPPLY BASE

Information Technology

- Hardware
- Processors
- Cloud services
- Data centers

Vendors

- Outsourced
- Consultants
- Contractors
- On site service providers

Operational Technology


- SCADA
- DCS
- PLC

Third Party Data


- Sensitive (SSN, DOB)
- Financial (PCI)
- Proprietary (IP)
- Regulated (PHI)

Software

- Operating systems
- Compilers and editors
- Drivers and dependencies
- Open-source scripts and packaged software
- Repository engines, testing suites, and CI/CD tools



SECURING TECHNOLOGY DEMANDS TRUST IN HOW IT WORKS AND IS CREATED – AND BY WHOM



Managing cyber supply chain risk expects an understanding the suppliers, products, and ecosystem.




EXIGER'S PLATFORM Uses DATA TO UNCOVER RISK IN BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS

Exiger's risk management platform is specifically designed to assess supply chain risk management of third parties by systematically investigating cyber risks to and through the supply chain, prioritizing by potential impact, and continuously monitoring of risk exposure.



MANAGING PRODUCT RISK: IDENTIFY PRODUCT PROVENANCE AND PEDIGREE

Complex interdependencies make it impossible to ensure the security of *all* components *and* contributors to supply chain.



Software Bill of Materials Illumination. Transparency into software components and libraries. Automated inventory identifies potential compromised software and potential software security vulnerabilities in supplier systems.




Hardware Provenance Identification. Item level identification of hardware parts and provenance. Material and component parts forecasting. Early warning of supply chain disruptions. Identification of counterfeit hardware or hardware with embedded malware.



SOFTWARE RISKS ARE LARGELY UNKNOWN AND UNADDRESSED

Software supply chains are a blind spot for many organizations: weaknesses can come from any component in your software supply chain, and threat actors know this.




- Using tools that only assess “known vulnerabilities” will miss key supply chain risk events; it is not enough to identify the hidden risks that lurk when you inherit, purchase or outsource software capabilities.
- Open source software accounts for 75% of codebases, on average— a major source of unknown risks.



CVES AND VULN IDENTIFICATION ARE LAGGING INDICATORS

Software risk includes managing challenges like insipient malware and adversarial control. Code commits are an early warning indicator and allow upstream detection.

Understanding what is supposed to be in software vs. what is *actually* in software requires more than an SBOM; it requires measurement.



BUILD A CYBER RESILIENT SUPPLY CHAIN



Identify **Hidden** Risks and Dependencies in Products



Prioritize the **Vulnerable** Vendors and Third Parties



Uncover Who is Really Building Your Trusted Tech



Understand **Exposure** for the Entire Supply Ecosystem



Make **Data-Driven** Procurement Decisions



Safeguard Trust with **Transparency** Through Data

