

# NIST SP-800-53 r5 – The Control Reference Layer: Taming the Beast beneath CCM 4.2 to NIST 800-53 Mapping Discussing the Cloud Security Alliance Working Group

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President, ISC2 East Bay Chapter

Presentation to ISACA San Francisco, Wednesday, Aug 25 at 12:00-1:00 PM PDT











# **Resources Frequently Mentioned During this presentation**



	Critical Resour	ce Website link			
CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY	Homepage   CISA	CIS Center for Internet Security (cisecurity.org)	CIS. Center for Internet S Confidence in to	<b>ecurity®</b> he Connected World®	
cloud CSA security alliance®	https://cloudsecurity alliance.org/	How to Become FedRAMP Authorized   FedRAMP.gov	Home > Regulations Regulations Regulations FedRAMP  DEAR	SOFARS  MY 99 (CAS)  TRANSFARS  AGAR	DOSAR DIAR DIAR DAR
	National Institute of Standards and Technology   NIST	Acquisition.GOV   www.acquisition.go  V Location for DFARS	DEARS  AFART  DARS  MMC	CAR  DEAR  DIAR  DOLAR	EPAAR  FEHBAR  GSAM/R  HHSAR  HSAR









# Enterprise GRC Solutions, Inc.

## Research Working Groups

Security through innovation. Innovation through collaboration.

WORKING GROUPS


PUBLICATIONS CONTRIBUTE WEBINARS

Home > Research > Working Groups









Privacy Level Agreement



People who want to join a Cloud Security Alliance Research Working Group should reach out to Cloud Controls Matrix Working Group | CSA (cloudsecurityalliance.org)

I'm very honored to be a lead among the Mapping of NIST 800-53r5 and CCM 4.0 WG

Home > Research > Working Groups > Cloud Controls Matrix

#### Maintaining cloud governance, risk and compliance is becoming increasingly

The more complex systems become, the less secure they become, even though security technologies improve. With the proliferation of security certifications, industry standards and regulations it is becoming increasingly challenging to keep up with the requirements to stay secure and compliant in the cloud.

#### Why was the CCM created?

To respond to simplify the process of assessing the overall security risk of a cloud provider, CSA created the Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) and Consensus Assessment Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ). The CCM provides a controls framework that gives detailed understanding of security concepts and principles that are aligned to the best practices outlined in the CSA Security Guidance for Cloud Computing. The CAIQ provides a set of Yes/No questions a cloud consumer and cloud auditor may wish to ask of a cloud provider to ascertain their compliance to the CCM.

Help Integrate the CCM with CRI's Financial Services Cybersecurity Profile CSA is partnering with the Cyber Risk Institute (CRI) to provide the financial community with new resources to map and integrate CSA's Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) and CRI's Financial Services Cybersecurity Profile. The goal is to define the scope, objectives and technical specifications of the Cloud Security Framework for Financial Services. To learn more, download our group charter.

Along with releasing updated versions of the CCM and CAIQ, this working group provides addendums, control mappings and gap analysis between the CCM and other research releases, industry standards, and regulations to keep it continually up to date.

Join Group

#### Next Meeting

Sep 01, 2021, 08:00AM PDT Join the Meetina →



#### Working Group Leadership

























# "We'd like to use Cloud Control Matrix & NIST SP 800-53 r5 Mapping as our Master Control List"



- RESOURCES / REASONS: Companies using NIST SP 800-53 r4, must update to Rev 5.1. Cloud Controls Matrix has recently updated to CCM 4.0 – We need them both, now.
- Problem: NIST SP 800-53 as a **mediating** framework is incompletely or inaccurately mapped in products; It requires updates for CIS CSC 7.1->8.1, CCM 3.1->4.2, NIST SP 800-171 r2 & NIST SP 800-172 (Cybersecurity Enhancement), plus New Tailoring Criteria
- Opportunity: Leveraging NIST SP 800-53 r5 to complete ©AICPA SOC 2, ©HITRUST, PCI DSS 3.21, CSTAR CCM, DFARS CMMC, ©ISO/IEC 27001 plus Privacy, Processing and Cloud requires detail understanding of these frameworks – i.e., experience completing engagements to do this work, but it can be done.
- Methodology: Creating *useable* cyber framework mapping is an exercise that drives common language across all Policies and Programs and is necessary to meaningful resilience and compliance.








## The Rush: Iterative steps maintain Common Controls



Change is the Constant – ground rules for what we do

- Controls and Policies map to Risks
- Risk Assessment affects Scope
- Any control or policy modifications introduced by mappings frameworks changes policy requirements
- Adding mapped controls requires validation of policy content and enforcement
- New policy introduces new risk cycle takes 1-2 years to fully implement








# Why Now: Cryptographic, Data Center, and Data Security Privacy Enterprise GRC Solutions, Inc.



- California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, California Privacy Rights and Enforcement Act of 2020 (CPRA) – Privacy + Cryptography
- For the ISO/IEC 27001 using ISO/IEC 27002:2013 € (Plus Privacy, Processing, Cloud)
  - *ISO/IEC 27017:2015 € 27002 for cloud services*
  - *ISO/IEC 27701:2019 € Privacy*
  - ISO/IEC 27018:2019 € Processing
- NIST 800-171 r2 (Controlled Unclassified Information/ DFARS)
- NIST 800-172 (Plus Cybersecurity Enhancements)
- NIST 800-53 r5 (NIST-800-53B) replaces Annex H + J.
- PCI DSS V3.2.1 Copyright © 2018 VISA (Cryptography, *Privacy*)
- TSP 100—2017 Trust Services Criteria Likely to add Cybersecurity, Healthcare, Supply Chain - Datacenter + Privacy + Cryptography greatly improve demonstration of these controls.
- HITRUST CSF v9\* Privacy + Cryptography + Data Center (to operate with HITRUST contact Hitrust.org)

#### ARRAY OF TESTS ASSIGNED TO CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE CLOUD CONTROLS MATRIX V4.0



ISO/IEC 27701:2019 € Security techniques — Extension to ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 for privacy information management — Requirements and guidelines ISO/IEC 27018:2019 € Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for protection of personally identifiable information (PII) in public clouds acting as PII processors ISO/IEC 27017:2015 € 27002 for cloud services













#### Cloud Control Matrix 17 Domains, 197 Controls, 262 Tests + Implementation Guidance




Audit and Assurance - A&A	Audit and Assurance Policy and Procedures; Independent Assessments; Risk Based Planning Assessment; Requirements Compliance; Audit Management Process; Remediation
Application and Interface Security - AIS	Application and Interface Security Policy and Procedures; Application Security Baseline Requirements; Application Security Metrics; Secure Application Design and Development; Automated Application Security Testing; Automated Secure Application Deployment; Application Vulnerability Remediation
Business Continuity Management and Operational Resilience - BCR	Business Continuity Management Policy and Procedures; Risk Assessment and Impact Analysis; Business Continuity Strategy; Business Continuity Planning; Documentation; Business Continuity Exercises; Communication; Backup; Disaster Response Plan; Response Plan Exercise; Equipment Redundancy
Change Control and Configuration  Management - CCC	Change Management Policy and Procedures; Quality Testing; Change Management Technology; Unauthorized Change Protection; Change Agreements; Change Management Baseline; Detection of Baseline Deviation; Exception Management; Change Restoration
Cryptography, Encryption and Key Management - CEK	Encryption and Key Management Policy and Procedures; CEK Roles and Responsibilities; Data Encryption; Encryption Algorithm; Encryption Change Management; Encryption Change Cost Benefit Analysis; Encryption Risk Management; CSC Key Management Capability; Encryption and Key Management Audit; Key Generation; Key Purpose; Key Rotation; Key Revocation; Key Destruction; Key Activation; Key Suspension; Key Deactivation; Key Activation; Key Compromise; Key Recovery; Key Inventory Management
Datacenter Security - DCS	Off-Site Equipment Disposal Policy and Procedures; Off-Site Transfer Authorization Policy and Procedures; Secure Area Policy and Procedures; Secure Media Transportation Policy and Procedures; Assets Classification; Assets Cataloguing and Tracking; Controlled Access Points; Equipment Identification; Secure Area Authorization; Surveillance System; Unauthorized Access Response Training; Cabling Security; Environmental Systems; Secure Utilities; Equipment Location
Data Security and Privacy Lifecycle Management - DSP	Security and Privacy Policy and Procedures; Secure Disposal; Data Inventory; Data Classification; Data Flow Documentation; Data Ownership and Stewardship; Data Protection by Design and Default; Data Privacy by Design and Default; Data Protection Impact Assessment; Sensitive Data Transfer; Personal Data Access, Reversal, Rectification and Deletion; Limitation of Purpose in Personal Data Processing; Personal Data Sub-processing; Disclosure of Data Sub-processors; Limitation of Production Data Use; Data Retention and Deletion; Sensitive Data Protection; Disclosure Notification; Data Location
Governance, Risk and Compliance - GRC	Governance Program Policy and Procedures; Risk Management Program; Organizational Policy Reviews; Policy Exception Process; Information Security Program; Governance Responsibility Model; Information System Regulatory Mapping; Special Interest Groups
Human Resources - HRS	Background Screening Policy and Procedures; Acceptable Use of Technology Policy and Procedures; Clean Desk Policy and Procedures; Remote and Home Working Policy and Procedures; Asset returns; Employment Termination; Employment Agreement Process; Employment Agreement Content; Personnel Roles and Responsibilities; Non-Disclosure Agreements; Security Awareness Training; Personal and Sensitive Data Awareness and Training; Compliance User Responsibility
Identity and Access Management - IAM	Identity and Access Management Policy and Procedures; Strong Password Policy and Procedures; Identity Inventory; Separation of Duties; Least Privilege; User Access Provisioning; User Access Changes and Revocation; User Access Review; Segregation of Privileged Access Roles; Management of Privileged Access Roles; CSCs Approval for Agreed Privileged Access Roles; Safeguard Logs Integrity; Uniquely Identifiable Users; Strong Authentication; Passwords Management; Authorization Mechanisms
Interoperability and Portability - IPY	Interoperability and Portability Policy and Procedures; Application Interface Availability; Secure Interoperability and Portability Management; Data Portability Contractual Obligations
Infrastructure and Virtualization Security - IVS	Infrastructure and Virtualization Security Policy and Procedures; Capacity and Resource Planning; Network Security; OS Hardening and Base Controls; Production and Non-Production Environments; Segmentation and Segregation; Migration to Cloud Environments; Network Architecture Documentation; Network Defense
Logging and Monitoring - LOG	Logging and Monitoring Policy and Procedures; Audit Logs Protection; Security Monitoring and Alerting; Audit Logs Access and Accountability; Audit Logs Monitoring and Response; Clock Synchronization; Logging Scope; Log Records; Log Protection; Encryption Monitoring and Reporting; Transaction/Activity Logging; Access Control Logs; Failures and Anomalies Reporting
Security Incident Management, E-Discovery, and Cloud Forensics - SEF	Security Incident Management Policy and Procedures; Service Management Policy and Procedures; Incident Response Plans; Incident Response Testing; Incident Response Metrics; Event Triage Processes; Security Breach Notification; Points of Contact Maintenance
Supply Chain Management, Transparency, and Accountability - STA	SSRM Policy and Procedures; SSRM Supply Chain; SSRM Guidance; SSRM Control Ownership; SSRM Documentation Review; SSRM Control Implementation; Supply Chain Inventory; Supply Chain Risk Management; Primary Service and Contractual Agreement; Supply Chain Agreement Review; Internal Compliance Testing; Supply Chain Service Agreement Compliance; Supply Chain Governance Review; Supply Chain Data Security Assessment
Threat and Vulnerability Management - TVM	Threat and Vulnerability Management Policy and Procedures; Malware Protection Policy and Procedures; Vulnerability Remediation Schedule; Detection Updates; External Library Vulnerabilities; Penetration Testing; Vulnerability Identification; Vulnerability Prioritization; Vulnerability Management Reporting; Vulnerability Management Metrics
Universal Endpoint Management - UEM	Endpoint Devices Policy and Procedures; Application and Service Approval; Compatibility; Endpoint Inventory; Endpoint Management; Automatic Lock Screen; Operating Systems; Storage Encryption; Anti-Malware Detection and Prevention; Software Firewall; Data Loss Prevention; Remote Locate; Remote Wipe; Third-Party Endpoint Security Posture



# CCM 4.0 Framework Coverage (especially Data Center, Data Security & Privacy, and Cryptography) is necessary for current Privacy, Processing and Cloud Cybersecurity Framework Controls













# LEGAL Requirement - FISMA PL 113-283 NIST SP 800-53 r5, NIST SP 800-171 r2 and NIST SP 800-172



#### Federal Information Security Modernization Act FISMA



Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (Public Law 113-283; December 18, 2014).

The original FISMA was <u>Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002</u> (Public Law 107-347 (Title III); December 17, 2002), in the <u>E-Government Act of 2002</u>.

#### RELATED NEWS

#### **Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements for CUI**

April 27, 2021

NIST has released Draft Special Publication (SP) 800-172A, "Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements...

#### NISTIR 8212: ISCM Program Assessment and Tool

March 31, 202

NIST has published NISTIR 8212, "An Information Security Continuous Monitoring Program Assessment,".

#### NIST Publishes SP 800-172

February 2, 2021

NIST announces the release of Special Publication (SP) 800-172, "Enhanced Security Requirements for..

#### Draft NIST SP 800-47 Rev. 1 Available for Comment

January 26, 2021

Draft NIST SP 800-47 Revision 1, "Managing the Security of Information Exchanges," is now available.

#### Control Catalog and Baselines as Spreadsheets

January 26, 2021

New supplemental materials are available for SP 800-53 Rev. 5 and SP 800-53B: spreadsheets for the..

#### FOF

Information Security Management Act

#### CS

#### irity and Privacy

yber supply chain risk management

- seneral security & privacy
- + identity & access management
- + privacy
- + risk management
- + security & behavior
- security measurement
- + security programs & operations
- systems security engineering zero trust

#### + Technologies

#### + Applications

#### Laws and Regulations

- + executive documents
- Jaws

Cyber Security R&D Act

Cybersecurity Enhancement Act

E-Government Act

Energy Independence and Security Act

Federal Information Security Modernization Act

First Responder Network Authority

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Help America Vote Act

- + regulations
- + Activities and Products
- + Sectors

#### RELATED TOPICS

Laws and Regulations: E-Government Act

#### Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information: Draft NIST SP 800-172A Available for Comment

April 27, 2021

f 3

The protection of controlled unclassified information (CUI) in nonfederal systems and organizations—especially CUI associated with a critical program or high value asset—is important to federal agencies and can directly impact the ability of the Federal Government to successfully carry out its assigned missions and business operations. To determine if the enhanced security requirements in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-172, Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information: A Supplement to NIST Special Publication 800-171, have been satisfied, organizations develop assessment plans and conduct assessments.

#### Draft NIST SP 800-172A, Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information, provides

federal agencies and nonfederal organizations with assessment procedures that can be used to carry out assessments of the requirements in NIST SP 800-172. The generalized assessment procedures that can be used to carry out assessments of the requirements in NIST SP 800-172. The generalized assessment procedures are flexible, provide a framework and starting point to assess the enhanced security requirements, and can be tailored to the needs of organizations and assessors. Organizations tailor the assessment procedures by selecting specific assessment methods and objects to achieve the assessment objectives and by determining the scope of the assessment and the degree of rigor applied during the assessment process. The assessment procedures can be employed in self-assessments, independent third-party assessments, or assessments conducted by sponsoring organizations (e.g., government agencies). Such approaches may be specified in contracts or in agreements by participating parties. The findings and evidence produced during assessments can be used by organizations to facilitate risk-based decisions related to the CUI enhanced security requirements. In addition to developing determination statements for each enhanced security requirement. Porfx INIST SP 800-172A introduces an updated structure to incorporate organization-defined parameters into the determination statements.

NIST is seeking feedback on the assessment procedures, including the assessment objectives, determination statements, and the usefulness of the assessment objects and methods provided for each procedure. We are also interested in the approach taken to incorporate organization-defined parameters into the determination statements for the assessment objectives.

A public comment period for this document is open through June 11, 2021. See the <u>publication details</u> for a copy of the draft publication and instructions for submitting comments, preferably using the <u>comment template</u> provided. For any questions, please contact <u>sec-cert@nist.gov</u>.

NOTE: A call for patent claims is included on page in of this draft. For additional information, see the <u>information Technology Laboratory (ITL) Patent</u>
Policy--inclusion of Patents in ITL Publications.


#### RELATED TOPICS

Security and Privacy: controls assessment, security

Laws and Regulations: <u>Federal Information Security</u> Modernization Act, OMB Circular A-130

#### https://csrc.nist.gov/Topics/Laws-and-Regulations/laws/FISMA

**Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations** 





## FY 2021 IG METRICS DEPEND ON NIST SP 800-53 r5 -



https://www.cisa.gov/

FY21 FISMA

Documents | CISA

FY 2021 Inspector

General FISMA

Reporting


Measures v1.1

(cisa.gov)

2021

FY 2021 Inspector General Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) Reporting Metrics

Version 1.1 May 12,



#### Key Changes to the FY 2021 IG FISMA Metrics

One of the goals of the annual FISMA evaluations is to assess agencies' progress toward achieving outcomes that strengthen Federal cybersecurity, including implementing the Administration's priorities and best practices. One such area is increasing the maturity of the Federal government's Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) practices. As noted in the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018, agencies are required to assess, avoid, mitigate, accept, or transfer supply chain risks. The FY 2021 IG FISMA Reporting Metrics include a new domain on Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) within the Identify function. This new domain focuses on the maturity of agency SCRM strategies, policies and procedures, plans, and processes to ensure that products, system components, systems, and services of external providers are consistent with the organization's cybersecurity and supply chain risk management requirements. The new domain references SCRM criteria in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53, Rev. 5. Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations. To provide agencies with sufficient time to fully implement NIST 800-53, Rev 5., in accordance with OMB A-130, these new metrics should not be considered for the purposes of the Identify framework function rating.

EMAIL US™ CONTACT SITE MAP

Also, within the Identify function, specific metric questions have been reorganized and reworded to focus on the degree to which cyber risk management processes are integrated with enterprise risk management (ERM) processes. As an example, IGs are directed to evaluate how cybersecurity risk registers are used to communicate information at the information system, mission/business process, and organizational levels. These changes are consistent with NIST Interagency Report 8286, "Integrating Cybersecurity and Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)," which provides guidance to help organizations improve the cybersecurity risk information they provide as inputs to their enterprise ERM programs.<sup>4</sup>

Furthermore, OMB has issued guidance on improving vulnerability identification, management, and remediation. Specifically, Memorandum M-20-32, <a href="Improving Vulnerability Identification">Improving Vulnerability Identification</a>, Management, and Remediation, September 2, 2020, provides guidance to federal agencies on collaborating with members of the public to find and report vulnerabilities on federal information systems. In addition, DHS Binding Operational Directive 20-01, <a href="Develop and Publish a Vulnerability Disclosure Policy">Develop and Publish a Vulnerability Disclosure Policy</a>, September 2, 2020, provides guidance on the development and publishing of an agency's vulnerability disclosure policy and supporting handling procedures. The IG FISMA Reporting Metrics include a new question (#24) to measure the extent to which agencies utilize a vulnerability disclosure policy (VDP) as part of









**Election Security** 

# SP 800-53 R5 New Families, Attributes, and Outcomes

- Two new control families: (PT)
   Personally Identifiable Information
   Processing and Transparency, (SR)
   Supply Chain Risk Management
- Consolidates Program Management to main catalog (PM)
- Attributes: Control or control enhancement is implemented by "S" System, or "O" organization, or both "O/S"
- Integrated Privacy controls across the entire catalog notated by "P"
- ALL controls shift from descriptive to outcome - based criteria:
  - Example "The information system enforces approved" v. "Enforce approved authorization"



Transition to NIST SP 800-53 r5.1, you must.

-Yoda











### NIST.GOV NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 final updates DECEMBER 2020





SP-4(1) Provesance   Track and Trace   Y   New base control   SP-4(1)   Provesance   Identity   Y   New costrol enhancement   SP-4(1)   SP-4(1)   Provesance   Identity   Y   New costrol enhancement   SP-4(1)   SP-4(1)   SP-4(2)   Provesance   I Track and Trace   Y   New costrol enhancement   SP-4(1)   SP-4(2)   SP-											
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SR-10	1181	SR-6(1)	Reviews   Testing and	nd					Υ	New control enhancement	Employ specified analysis or testing of specified s elements, processes, and actors associated with the system component, or system service
SR-80 Notification Agreements X X X Y P Add to L, M, and H Security Control Baseline (SP 800-SB)  Tangue Resistance and Detection X Y P Add to N Security Control Baseline (SP 800-SB)  SR-9(1)  SR-9(1)  SR-9(1)  SR-10 Inspection of Systems or X X X X Y P Add to N Security Control Baseline (SP 800-SB)  SR-10 Inspection of Systems or X X X X Y P Security Control Baseline (SP 800-SB)  SR-10 Inspection of Systems or X X X X Y P Security Control Baseline (SP 800-SB)  SR-11 Component Authoriticity X X X X Y P Add to L, M, and H Security Control Baseline (SP 800-SB)  SR-11(1) Component Authoriticity X X X X Y P Security Control Baseline (SP 800-SB)  SR-11(2) Component Authoriticity Anii  Component Authoriticity X X X X Y P Security Control Baseline (SP 800-SB)  New control shahamement Add to L, M, and H Security Control Baseline (SP 800-SB)  SR-11(2) Component Authoriticity Anii  Y New control shahamement Add to L, M, and H Security Control Schall Sc	1182	SR-7		s					Υ	New base control	Employ specified OPSEC controls to protect supprelated information
SR-9    Tanger Hestertance and   X   Y   Add to 18 Security Control Baseline (SP   Addresses the new control of A-18   Security Control Baseline (SP   Addresses the new control of A-18   Security Control Baseline (SP   S	1183	SR-8	Notification Agreements	s		×	х	×	Υ	Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Establish agreements and procedures with entities supply chain Incorporates withdrawn control SA-12(12)
SR-10 Detection Multiple Stages of System Development Life  SR-10 SR-10 Component Authenticity  SR-11 Component Authenticity	1184	SR-9	Detection					×	Υ	Adds to H Security Control Baseline (SP 800-53B)	· ·
SR-10 Component Authenticity   Author   X X X X Y Add so   M, and the Societily Control   Sacretine (SR 900-SSB)   Societive   Sacretine (SR 900-SSB)   Societive   Sacretine	1185	SR-9(1)	Detection   Multiple Sta-					×	Υ	Adds to H Security Control Baseline (SP 800-53B)	throughout the system development life cycle Incorporates withdrawn control SA-18(1)
SR-110   Component Authenticity   X   X   X   Y   Add or to I, M, and M Security Control Baselines (SR 900-SB)   Multiple Component Authenticity   Anti-Countrol SR-19	1186	SR-10	Inspection of Systems o Components	r		×	х	×	Y	Adds to L, M, and H Security Control	tampering Incorporates withdrawn control SA-18(2)
SR-11(1) Component Authenticity   Anti-  SR-11(2) Component Authenticity   Anti-  SR-11(3) Component Authenticity   Anti-  SR-11(4) Component Authenticity   Anti-  SR-11(5) Component Authenticity   Anti-  SR-11(6) Component Authenticity   Anti-  SR-11(7) Component Authenticity   Anti-  SR-11(8) Component Authenticity   Ant	1187	SR-11	Component Authenticity	,		×	×	×	Y	Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	policy and procedures, to include reporting count components Incorporates withdrawn control SA-19
SR-11(2) Configuration Control for Components Service and Service Components awaiting service or repair and service Components awaiting service or repair and service Repair SR-11(3) Components Awaiting Service or repair and service Repair SR-11(3) Components Awaiting service or repair and service Repair SR-11(3) Components Awaiting service or repair and service Repair SR-11(3) S	1188	SR-11(1)	Counterfeit Training			×	×	×	Υ	Adds to L, M, and H Security Control	components Incorporates withdrawn control SA-19(1)
Sh-1801 1	1189	- ' '	Configuration Control for Component Service and Repair	or		×	×	×	Υ	Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Incorporates withdrawn control SA-19(2)
Introduction Legend Rev4 Rev5 Compared (+)	400	SR-11(3)	Component Authenticity	/   Anti-	L		_	l	Υ	New control enhancement	Periodically scan for counterfeit system componen
	4	-	Introduc	tion	Le	gend	Re	v4 Rev	/5 Compare	ed +	: 4 <b>)</b>









The collaboration index template supports information security and privacy program collaboration to help ensure that the objectives of both disciplines are met and that risks are appropriately managed. It is an optional tool for information

security and privacy programs to identify the degree of collaboration needed between security and privacy programs

**Security and Privacy** 

**Laws and Regulations** 

operations

privacy controls; security controls; security programs &


Modernization Act; Homeland Security Presidentia

analysis.

. Security and Privacy Control Collaboration Index Template (Excel & Word)

Also available:

## **20 Families (Two New Domains)**



The total number of tracked items since the start of NIST SP 800-53 is 1,189 items.
 That includes everything withdrawn and everything active. \*Green boxes are the Control Families used for SP 800-171r2 and NIST SP 800-172.



1	Rev 5 Update	NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Controls	1	IIST S 63B C Base	ont	rol	More than editorial or administrative change? (Y/N)	Changed Elements	Change Details	
1179	SR-5(2)	Acquisition Strategies, Tools, and Methods   Assessments Prior to Selection, Acceptance, Modification, or Update					Y	New control enhancement	Perform assessments of systems, system components, or system services prior to selection, acceptance, modification, or update. Incorporates withdrawn control SA-12(7)	
1180	SR-6	Supplier Assessments and Reviews			x	x	Y	New base control Adds to M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Assess and review the supply chain-related risks associated with suppliers or contractors and the system, system component, or system service they provide Incorporates withdrawn control SA-12(2)	
1181	SR-6(1)	Supplier Assessments and Reviews   Testing and Analysis					Y	New control enhancement	Employ specified analysis or testing of specified supply chain elements, processes, and actors associated with the system, system component, or system service Incorporates withdrawn control SA-12(11)	
1182	SR-7	Supply Chain Operations Security					Υ	New base control	Employ specified OPSEC controls to protect supply chain-related information Incorporates withdrawn control SA-12(9)	
1183	SR-8	Notification Agreements		x	x	x	Υ	New base control Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Establish agreements and procedures with entities involved in the supply chain Incorporates withdrawn control SA-12(12)	
1184	SR-9	Tamper Resistance and Detection				x	Υ	New base control Adds to H Security Control Baseline (SP 800- 53B)	Addresses the need to implement a tamper protection program. Incorporates withdrawn control SA-18	
1185	SR-9(1)	Tamper Resistance and Detection   Multiple Stages of System Development Life Cycle				x	Υ	New control enhancement Adds to H Security Control Baseline (SP 800- 53B)	Employ anti-tamper technologies, tools, and techniques throughout the system development life cycle Incorporates withdrawn control SA-18(1)	
1186	SR-10	Inspection of Systems or Components		x	x	x	Y	New base control Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Inspect specified systems or system components to detect tampering Incorporates withdrawn control SA-18(2)	
1187	SR-11	Component Authenticity		x	x	x	Y	New base control Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Addresses the need to develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures, to include reporting counterfeit system components Incorporates withdrawn control SA-19	
1188	SR-11(1)	Component Authenticity   Anti- Counterfeit Training		x	x	x	Y	New control enhancement Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Addresses need to train personnel to detect counterfeit system components Incorporates withdrawn control SA-19(1)	
1189	SR-11(2)	Component Authenticity   Configuration Control for Component Service and Repair		х	x	x	Y	New control enhancement Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-538)	Maintain configuration control over specified system components awaiting service or repair and serviced or repaired components awaiting return to service Incorporates withdrawn control SA-19(2)	
1190	SR-11(3)	Component Authenticity   Anti- Counterfeit Scanning	Г				Υ	New control enhancement	Periodically scan for counterfeit system components Incorporates withdrawn control SA-19(4)	
1191	SR-12	Component Disposal		x	х	х	Y	New base control Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-538)	Dispose of specified data, documentation, tools, or system components using the specified techniques and methods Incorporates withdrawn control SA-19(3)	

- Big Domains/Families 20
- Medium Controls/Universe 298
- Small Tests Enhancements Detail 709









# Some of the New Controls Affect the SSP Baselines Some Controls Do Not appear in any Baseline









# These Controls Are Not Part of any Baseline



Ctrl ID	Control Name				
AC-9	Previous Logon Notification	PE-22	Component Marking	SC-40	Wireless Link Protection
AC-16	Security and Privacy Attributes	PE-23	Facility Location	SC-41	Port and I/O Device Access
AC-23	Data Mining Protection	PL-7	Concept of Operations	SC-42	Sensor Capability and Data
AC-24	Access Control Decisions	RA-6	Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Survey	SC-43	Usage Restrictions
AC-25	Reference Monitor	RA-10	Threat Hunting	SC-44	Detonation Chambers
AT-6	Training Feedback	SA-20	Customized Development of Critical Components	SC-45	System Time Synchronization
AU-13	Monitoring for Information Disclosure	SA-23	Specialization	SC-46	Cross Domain Policy Enforcement
AU-14	Session Audit	SC-6	Resource Availability	SC-47	Alternate Communications Paths
AU-16	Cross-organizational Audit Logging	SC-11	Trusted Path	SC-48	Sensor Relocation
CM-13	Data Action Mapping	SC-16	Transmission of Security and Privacy Attributes	SC-49	Hardware-enforced Separation and Policy Enforcement
CM-14	Signed Components	SC-25	Thin Nodes	SC-50	Software-enforced Separation and Policy Enforcement
CP-11	Alternate Communications Protocols	SC-26	Decoys	SC-51	Hardware-based Protection
CP-12	Safe Mode	SC-27	Platform-independent Applications	SI-13	Predictable Failure Prevention
CP-13	Alternative Security Mechanisms	SC-29	Heterogeneity	SI-14	Non-persistence
IA-9	Service Identification and Authentication	SC-30	Concealment and Misdirection	SI-15	Information Output Filtering
IA-10	Adaptive Authentication	SC-31	Covert Channel Analysis	SI-17	Fail-safe Procedures
IR-9	Information Spillage Response	SC-32	System Partitioning	SI-20	Tainting
MA-7	Field Maintenance	SC-34	Non-modifiable Executable Programs	SI-21	Information Refresh
MP-8	Media Downgrading	SC-35	External Malicious Code Identification	SI-22	Information Diversity
PE-19	Information Leakage	SC-36	Distributed Processing and Storage	SI-23	Information Fragmentation
PE-20	Asset Monitoring and Tracking	SC-37	Out-of-band Channels	SR-4	Provenance
PE-21	Electromagnetic Pulse Protection	SC-38	Operations Security	SR-7	Supply Chain Operations Security





# These Controls & Enhancements are withdrawn / replaced



CTRL ID	Control Name				
AT-3.4	AT-3.4 Suspicious Communications and Anomalous System Behavior	IA-9.2	IA-9.2 Transmission of Decisions	SA-12.15	SA-12.15 Processes to Address Weaknesses or Deficiencies
AU-2.3	AU-2.3 Reviews and Updates	IR-9.1	IR-9.1 Responsible Personnel	SA-18.1	SA-18.1 Multiple Phases of System Development Life Cycle
AU-3.2	AU-3.2 Centralized Management of Planned Audit Record Content	PE-5.1	PE-5.1 Access to Output by Authorized Individuals	SA-18.2	SA-18.2 Inspection of Systems or Components
AU-7.2	AU-7.2 Automatic Sort and Search	PE-5.3	PE-5.3 Marking Output Devices	SA-19.1	SA-19.1 Anti-counterfeit Training
AU-8.1	AU-8.1 Synchronization with Authoritative Time Source	PE-18.1	PE-18.1 Facility Site	SA-19.2	SA-19.2 Configuration Control for Component Service and Repair
AU-8.2	AU-8.2 Secondary Authoritative Time Source	PL-2.3	PL-2.3 Plan and Coordinate with Other Organizational Entities	SA-19.3	SA-19.3 Component Disposal
AU-14.2	AU-14.2 Capture and Record Content	SA-12.1	SA-12.1 Acquisition Strategies / Tools / Methods	SA-19.4	SA-19.4 Anti-counterfeit Scanning
CA-3.1	CA-3.1 Unclassified National Security System Connections	SA-12.2	SA-12.2 Supplier Reviews	SA-22.1	SA-22.1 Alternative Sources for Continued Support
CA-3.2	CA-3.2 Classified National Security System Connections	SA-12.5	SA-12.5 Limitation of Harm	SC-34.3	SC-34.3 Hardware-based Protection
CA-3.3	CA-3.3 Unclassified Non-national Security System Connections	SA-12.7	SA-12.7 Assessments Prior to Selection / Acceptance / Update	SC-42.3	SC-42.3 Prohibit Use of Devices
CA-3.4	CA-3.4 Connections to Public Networks	SA-12.8	SA-12.8 Use of All-source Intelligence	SI-2.1	SI-2.1 Central Management
CA-3.5	CA-3.5 Restrictions on External System Connections	SA-12.9	SA-12.9 Operations Security	SI-3.1	SI-3.1 Central Management
CM-5.2	CM-5.2 Review System Changes	SA-12.10	SA-12.10 Validate as Genuine and Not Altered	SI-3.9	SI-3.9 Authenticate Remote Commands
CM-5.3	CM-5.3 Signed Components	SA-12.11	SA-12.11 Penetration Testing / Analysis of Elements, Processes, and Actors	SI-7.11	SI-7.11 Confined Environments with Limited Privileges
CM-8.5	CM-8.5 No Duplicate Accounting of Components	SA-12.12	SA-12.12 Inter-organizational Agreements	SI-7.13	SI-7.13 Code Execution in Protected Environments
CP-2.4	CP-2.4 Resume All Mission and Business Functions	SA-12.14	SA-12.14 Identity and Traceability	SI-7.14	SI-7.14 Binary or Machine Executable Code
IA-9.1	IA-9.1 Information Exchange			SI-8.1	SI-8.1 Central Management







# 268 New & Substantially changed Enhancements and Controls EnterpriseGRC Solutions, Inc.

- 20 (Big) Family Domains PT, SR
- 298 (Medium) Control Family /Universe (example AC-2)
- 709 (Child Small) Tests
   Enhancements (example AC-2(3))



Α	В	C	D	Ε	F	G	Н	I
Rev 5 Update	NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Controls	53 B	ST S B C Base	ont	rol	More than editorial or administrative change? (Y/N)	Changed Elements	Change Details
CA-3(6)	Information Exchange   Transfer Authorizations				x	Y	New control enhancement Adds to H Security Control Baseline (SP 800- 53B)	Verify that individuals or systems transferring data between interconnecting systems have the requisite authorizations
CA-3(7)	Information Exchange   Transitive Information Exchanges					Y	New control enhancement	Identify transitive (downstream) information exchanges with other systems and take measures to ensure that transitive information exchanges cease when the controls cannot be verified or validated
CA-6(1)	Authorization   Joint Authorization — Intra - Organization					Y	New control enhancement	Employ a joint authorization process that includes multiple authorizing officials from the same organization
CA-6(2)	Authorization   Joint Authorization — Inter - Organizations					Y	New control enhancement	Employ a joint authorization process that includes multiple authorizing officials with at least one authorizing official from an organization external to the organization conducting the authorization
CA-7(4)	Continuous Monitoring   Risk Monitoring	Х	x	x	x	Y	New control enhancement Adds to Privacy Control Baseline (SP 800-53B) Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Ensure risk monitoring is an integral part of the continuous monitoring strategy
CA-7(5)	Continuous Monitoring   Consistency Analysis					Y	New control enhancement	Employ specific actions to validate that policies are established and implemented controls operate in a consistent manner
CA-7(6)	Continuous Monitoring   Automation Support for Monitoring					Y	New control enhancement	Ensure the accuracy, currency, and availability of monitoring results for the system using specified automated mechanisms
CA-8(3)	Penetration Testing   Facility Penetration Testing					Y	New control enhancement	Employ a penetration testing process that includes defined frequency of announced and unannounced attempts to bypass or circumvent physical access point controls
CM-3(7)	Configuration Change Control   Review System Changes					Y	New control enhancement	Review changes to the system at a specific frequency or for specific circumstances to determine whether unauthorized changes have occurred Incorporates withdrawn control CM-5(2)
CM-3(8)	Configuration Change Control   Prevent or Restrict Configuration Changes					Y	New control enhancement	Prevent or restrict changes to the configuration of the system under the specific circumstances
CM-7(6)	Least Functionality   Confined Environments With Limited Privileges					Y	New control enhancement	Requires specified user-installed software execute in a confined physical or virtual machine environment with limited privileges Incorporates withdrawn control SI-7(11)







## 75 Changes have implications in the Baselines, NIST 800-53B



- Privacy Attribute (P)
- Part of Low, Medium, High
- Changes to details and modifications to the baselines used for FedRamp
- Addition of S/O/SO attribute
- Associated Tailoring Criteria

Rev 5 Update	NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Controls	53	ST S B C Base	ont	rol	More than editorial or administrative change? (Y/N)	Changed Elements	Change Details
AC-3(14)	Access Enforcement   Individual Access	х				Υ	New control enhancement Adds to Privacy Control Baseline (SP 800-538)	Mechanisms for individuals to have access to PII Incorporates individual access elements of withdrawn App J contro IP-2
AT-2(3)	Literacy Training and Awareness   Social Engineering and Mining			x	х	Υ	New control enhancement Adds to M and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Provide literacy training on recognizing and reporting potential and actual instances of social engineering and social mining
AT-3(5)	Role-Based Training   Processing Personally Identifiable Information	х				Υ	New control enhancement Adds to Privacy Control Baseline (SP 800-538)	Provide specific personnel or roles with initial and at a specific frequency training in the employment and operation of PII processing and transparency controls  Incorporates training elements of withdrawn App J control UL-2
AU-3(3)	Content of Audit Records   Limit Personally Identifiable Information Elements	x				Υ	New control enhancement Adds to Privacy Control Baseline (SP 800-53B)	Limit PII contained in audit records to the specific elements identified in the privacy risk assessment
CA-3(6)	Information Exchange   Transfer Authorizations				х	Υ	New control enhancement Adds to H Security Control Baseline (SP 800- 53B)	Verify that individuals or systems transferring data between interconnecting systems have the requisite authorizations
CA-7(4)	Continuous Monitoring   Risk Monitoring	x	x	x	x	Υ	New control enhancement Adds to Privacy Control Baseline (SP 800-53B) Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Ensure risk monitoring is an integral part of the continuous monitoring strategy
CM-12	Information Location			х	х	Υ	New base control Adds to M and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Identify and document the location of specific information and the specific system components on which the information resides; the users who have access; and changes to the location where the information resides
CM-12(1)	Information Location   Automated Tools to Support Information Location			x	x	Υ	New control enhancement Adds to M and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Use automated tools to identify specific information by information type on specific system components to ensure controls are in place to protec organizational information and individual privacy
CP-9(8)	System Backup   Cryptographic Protection			x	х	Υ	New control enhancement Adds to M and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Requires implementing cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure and modification of specified backup information
IA-12	Identity Proofing			x	х	Υ	New base control Adds to M and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Identity proof users for logical access based on identity assurance level requirements
IA-12(2)	Identity Proofing   Identity Evidence			х	х	Υ	New control enhancement Adds to M and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Requiring evidence of individual identification be presented to the registration authority reduces the likelihood of individuals using fraudulent identification to establish an identity







## Three Tiers – Domain, Control, Test



																				JOILI	UI	1116.	
Assessi	Assess	Assessme	Assess	Assessment	Assessment	Assessment	Assessment	Assessment	Assessme	Assessme	Assessmen	Assessme	Assessm As	sessme /	Assessme	Assessme	Assessment	Assessment	Assessment Testing. Detail Control Description (UCF)	Assessment	Assessment	Assessment	
ent	ment	nt	ment	Universe.Control	Universe.Control	Universe.Risk	Universe.TestingPro	Universe.Test ID	nt	nt	t	nt	ent	nt	nt	nt	Testing.Test_ID	Testing.Detail		Testing.Problem	Testing.Privac	Testing.Assurance	
Edition	Domai	Domain	Contr	Control Objective	Control Objective	Risk	TestingProcedure	Test ID	Unified	Unified	Privacy	IMPLEME	Assuranc Ba	seline	Baseline	Baseline	Test_ID	Detail Control	Detail Control Description (UCF)	Problem Metadata	Privacy	Assurance	
or	n ID	Name	ol ID		Description				Testing	Universe	Control	NTED BY	e	Low I	Medium	High		Objective					
Source									Map	Mapping	Baseline												
								_										_					
	_			_	▼	~	▼	~	_	· -	~		<b>*</b>		~		▼	_		▼	~	~	
117		A.0	A0-1	10 1 hecess Contro	Control.	51300331011.7100033	neterences. [or ood		A.S.1.1,	A.S.1,		<del>-</del>	A AS	1 /	.0.1						A 1 -		
53 r5	53-R5	ACCESS		Policy and	a. Develop,	control policy and	162], [SP 800-178],		A.5.1.2,	A.6.1,											At IS	sue in	
		CONTROL		Procedures	document, and	procedures	[SP 800-192].		A.6.1.1,	A.9.1,													
					disseminate to	address the			A.9.1.1,												man	ping:	
					[Assignment:	controls in the AC			A.12.1.1,												ттар	pilig.	
NIST 80	AC 800		AC-2	AC-2 Account	Control:	Discussion:		AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC-		A.9.2, AC-		0	AC	-2 A	C-2	AC-2		AC-2.1 Automated	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT	AUTOMATIC	C		
55 r5	53-R5	Access		Management	a. Define and	Examples of system			A.9.2.2,								1	System Account	MANAGEMENT	NOTIFICATION;	Sour	ce	
		CONTROL			document the types		[PRIVACT], [OMB A-		A.9.2.3,	AC-6, AC-							Management	Management	Employ automated mechanisms to support the	MONITOR ACCOUNT			
							130], [SP 800-57-1],		A.9.2.5,	17, AC-18,								\ /	management of system accounts.	USAGE; TELEPHONE	Doci	uments	
				AC-2 Account	allowed for use	shared, group,	[SP 800-57-2], [SP		A.9.2.6	AC-20 AC- A.9.2 AC-		_			C-2	AC-2			Supplemental Guidance: The use of automated	NOTIFICATION; EMAIL	DUC	JIIICIICS	
	AC 800		AC-2		Control:	Discussion:		AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC-				0	AC	-2 A	(C-2			AC 2.7 Automated	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   REMOVAL OF TEMPORARY AND	AUTOMATICALLY		1.15	
53 r5	55-65	ACCESS CONTROL		Management		Examples of system			A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3.	3, A/-5, AC-5, AC-								Tem orary and	EMERGENCY ACCOUNTS	REMOVE; AUTOMATICALLY	Cont	rol ID v.	
		CONTROL				account types include individual,	[PRIVACT], [OMB A- 130], [SP 800-57-1],	2(5), AC-2(6), AC-	A.9.2.5, A.9.2.5,	17 AC-18.							Emergency Account Management	Management	Automatically [Selection: remove; disable] temporary and emergency accounts after [Assignment: organization				
/					allowed for use	shared, group,			A.9.2.6	A -20, AC-							Management	Management	defined time-period for each type of account].	ACCOUNTS	Enh	nceme	nt _
NIST 80	O- AC 800	AC-	AC-2	AC-2 Account	Control:	Discussion:	[3F 600-37-2], [3F	AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC-		A 9.2, AC-		0	AC	-2 A	C-2	AC-2	AC-2.3 Disable	A -2.3 lisable	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   DISABLE ACCOUNTS	AUTOMATICALLY		псетте	111
/ 1		ACCESS	7.0.2	Management	<b>\</b>	Examples of system	References:	2(3), AC-2(4), AC-	A.9.2.2,	, AC-5,			/10	- /			Accounts	A counts	Automatically disable accounts when the accounts:	DISABLE; INACTIVE	Б.	1115	
33.3	222	CONTROL		management.			[PRIVACT], [OMB A-		A.9.2.3,	C-6, AC-							710001112	,	(a) Have expired;	ACCOUNTS	Deta	il IDs	
						include individual,	130], [SP 800-57-1],		A.9.2.5,	17, AC-18,								1	(b) Are no longer associated to a user;				
					allowed for use	shared, group,			A.9.2.6	AC-20, AC-									(c) Are in violation of organizational policy;		with	Out	
NIST 80	- AC 800	- AC-	AC-2	AC-2 Account	Control:	Discussion:		AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC-	A.9.2.1,	A.9.2, AC-		0	AC	-2 A	C-2	AC-2	AC-2.4 Automated	C-2.4 At tomated	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   AUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONS	AUTOMATED AUDIT;	VVICII	out	
53 r5	53-R5	ACCESS		Management	a. Define and	Examples of system	References:	2(3), AC-2(4), AC-	A.9.2.2,	3, AC-5,							Audit Actions	udit Act ons	Automatically audit account creation, modification,	ACCOUNT CREATION;			
		CONTROL			document the types	account types	[PRIVACT], [OMB A-	2(5), AC-2(6), AC-	A.9.2.3,	AC-6, AC-								<b>\                                    </b>	enabling, disabling, and removal actions, and notify	ACCOUNT	mea	ningful	
					of system accounts	include individual,	130], [SP 800-57-1],	2(7), AC-2(8), AC-	A.9.2.5,	17, AC-18,								<b>\</b>	[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].	MODIFICATION;		O	
					allowed for use	shared, group,	[SP 800-57-2], [SP		A.9.2.6	AC-20, AC-									Supplemental Guidance: None.	ACCOUNT ENABLING;	idon	tifiers	
	- AC 800		AC-2	AC-2 Account	Control:	Discussion:		AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC-		.9.2, AC-		0	AC	-2 A	C-2	AC-2	AC-2.5 Inactivity	AC 2.5 In activity	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   INACTIVITY LOGOUT	INACTIVITY; LOGOUT	lucii	tille13	
53 r5	53-R5	ACCESS		Management	a. Define and	Examples of system		2(3), AC-2(4), AC-	A.9.2.2,	AC-5,							Logout	Log put	Require that users log out when [Assignment:		Δ.1.1	l	
<b>\</b>		CONTROL			document the types	**	[PRIVACT], [OMB A-		A.9.2.3,	AC-6, AC-								\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	organization-defined time-period of expected inactivity		Attri	butes	
NI.					of system accounts				4.9.2.5,	17 AC-18,								V	or description of when to log out].				
NICT OF	- AC 800	40	AC-2	AC-2 Account	allowed for use Control:	shared, group, Discussion:	[SP 800-57-2], [SP	2(9), AC-2(11), AC-	A.9.2.1	AC 20, AC- A.9.2. AC-		0	AC	2 4	C-2	AC-2	AC-2.6 Dynamic	AC-2 6 lynamic	Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement is ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   DYNAMIC PRIVILEGE	DYNAMIC PRIVILEGE	adda	ed unde	r
VIST 80		ACCESS	AC-2	Management	a. Defice and	Examples of system	Pafaranca:	AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC- 2(3), AC-2(4), AC-	1.9.2.1,	A.912, AC-		0	AC	-2 A	IC-2	AC-2	Privilege	Privilege	MANAGEMENT   DYNAMIC PRIVILEGE	MANAGEMENT:	auut	.u unuc	. 1
3,13	33-N3	CONTROL		Wallagement	document the types		[PRIVACT], [OMB A-	-(-1)(-1)	A.9.2.3,	ACE C								M: nagem nt	Implement the following dynamic privilege management	,		C: L:	
		CONTROL				include individual,	120], [97-200-57-1]	2(7), AC-2(8), AC-	A.9.2.5,	17. AC 8.							ivianagement	Widnagement	capabilities: [Assignment: organization-defined list of	CONTROL; RESILIENCY;	certi	fication	1
				is Par	all twill for use	Vieter I, group,		2(5), AC-2 (11), AC-	A.9.2.6	AC-20, A								/	dynamic privilege management capabilities].	RESILIENCE			
NIST 80	- AC 800	AC-	AC-2	AC-2 Account	Control:	Discussion:	[B) 53. 57 E), (8)	AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC-		A.9.2. AC-		0	AC	-2 A	C-2	AC-2	AC-2.7 Privileged	AC-2.7 Privilege	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   ROLE-BASED SCHEMES	PRIVILEGED USER	conc	litions,	\/
53 65	53-R5	ACCESS		Macagement		Examples of system	References:		A.9.2.2.	3. AC-5.							- /	User Accounts	Establish and administer privileged user accounts in	ACCOUNTS:	COITE	11110113,	٧.
		CONTROL		, and the second	document the your	accountt (es	[PRIVACT], [OMB A-	2(5), AC-2(6), AC-	A.9.2.3,	AC-6, A2									ccordance with a role-based access scheme that	PRIVILEGED ROLE			
					of system accounts	include individual,	130], [SP 800-57-1],	2(7), AC-2(8), AC-	A.9.2.5,	17, AC-18,									organizes allowed system access and privileges into	ASSIGNMENTS; ROLE	core	control	1
					allowed for use	shared, group,	[SP 800-57-2], [SP	2(9), AC-2(11), AC-	A.9.2.6	AC-20, AC-									roles,	BASED ACCESS			
NIST 80	- AC 800	- AC -	AC-2	AC-2 Account	Control:	Discussion:		AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC-	A.9.2.1,	A.9.2, AC-		0	AC	-2 A	C-2	AC-2	AC-2.8 Dynamic	AC-2.8 Dynamic	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT   DYNAMIC ACCOUNT	DYNAMIC ACCOUNT	ctate	ement	
53 r5	53-R5	ACCESS		Management	a. Define and	Examples of system	References:	2(3), AC-2(4), AC-	A.9.2.2,	3, AC-5,							Account	Account	MANAGEMENT	CREATION; TRUST	State	THEIL	
		CONTROL			document the types	account types		2(5), AC-2(6), AC-	A 3.2.3,	AC-6, AC-							Management	Management	Create, activate, nanage, and deactivate [Assignment:	RELATIONSHIPS;			
					of system accounts	include individual,	130], [SP 800-57-1],	2(7), AC-2(8), AC-	A.9.2.5,	17, AC-18,							1		organization-defined system accounts] dynamically.	RESILIENCY;			
					allowed for use	shared, group,	[SP 800-57-2], [SP		A.9.2.6	AC-20, AC-									Supplemental Guidance: Approaches for dynamically	RESILIENCE			
Luctor	****	1.0	***		la			10.0(4) 10.0(5) 10				^					****	****	ACCOUNT AT A LANGE SERVER I DECEMBER TO STORE OF LANGE OF	CHARGO ACCOUNT			











Providing control-related information in machine-readable formats.

NIST, in collaboration with industry, is developing the Open Security Controls Assessment Language (OSCAL). OSCAL is a set of formats expressed in XML, JSON, and YAML. These formats provide machine-readable representations of control catalogs, control baselines, system security plans, and assessment plans and results.

Layers and Models Reference (nist.gov)

Concepts Used in OSCAL (nist.gov)







# **Attribute Changes Manual & Automation Resources**



#### Tailoring Criteria for NIST 171 Depend Upon 800-53

- (171r2) security controls are taken from NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4. These tables will be updated upon publication of [SP 800-53B] which will provide an update to the moderate security control baseline consistent with NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5. Changes to the moderate baseline will affect future updates to the basic and derived security requirements
- The same tailoring criteria were applied to the security requirements in [FIPS 200] resulting in the CUI basic security requirements
- There is a close relationship between the security objectives of confidentiality and integrity. Therefore, the security controls in the [SP 800-53] moderate baseline that support protection against unauthorized disclosure also support protection against unauthorized modification.
- 39 The security controls tailored out of the moderate baseline (i.e., controls specifically marked as either NCO or NFO and highlighted in the darker blue shading in Tables E-1 through E-17), are often included as part of an organization's comprehensive security program.

#### FedRAMP OSCAL Resources and Templates

FedRAMP has published resources to aid stakeholders and vendors in the digitization of FedRAMP authorization package content. Located on the <u>FedRAMP Automation</u> <u>GitHub Repository</u>, these include:

- New Guide to OSCAL-based FedRAMP <u>Content</u>. Guidance and concepts common to all FedRAMP deliverables when using OSCAL.
- Revised Guide to OSCAL-based FedRAMP System Security Plans (SSP).
- New Guide to OSCAL-based FedRAMP Security Assessment Plans (SAP).
- New Guide to OSCAL-based FedRAMP Security Assessment Reports (SAR).
- New Guide to OSCAL-based FedRAMP Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M).
- Revised Updated FedRAMP OSCAL Registry.
   Revised OSCAL-based FedRAMP SSP Templates/Samples.
   FedRAMP SSP Template in both XML and JSON formats.
- New OSCAL-based FedRAMP <u>Templates/Samples</u>.
   There are now three additional templates/samples covering the SAP, SAR, and POA&M. These exist in both XML and JSON formats.
- Revised FedRAMP <u>Baselines</u>. (XML and JSON formats)
   The baselines now include a "CORE" property, enabling tools to identify the FedRAMP core controls; as well as the assessment objectives and methods (Examine, Interview, Test) found in a blank test case workbook (TCW).
- New Experimental Resources.
   FedRAMP is offering additional support files to aid tool developers. These provide content in XML and JSON that is relevant to FedRAMP authorization packages yet does not fit in the official OSCAL syntax.







# Mapping Guidance for ISO/IEC 27001:2013 does not consider additional content for ISO/IEC 27017 Cloud, 27701 Privacy, 27018 Processing



- IT NEEDS TO

Table 1 provides a mapping from the security controls in NIST Special Publication 800-53 to the security controls in ISO/IEC 27001. Please review the introductory text above before employing the mappings in

#### TABLE 1: MAPPING NIST SP 800-53 TO ISO/IEC 27001

	NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS	ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS  Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.
AC-1	Access Control Policy and Procedures	5.2, 5.3, 7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.3, A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.9.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
AC-2	Account Management	A 9.2.1, A 9.2.2, A 9.2.3, A 9.2.5, A 9.2.6
AC-3	Access Enforcement	A6.2.2, A9.1.2, A9.4.1, A9.4.4, A9.4.5, A13.1.1, A14.1.2, A14.1.3, A18.1.3
AC-4	Information Flow Enforcement	A 13.1.3, A 13.2.1, A 14.1.2, A 14.1.3
AC-5	Separation of Duties	A.6.1.2
AC-6	Least Privilege	A 9.1.2, A 9.2.3, A 9.4.4, A 9.4.5
AC-7	Unsuccessful Logon Attempts	A.9.4.2
AC-B	System Use Notification	A.9.4.2
AC-9	Previous Logon Notification	A.9.4.2
AC-10	Concurrent Session Control	None
AC-11	Device Lack	A11.2.8, A.11.2.9
AC-12	Session Termination	None
AC-13	Withdrawn	_
AC-14	Permitted Actions without Identification or Authentication	None
AC-15	Withdrawn	
AC-16	Security and Privacy Attributes	None
AC-17	Remote Access	A621.A622.A13.11.A1321.A14.12
AC-18	Wireless Access	A621, A13.1.1, A13.2.1
AC-19	Access Control for Mobile Devices	A 6 2 1, A 11 15, A 11 2 6, A 13 2 1
AC-20	Use of External Systems	A 11.2.6, A 13.1.1, A 13.2.1
AC-21	Information Sharing	None
AC-22	Publicly Accessible Content	None
AC-23	Data Mining Protection	None
AC-24	Access Control Decisions	A9.41*
AC-25	Reference Monitor	None
AT-1	Awareness and Training Policy and Procedures	5.2, 5.3, 7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.3, A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
AT-2	Literacy Training and Awareness	7.3, A.7.2.2, A.12.2.1
AT-3	Role-Based Training	A7.2.2*
AT-4	Training Records	None
AT-5	Withdrawn	-
AT-6	Training Feedback	None
AU-1	Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures	52, 53, 7.51, 7.52, 7.53, A.5.11, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1, A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2
AU-2	Event Logging	None
AU-3	Content of Audit Records	A12.4.1*
AU-4	Audit Log Storage Capacity	A12.1.3
AU-5	Response to Audit Logging Process Failures	None
AU-6	Audit Record Review, Analysis, and Reporting	A12.4.1, A16.1.2, A16.1.4
AU-7	Audit Record Reduction and Report Generation	None
AU-8	Time Stamps	A12.4.4

	NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS	ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS  Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.				NIST SP 800-53 CONTROLS	ISO/IEC 27001 CONTROLS  Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the ISO/IEC control does not fully satisfy the intent of the NIST control.	
AU-9	Protection of Audit Information	A.12.4.2, A.12.4.3, A.18.1.3		ISO/IEC 27001 C	PE-9	Power Equipment and Cabling	A11.14, A11.21, A11.22, A11.23	
AU-10	Non-repudiation	None	ROLS	Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that i	PE-10	Emergency Shutoff	A11.2.2*	
AU-11	Audit Record Retention	AZAZAZA	700	not by satisfy the intent of the	PE-11	Emergenc Porer	1 122	
AU-12	Audi Record Coneration	A.1. 1, A 2.4.3	tion Organizations	192	PE 12	Ehergend Light	11.2.2*	
AU-13	Montoring for information Discosure	Nane		JI USI	PE 13	Eire Prote line	A114 A1121	
AU-14	Session Audit	A.12.4.1*	hentication	None	PE-14	5 vironmental Controls	A11.14, A11.21, A11.22	
AU-15	Withdrawn	_		A9.2.1	PE-15	Water Damage Protection	A11.14.A11.21.A11.22	
AU-16	Cross-Organizational Audit Logging	None		A9.21, A9.24, A9.31, A9.43	PE-16	Delivery and Removal	A8.23, A11.1.6, A11.2.5	
CA-1	A lessmen an Authoritation Policies and	5 (5. 7.5.1 7.5.2, 7.5. A.5.1.1, 7.5.1.2, A.6.1 (A.1.1.1.)		7 9.4.2	PE-17_	Alterna e Wirk Site	A622,A1126,A1321	
	Pocedury	A18.1. A.182.2	tication	J18 S	E-1	Locati Syst in Component	9.23 41 44 41 2.1	
CA-2	Control assess entr	A 14.2 , A 18 L2, A 18.2	ion Von-	A9 1	1119	Information League	A 1 A 12	
CA-3	Information Exchange	A.13.1.2, A.13.2.1, A.13.2.2	<b></b> .		E-21	Asset Monitoring and Tracking	A823*	
CA-4	Withdrawn		hentication	None	PE-21	Electromagnetic Pulse Protection	None	
CA-5	Plan of Action and Milestones	8.3, 9.2, 10.1*	uthentication	None	PE-22	Component Marking	A8.2.2	
CA-6	Author ation	9.3*		None	PE-23	Facility Location	A11.14, A11.2.1	
CA-7	Contin ou Montor of	9.1, 9.2, A.18.2.2, A.18.2.3*		None	PL-1	Planning Policy and Procedures	52, 53, 7.51, 7.52, 7.53, A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1	
CA-8	Paget dir Tarine	None	Procedures	5.2, 5.3, 7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.3, A.5.1.1, A		This mig to day and thousands	A 18.1.1, A 18.2.2	
CA-9	Internal System Connections	None		A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2	PL-2	System Security and Privacy Plans	7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.3, 10.1, A.14.1.1	
CM-1	Configuration Management Policy and Procedures	5.2, 5.3, 7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.3, A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1,		A7.2.2*	PL-3	Withdrawn	_	
CIM-T	Configuration Management Policy and Procedures	A18.1. A18.2.2		None	PL-4	Rules of Behavior	A7.12, A7.21, A8.13	
CM-2	Baseline Configuration	Inc C 2701	1 20	5.1.4 C10.1.5, A.16 / 5	11-5	Tiedray O O		
CM-3	Configuration Charge Convol	A 112 A 1422 A 122 A 12	• /	N ne	01.6		rcinid	
CM-4	Impact Analyses	5.1, R. 1.12, R.14.22, 9.44.23, 9.44.24		4 6.1.3, A 162	PL-7	Corner t paragra	81 4441	
CM-5		A.9.2.3, A.9.4.5, A.12.1.2, A.12.1.4, A.12.5.1		None	PL-8	Security and Privacy Architecturer	A1411*	
	Access Restrictions for Change			7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.3, A.16.1.1	PL-9	Central Management	None	
CM-6	Configuration Settings	None	-	None	PL-10	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	None	
CM-7	Least Functionality	A.12.5.1*		-		Baseline Selection		
CM-8	System Componer vers	~:\~:\~	nd Procedures	5.2, 5.3, 7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.3, A.5.1.1, A	PL-11 PM-1	Baseline Tailoring Information Security Program Plan	None 4.1.4.2.4.3.4.4.5.2.5.3.6.1.1.6.2.7.4.7.5.1.7.5.2.7.5.3.8	
CM-9	Configuration Management an	A.6		A 18.1.1, A 18.2.2	PIVI-1	Information Security Program Plan	93, 102, A511, A512, A611, A1811, A1822	
CM-10	Software Usage Confiction			A.11.2.4*, A.11.2.5*	PM-2	Information Security Program Leadership Role	51,53,A611	
CM-11	User-Installed Software	A.12.5.1, A.12.6.2		None	PM-3	Information Security Frogram Ceadership Rose	5.1, 6.2, 7.1	
CM-12	Information Location	None		None	PM-4	Plan of Action and Milestones Process	6.1.1, 6.2, 7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.3, 8.3, 9.2, 9.3, 10.1	
CM-13	Data Action Mapping		20	M: 0 C	T WITE	Control le control	None	
CM-14	Signed Components	tone	• //	A 1.2.	7.7	TILCOL	5.3, 6.1.1, 6.2, 9.1,	
CP-1	Contingency Planning Police and Procedure.	5.2, 5.1, 7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.1.3, A.5.1.4, A.5.1.2, A.6.11, A.1.1.1,		tone	DA.A	The state of the s	None	
	100/1	3.1.3.2.2	rocedures	5.2, 5.3, 7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.3, A.5.1.1, 7	PM-8	Critical Infrastructure Plan	None	
CP-2	Contingency Plan	7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.3, A.6.1.1, A.17.1.1, A.17.2.1		A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2	PM-9		43, 44, 6.1.1, 6.1.2, 6.2, 7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.3, 9.3, 10.2	
CP-3	Contingency Training	A.7.2.2*		A8.23, A8.3.1, A.11.2.9	PM-10	Risk Management Strategy		
CP-4	Contingency Plan Testin		00	M22 C	PM-10	Authorization Process	93, A 6.1.1*	
CP-5	Withdrawn			A .23, 483 , A114	7.2	Mission and Business Process Definition		
CP-6	Alternate Storage Site	A.11.1 . A.17.1.2, A.17.2.1		4 8.2.3, A.8.7.1, A.8.5.1, R.11.2.5, A	W-	Iside III eat Program	Non-	
CP-7	Alternate Processing Site	A11.14, A17.12, A17.2.1	.20	A.S.2.3, A.S.3.1, A.S.3.2, A.11.2.7	PM-13	covity and Briston Workfords	7.7.2.2*	
CP-8	Telecommunications Services	A.11.2.2, A.17.1.2		A8.23, A8.3.1	PM-14	Testing, Training, and Monitoring		
CP-9	System Backup	A12.3.1, A17.1.2, A18.1.3		None	PM-15	Security and Privacy Groups and Associations	7.4, A.6.1.4	
CP-10	System Recovery and Reconstitution	A.17.1.2	rotection Policy and	5.2, 5.3, 7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.3, A.5.1.1, F	PM-16	Threat Awareness Program	None	
CP-11	Alternate Communications Protocols	A.17.1.2*		A.18.1.1, A.18.2.2	PM-17	Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information on	None	
CP-12	Safe Mode	None	5	A11.1.2*		External Systems		
CP-12	Alternative Security Mechanisms	A.17.1.2*		A 11.1.1, A 11.1.2, A 11.1.3	PM-18	Privacy Program Plan	None	
IA-1	Identification and Authentication Policy and	5.2, 5.3, 7.5.1, 7.5.2, 7.5.3, A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2, A.6.1.1, A.12.1.1,	on Medium	A11.1.2, A11.2.3	PM-19	Privacy Program Leadership Role	None	
IA-T	Procedures	A18.1.1 A18.2.2	vices	A11.1.2, A11.1.3	PM-20	Dissemination of Privacy Program Information	None	
	11000000	Principles of Principles		None				





# Misunderstood Content – due to lack of a control library and lack of subject matter experience by domain and assessment.










# NIST 171 r2 and NIST 172 use NIST 800-53 Rev5 as Parent/Family EnterpriseGRC Solutions, Inc.







### NIST SP800 171r2 and 172 add Protection Strategy and Mapped Meta Data



Test_ID ∨	Control ID ∨	Edition or Sou ∨	Mapping $\vee$	Risk Drivers ✓	PROTECTION STRATEGY V	Detail Control Description (UCF) $\vee$	Mapped testing or practices $\vee$	Mapped testi ∨	Mapped Processes ∨	Mapped Processes:Control Objective ~	Mapped testing or practices:Problem Metadata ~
N171_3.1.1 Limit information	N171_3.1	NIST 800-171 r2	NIST800-53	Add AC-2(1);AC-2(2);AC		Basic Security Requirements Limit system access to authorized	A.6.2.1; A.6.2.2; A.9.1.2; A.9.2.1; A.9.2.2; A	A.6.2.1 Mobile device	A.6.2; A.9.1; A.9.2; A.9.4; A.1	A.6.2 Mobile devices and teleworking; A.9.1 Busin	AUTOMATIC NOTIFICATION: AUTOR ACCOUNT USAGE; TELEPHONE NOTIFICATION; EMAIL A
N172_3.1.1e Employ dual aut	N171_3.1	NIST 800-172	NIST800-53	Add A.6.1;CA-6 A.6.1.1;	Cyber Resiliency Survivability (CRS)	Employ dual authorization to execute critical or sensitive syste	A.6.1.1; AC-3(2); AU-9(5); CA-6(2); CM-5(	A.6.1.1 Information s	A.6.1; CA-6; CM-5; CP-9; M	A.6.1 Internal organization; CA-6 Authorization; C	DUAL AUTHORIZATION; PRIVILEGED COMMANDS; TWO-PERSON CONTROL; RESILIENCY; RESIL
N172_3.1.2e Restrict access to	N171_3.1	NIST 800-172	NIST800-53	Add A.9.2.1	Penetration Resistant Architecture (PRA)	Restrict access to systems and system components to only thos	AC-20(3); A.9.2.1	AC-20.3 Non-organiz	AC-20; A.9.2	AC-20 Use of External Systems; A.9.2 User access	BYOD; EXTERNALLY OWNED; RESTRICTIONS; FOXENSIC ANALYSIS; BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE
N171_3.1.2 Limit information	N171_3.1	NIST 800-171 r2	NIST800-53	FIX THIS - "users" is cri		Limit system access to the types of transactions and functions t	A.9.4.1; A.14.1.2; AC-3(3); AC-3(4); AC-3(7	A.9.4.1 Information a	A.9.4; A.14.1; AC-3; AC-17	A.9.4 System and application access control; A.14	MANDATORY ACCE S CONTROL 1AC; M. NDATORY ACCESS CONTROL POLICY; LEAST PRIVILE
N171_3.1.3 Control the flow o	N171_3.1	NIST 800-171 r2	NIST800-53	Add AC-4(10)		Derived Security Requirements Control the flow of CUI in accor	A.13.1.3; A.13.2.1; A.14.1.2; A.14.1.3; AC-4	A.13.1.3 Segregation	AC-4; A.13.1; A.13.2; A.14.1	AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement; A.13.1 Netw	DISABLE SECURITY OLICY FILTERS; ENAB E SECURITY POLICY FILTERS
N172_3.1.3e Employ organiza	N171_3.1	NIST 800-172	NIST800-53	Add A.13.2.1	Penetration Resistant Architecture (PRA)	Employ [Assignment: organization-defined secure information	AC-4(1); AC-4(6); AC-4(8); AC-4(13); AC-4	AC-4.1 Object Securit	AC-4; A.13.2	AC-4 Information Flow Enforcement; A.13.2 Infor	SECURITY ATTRIBUTES; INFOPMATION FLI W ENFORCEMENT; METADATA; SECURITY POLICY FI
N171_3.1.4 Separate the dutie	N171_3.1	NIST 800-171 r2	NIST800-53	Add SA-17(7)		Separate the duties of individuals to reduce the risk of malevol	A.6.1.2; SA-17(7)	A.6.1.2 Segregation o	AC-5; A.6.1; SA-17	AC-5 Separation of Duties; A.6.1 Internal organiz	LEAST PRIVILEGE; R SILIENCY ASSILLENCE
N171_3.1.5 Employ the princi	N171_3.1	NIST 800-171 r2	NIST800-53	Add A.9.1.2;A.9.2.3;A.9.4	$A \rightarrow$	Employ the principle of least privilege, including for specific sec	A.9.1.2; A.9.2.3; A.9.4.4; A.9.4.5; AC-6(1);	A.9.1.2 Access to net	AC-6; A.9.1; A.9.2; A.9.4	AC-6 Least Privilege; A.9.1 Business requirements	EXPLICIT AUTHORIZATION; REASSIONS PRIVILEGES; INTRUSION DETECTION PARAMETERS;
N171_3.1.6 Use non-privilege	N171_3.1	NIST 800-171 r2	NIST800-53	Add A.9.2.3	क	Use non-privileged accounts or roles when accessing nonsecuri	AC-6(2); A.9.2.3	AC-6.2 Non-privilege	AC-6; A.9.2	AC-6 Least Privilege; A.9.2 User access managem	ROLE-BASED ACCES: CONTRO - PBAC; PF VILEGED ACCOUNTS; NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS
N171_3.1.7 Prevent non-privil	N171_3.1	NIST 800-171 r2	NIST800-53	Add CM-7(2)	DO T	Prevent non-privileged users from executing privileged functio	AC-6(9); AC-6(10); CM-7(2)	AC-6.9 Log Use of Pri	AC-6; A.9.2; CM-7	AC-6 Least Privilege; A.9.2 User access managem	AUDITING PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS; NON PRIVILEGED USERS; PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS; SECU
N171_3.1.8 Limit unsuccessful	N171_3.1	NIST 800-171 r2	NIST800-53	Add AC-9; // 3.4.2, AC-7(2		Limit unsuccessful logon attempts. DISCUSSION This requirem	A.9.4.2; AC-7(2); AC-7(3); AC-7(4); AC-9(1	A.9.4.2 Secure log-on	AC-7; A.9.4; AC-9	AC-7 Unsuccessful Logon Attempts; A.9.4 System	MOBILE DEVICE; WI ING; PUR GIN ); UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON; BIOMETRIC; LOGON ATTEMPT L
N171_3 .9 Provide privacy an	N171_3.1	NIST 800-171 r2	NIST800-53	Add PT-4(1);PT-4(2);PT-4	其	Provide privacy and security notices consistent with applicable	A.9.4.2; PT-4(1); PT-4(2); PT-4(3); PT-5(1);	A.9.4.2 Secure log-on	AC-8; A.9.4; PT-4; PT-5	AC-8 System Use Notification; A.9.4 System and a	Tailored Consent; Jult-in-time Consent; Reliocation Revoke Consent; Just-in-time Notice; Priva
N171_1.1.10 Use session lock	N171_3.1	NIST 800-171 r2	NIST800-53		$\triangleleft$	Use session lock with pattern-hiding displays to prevent access	AC-11(1); A.11.2.8; A.11.2.9	AC-11.1 PATTERN-HI	AC-11; A.11.2	AC-11 Device Lock; A.11.2 Equipment	SCREEN CONCEALN ENT; SES! (CN LOCK
N171_3 .1.11 Terminate (auto	N171_3.1	MST 800-171 rs	NIST800-53	NIST (SF   800 F / 2v !		Terminate (automatically) a user session after a defined conditi	AC-12(3); MA-4(7); A.9.4.2	AC-12.3 Timeout War	AC-12; MA-4; A.9.4	AC-12 Session Termination; MA-4 Nonlocal Main	SESSION TERMINATION; RENOTE DISCONNECT VERIFICATION; REMOTE CONNECTION TERM
N171_3 1.12 Mo litor and con	N171_3.1	NIS 1 C 2 C 1 r2	NIST800-53	Add A.1 .4.1	$\frac{1}{2}$	Monitor and control remote access sessions. DISCUSSION Rem	AC-17(1); A.12.4.1	AC-17.1 AUTOMATED	AC-17; A.12.4	AC-17 Remote Access; A.12.4 Logging and monit	AUTOMATED MONI ORING; / UTC MATED CONTROL
N171_3 1.13 Em loy cryptogr	N171_3.1	NIS ' 807 171 r2	NIST800-53	Add A.9 1.2		Employ cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentialit	AC-17(2); A.9.1.2	AC-17.2 PROTECTIO	AC-17; A.9.1	AC-17 Remote Access; A.9.1 Business requiremen	ENCRYPTION; SESSION CONFIDENTIALITY SESSION INTEGRITY; SECURITY CATEGORIZATION
N171_: not le remote ac	N171_3.1	NIS 1 80 1 4771 r2	NIST800-53	Add A.1 1.2; C 'A		Route remote access via managed access control points. DISCU	AC-17(3); A.13.2.1; CA-3(6); SC-7(4)	AC-17.3 MANAGED A	AC-17; A.13.2; CA-3; SC-7	AC-17 Remote Access; A.13.2 Information transfe	ACCESS CONTROL POINTS; TÍ Q 10 3D INTERNET CONNECTIONS; HIGH-VALUE ASSETS; SECON
N171_: 1.15 > 1 norize remot	N171_3.1	NIS 1 800.43 1 r2	NIST800-53	Add A.1 3.2.		Authorize remote execution of privileged commands and remo	AC-17(4); A.13.2.1	AC-17.4 PRIVILEGED	AC-17; A.13.2	AC-17 Remote Access; A.13.2 Information transfer	PRIVILEGED COMM INDS
N171_: 1.15 sut iorize wirele	N171_3.1	NIS 1 80 71 r2	NIST800-53	Add AC 18(1);AC-18(4)		Authorize wireless access prior to allowing such connections. D	A.6.2.1; A.13.1.1; A.13.2.1; AC-18(1); AC-1	A.6.2.1 Mobile device	AC-18; A.6.1; A.13.2	AC-18 Wireless Access; A.6.1 Internal organizatio	WIRELESS AUTHENT CATION (1997) AUTHORIZED USER; CONFIGURING WIRELESS NE
N171_: 1.12 Pro ect wireless	N171_3.1	NIS 1 300-11 1 r2	NIST800-53	Add A.1 1.1		Protect wireless access using authentication and encryption. Dl	AC-18(1); AC-18(5); A.13.1.2	AC-18.1 Authenticati	AC-18; A.13.1	AC-18 Wireless Access; A.13.1 Network security	WIRELESS AUTHENT CATION BE ACRYPTION; WIRELESS TRANSMISSIONS; REDUCE TRANSMISS
N171_3 1.18 Cor trol connecti	N171_3.1	NIS ' 87 d 1) 1 r2	NIST800-53	FIX THI - includes the		Control connection of mobile devices. DISCUSSION A mobile d	A.6.2.1; AC-7(2); AC-19(4); AC-19(5); CM	A.6.2.1 Mobile device	A.6.2; AC-7; SC-18; SC-28;	A.6.2 Mobile devices and teleworking; AC-7 Unsu	MOBILE DEVICE; WILLING; PURGING; UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON; UNCLASSIFIED MOBILE DEVICE:
N171_1.1.19 Enc ypt CUI on	N171_3.1	NIS ' 800-1/1 r2	NIST800-53	Q		Encrypt CUI on mobile devices and mobile computing platform	AC-19(5)	AC-19.5 Full Device o	AC-19	AC-19 Access Control for Mobile Devices	FULL-DEVICE ENCRYPTION; CONTAINER-BASED ENCRYPTION
N171_: 1.20 Ver fy and contr	N171_3.1	NIS ' 800 - 1 r2	NIST800-53			Verify and control/limit connections to and use of external syst	A.11.2.6; A.13.1.1; A.13.2.1; AC-20(1)	A.11.2.6 Security of e	AC-20; A.11.2; A.13.1; A.13.2	AC-20 Use of External Systems; A.11.2 Equipment	CONNECTION AGREEMENT; PROCESSING AGREEMENT; LIMITS; SECURITY ASSESSMENT; EXTE
N171_3 1.21 Lim t use of orga	N171_3.1	NIS CXTY 12	NIST800-53	This isn' addressed ir IS		Limit use of portable storage devices on external systems. DISC	A.12.3.1; AC-20(2); AC-20(5)	A.12.3.1 Information	AC-20	AC-20 Use of External Systems	PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES, RESTRICT; PROHIBIT; Portable Storage Devices — Prohibited Us
N171_3.1.22 Cor trol informat	N171_3.1	NIS ' 800-171 r2	NIST800-53	Add PL- I(1); PM-20(1		Control CUI posted or processed on publicly accessible system	PL-4(1); PM-20(1)	PL-4.1 Social Media a	AC-22; PL-4; PM-20	AC-22 Publiciy A TO CONTINUE FOR THE CON	SCH TO NEED A RESTRICTIONS; PUBLIC WEBSITE; Dissemination of Privacy Program
N171_3.2.1 Ensure that mana	N171_3.2	NIST 800-171 r2	NIST800-53	Add A.7.2.2; A.12.2.1; AT		AWARENESS AND TRAINING Basic Security Requirements Ensu	A.7.2.2; A.12.2.1; AT-2(1); AT-2(2); AT-2(3)	A.7.2.2 Information s	AT-2; A.7.2; A.12.2		PHISHING; MALICIOUS LINKS; PRACTICAL EXERCISES; PRIVACY; INSIDER THREAT; INDICATORS





# CSF Tools Depends upon Framework Updates

FRAMEWORKS AND CONTROLS

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

CSF Version 1.1 [Summary]

NIST Special Publication 800-53

NIST SP 800-53, Revision

4 [Summary]

NIST SP 800-53, Revision

5 [Summary]

**CSA Cloud Controls Matrix** 

**Cloud Controls Matrix** 

v3.0.1 [Summary] (Update to CCM

4 in process)

**CIS Critical Security Controls** 

**Critical Security Controls** 

v7.1 [Summary] (Update to CSC 8.1


in process)


STRIDE-LM Threat Model





#### Welcome to CSF Tools





#### FRAMEWORKS AND CONTROLS

- · NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- CSF Version 1.1 [Summary]
- NIST Special Publication 800-53
- NIST SP 800-53, Revision 4 [Summary]
- NIST SP 800-53, Revision 5 [Summary]
- · CSA Cloud Controls Matrix
- Cloud Controls Matrix v3.0.1 [Summary]
- · CIS Critical Security Controls
- Critical Security Controls v7.1 [Summary]
- · STRIDE-LM Threat Model





# **NIST Cyber** Security Framework CSF

**Control Enhancements** 

#### RA-5(2): Update Vulnerabilities to Be Scanned

BASELINE(S): Low Moderate High

Update the system vulnerabilities to be scanned [Assignment (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency], prior to a new scan, when new vulnerabilities are identified and reported].

#### RA-5(3): Breadth and Depth of Coverage

**BASELINE(S):** (Not part of any baseline)

Define the breadth and depth of vulnerability scanning coverage.

#### RA-5(4): Discoverable Information

BASELINE(S): High

Determine information about the system that is discoverable and take [Assignment: organization-defined corrective actions].

#### RA-5(5): Privileged Access

BASELINE(S): Moderate High

Implement privileged access authorization to [Assignment: organizationdefined system components] for [Assignment: organization-defined vulnerability scanning activities].

#### RA-5(6): Automated Trend Analyses

BASELINE(S): (Not part of any baseline)

Compare the results of multiple vulnerability scans using [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms].

#### RA-5(8): Review Historic Audit Logs

BASELINE(S): (Not part of any baseline)

Review historic audit logs to determine if a vulnerability identified in a [Assignment: organization-defined system] has been previously exploited within an [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

#### RA-5(10): Correlate Scanning Information

BASELINE(S): (Not part of any baseline)

Correlate the output from vulnerability scanning tools to determine the presence of multi-vulnerability and multi-hop attack vectors.

#### RA-5(11): Public Disclosure Program

BASELINE(S): Low Moderate High

Establish a public reporting channel for receiving reports of vulnerabilities in organizational systems and system components.

#### Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning – CSF Tools

EnterpriseGRC Solutions, Inc.

NIST Special Publication 800-53 > NIST SP 800-53, Revision 5 > RA: Risk Assessment

#### RA-5: Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning

Control Family: Risk Assessment

CSF Relationships: ID.RA-1: Asset vulnerabilities are identified and documented

PR.IP-12: A vulnerability management plan is developed and implemented

DE.AE-2: Detected events are analyzed to understand attack targets...

DE.CM-8: Vulnerability scans are performed

DE.DP-4: Event detection information is communicated DE.DP-5: Detection processes are continuously improved RS.AN-1: Notifications from detection systems are investigated

RS.MI-3: Newly identified vulnerabilities are mitigated or documented...

**Baselines:** Low RA-5(2)(11)

> Moderate RA-5 (2) (5) (11) High RA-5(2)(4)(5)(11)

Privacy N/A

Previous Version: NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 (RA-5)



Incorporates the following control from the previous version: RA-5 (1): Update Tool

Capability.

#### Control

- a. Monitor and scan for vulnerabilities in the system and hosted applications [Assignment: organization-defined frequency and/or randomly in accordance with organization-defined process] and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system are identified and reported;
- b. Employ vulnerability monitoring tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for:



Search



#### FRAMEWORKS AND CONTROLS

- · NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- CSF Version 1.1 [Summary]
- NIST Special Publication 800-53
- NIST SP 800-53, Revision 4 [Summary]
- NIST SP 800-53, Revision 5 [Summary]
- AC: Access Control
- AT: Awareness and Training
- AU: Audit and Accountability
- CA: Assessment, Authorization, and Monitoring
- CM: Configuration Management
- · CP: Contingency Planning
- IA: Identification and Authentication
- IR: Incident Response










# Spoofing Tampering

### NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5

This page contains an overview of the controls provided by NIST to protect organization personnel and assets. NIST includes baselines for various security levels. The "Low" security level is applicable to all assets.

Ther controls													
Name c	ontains:		□ Include control lanuage in search										
Family:	(any) V	Baseline: (any) 🗸	Threat:	(any) ∨		APPLY	CLEAR						
ID	N	Varne	Low	Moderate	High	Privacy	Threats						
AC-1	Policy and Procedures						STRIDE-LM						
AC-2	Account Management						STRIDE-LM						
(1)	Automated System Accour	nt Management					STRIDE-LM						
	Automated Temporary and Management	d Emergency Account					STRIDE-LM						
(3)	Disable Accounts						STRIDE-LM						
(4)	Automated Audit Actions						STRIDE-LM						
(5)	Inactivity Logout						STRIDE-LM						
(6)	Dynamic Privilege Manage	ement					STRIDE-LM						
(7)	Privileged User Accounts						STRIDE-LM						
(8)	Dyna Count Manage	ment					STRIDE-LM						
(9)	Re Use of Sha	red and Gro	1				RIDE-LM						
(11)	E S						RID <b>E</b> -LM						
(12)	ng for At	ypical U					DE-LM						
(13)	for High	-risk Indi					IDE-LM						
Re	pudiation	Information Disclosure		Denial of ervice		Elevat of privle							





#### FRAMEWORKS AND CONTROLS

- · NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- CSF Version 1.1 [Summary]
- NIST Special Publication 800-53
- NIST SP 800-53, Revision 4 [Summary]
- NIST SP 800-53, Revision 5 [Summary]
- · CSA Cloud Controls Matrix
- · Cloud Controls Matrix v3.0.1 [Summary]
- · CIS Critical Security Controls
  - Critical Security Controls v7.1 [Summary]
- STRIDE-LM Threat Model







Filter Centrale

# What's so hard about mapping?








# How to map

EnterpriseGRC Solutions, Inc.

- Have a workplan
- Identify what sources and domains should map line up the full schema
- Iterate
- Finalize
- Negative Map (what should have but didn't)
- Map the Missing
- QA
- Communicate back to content owners







# For Each Control Statement gather keywords, concepts and suitable common domains



- Search for list of testable items based on keywords and common terms, including global spelling. Consider more than "does it" by asking if the implied understanding of the control is that it "should".
- Prepare a list of probable matches likely 1-2% of total population.
- Consider overuse and reduce the number of times we use same items
- Consider that the client may use multiple controls to accomplish a same objective. This exercise may result in client customization to their written policies and program objectives.










# Mapping Plan -> Records need sufficient legal rights to put into a searchable system.









# Encryption – Let's discuss – Transition to CCM 4.2 ASAP




					F Lis	t			Robin Basham (robin@enterprisegro	c.com) is signed i
Edition or	Main ID				r po	CSA Test language - pre adoption/ CSA edits		Unified Testing Map:Test_ID		
Source 🔻	7	Client ID T	Control Objective	Control Objective Description	-	open	Unified Testing Map	(to review the details of each mapped item see the	ne All Mapping Tab)	viified Universe
CCIVI V4.U	el	CEK-01 Encryption and	Encryption and Key Management Policy and	Establish, document, apprové,	П	CCM_CEK-1.1 A re cryptography ,	A.10.1.1, A.10.1.2, A.13.2.1,	C.5.2 Policy; C.8.3 Information security risk treatment; A.10.1 Crypto	ographic controls; A.13.2 Information	A.13.2; A.18.1;
Cloud	8 8	CEK-01 Encryption and Key Management Policy	Procedures	communicate, apply, evaluate and		encryption and key management	A.13.2.2, A.18.1.3, A.18.1.5,	transfer; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual requireme	nts; ISO27701_6.5 Asset	ISO27701_6.5;
CCIVITV4.0	ن الح	CEK-02 CEK Roles and	and a second	Define and Implement cryptographic,	П	CCM_CEK-2.1 Are cryptography,	A.8.2.1, A.9.2.3, A.10.1.1, A.10.1.2,	A.8.2 Information classification; A.9.2 User access management;	A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.13.1	A.13.1; A.13.2;
Cloud	5 E	CEK-02 CEK Roles and Responsibilities	CEK Roles and Responsibilities	encryption and key management roles		encryption and key management roles	A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.18.1.3,	Network security management; A.13.2 Information transfer; A.18.3	Compliance with legal and	A.18.1; CLD.6.3
CCIVI V4.0	1		Data Farantian	Provide cryptographic protection to data-	П	CCM_CEK-3.1 Are data at-rest and in-	A.6.2.1, A.8.3.1, A.10.1.1, A.10.1.2,	A.6.2 Mobile devices and teleworking; A.8.3 Media handling; A.10	.1 Cryptographic controls; A.13.2	A.13.2; A.14.1;
Cloud	8 8	CEK-03 Data Encryption	Data Encryption	at-rest and in-transit, using		transit cryptographically protected using	A.13.2.1, A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3,	Information transfer; A.14.1 Security requirements of information	systems; A.18.1 Compliance with	A.18.1; AC-19;
CCM1V41.0	ی اج	CEK-04 Encryption	Encryption Algorithm	Use encryption argorithms that are		CCM_CEK-4.1 Are appropriate encryption	A.8.2.1, A.8.3.3, A.10.1.1, A.10.1.2,	A.8.2 Information classification; A.8.3 Media handling; A.10.1 Cryp		A.14.1; A.18.1;
Cloud	8 8	Algorithm	Encryption Algorithm	appropriate for data protection,		algorithms used for data protection,	A.14.1.2, A.14.1.3, A.18.1.3,	requirements of information systems; A.18.1 Compliance with le	gal and contractual requirements; SA	д- SC-12; SC-28;
			Encryption Change Management	Estabilish a standard change f d		CCM_CEK-5.1 Are standard change	A.8.2.1, A.10.1.2, A.12.1.2, A.14.2.2,	A.8.2 Information classification; A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.1		A.14.2; A.18.1;
Covi v4:0	8 8	CEK-05 Encryption Change Management	Encryption change Management	management procedure, to		management procedures established to	A.18.1.3, ISO27701_6.7.1,	responsibilities; A.14.2 Security in development and support pro	esses; A.18.1 Compliance with legal	ISO27701_6.11
Cloud	N A	CFK-06 Encryption Change	Encryption Change Cost Benefit Analysis	ryptography-, encryption-, and key		CCM_CEK-6.1 Are changes to cryptography	A.8.2.1, A.10.1.2, A.12.1.2, A.14.2.2,	C.6.1 Actions to address risks & opportunities; A.6.1 Internal orga	nization; A.10.1 Cryptographic	A.12.1; A.13.2;
CCIVI V4.0		Cost Benefit Analysis	Encryption change cost benefit Analysis	Establish and maintain an encryption	Ш	, encryption- and key management-	A.18.1.3, ISO27701_6.7.1,	controls; A.12.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities; A.1	3.2 Information transfer; A.14.2	A.14.2; HT_09.
	وٰ اٰΣ	CEK-07 Encryption Risk	Encryption Risk Management	and key management risk program that		CCM_CEK-7.1 Is a cryptographic,		A.6.1 Internal organization; A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.18.1 C		ISO27701_6.7;
CCIVITV4T.U	ខ	Management	Encryption wisk management	CSP's must provide the capability for	Ш	encryption and key management risk	ISO27701_6.7.1, ISO27701_6.11.1,	contractual requirements; ISO27701_6.7 Cryptography; CM-3 Config	uration Change Control; SA-9	3; SA-9; SC-8; S
Cloud	لا أ∑	CEK-08 CSC Key Management Capability	CSC Key Management Capability	CSCs to manage their own data		CCM_CEK-8.1 Are CSC's provided the	A.10.1.2, A.15.1.2, A.15.1.3,	A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.15.1 Information security in supp		CLD.6.3; CLD.1
CCIVI V4.0	8 8	Management Capability		Aŭāit encryption and key management	Щ.	capability to manage their own data	CLD.6.3.1, CLD.12.1.5, CA-6(2), CP-	Relationship between cloud service customer and cloud service		CCPA2018-T12-
	ی اج	CEK-09 Encryption and	Encryption and Key Management Audit	systems, policies, and processes with a		CCM_CEK-9.1 Are encryption and key	CCPA12.1.4 1798.140(d), 2.3.0	A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.12.7 Information systems audit co	•	A.18.2; C.9.2;
Ccivi v4:u	8 8	Key Management Audit		Generate Chyptographic keys using	Н_	management systems, policies, and	BMSN, 3.6.5 PCD, 3.6.6 PCD,	security reviews; C.9.2 Internal audit; ISO27701_6.7 Cryptography;		ISO27701_6.7;
	يو اج	CEK-10 Key Generation	Key Generation	industry-accepted cryptographic		CCM_CEK-10.1 Are cryptographic keys		A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and c		10; SC-12; SC-2
Ccrorvi4to	8 8	,		Wanage cryptographic secret and	Н-	being generated using industry		Developer Configuration Management; SC-12 Cryptographic Key E		
Cloud	동' 날	CEK-11 Key Purpose	Key Purpose	private keys that are provisioned for a		CCM_CEK-11.1 Are cryptographic secret	A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.10.1.1, A.10.1.2,	A.9.2 User access management; A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; 10.0	// U / / _	HT_10.03; 3_P( 5; SC-12; CC6.1
Ccrvrv4:u	0 0			Kötäte cryptograpnic keys in accordance	H	and private keys that are provisioned for	. = 0,	Protect Stored Data; IA-5 Authenticator Management; SC-12 Crypto	• • •	ISO27701_6.7;
Cloud	동 날	CEK-12 Key Rotation	Key Rotation	with the calculated cryptoperiod, which		CCM_CEK-12.1 Are cryptographic keys rotated based on a cryptoperiod	A.10.1.1, A.10.1.2, A.12.4.1, ISO27701_6.7.1, N172_3.5.2e,	A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.12.4 Logging and monitoring; ISO2 Identification and Authentication; 6_MVMP Develop and Maintai		
CCIVI V4.0	1			Define, Implement and evaluate	$\vdash$		11.300(b), A.10.1.1, A.10.1.2,	Sec. 11.300 Controls for identification codes/passwords; A.10.1 Cr		A.10.1; A.11.2;
Cloud	울 불	CEK-13 Key Revocation	Key Revocation	processes, procedures and technical		CCM_CEK-13.1 Are cryptographic keys revoked and removed prior to the end of		Equipment; A.12.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities;		A.12.1; A.15.1;
CCM V4.0				Denne, implement and evaluate	$\vdash$	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		A.8.1 Responsibility for assets; A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.11		A.18.1; CLD.12.
Cloud	逐	CEK-14 Key Destruction	Key Destruction	processes, procedures, and technical		and technical measures to destroy keys		with legal and contractual requirements; CLD.12.1 Operational pr		
CCIVITV4T.U	1	,		Define, implement and evaluate	$\vdash$	CCM CEK-15.1 Are Processes, procedures		A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.12.1 Operational procedures and		A.14.1; A.18.1;
Cloud	뜅밤	CEK-15 Key Activation	Key Activation	processes, procedures, and technical		and technical measures to create keys	CLD.12.1.5. AC-3(8), IA-5(2), SA-	requirements of information systems; A.18.1 Compliance with le		CLD.12.1; HT_1
CCIVITV4:0	1			Derine, împlement and evaluate	$\vdash$	CCM CEK-16.1 Are Processes, procedures	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.14.1 Security requirements of info	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	n MP-6; HT 06.0
Cloud	징 발	CEK-16 Key Suspension	Key Suspension	processes, procedures, and technical		and technical measures to monitor.	3(6), MP-6(1), HT 6.d, HT 6.g,	Change Control; MP-6 Media Sanitization; 06.01 Compliance with		HT_09.06;
Ccrvi v4:u	1			Define, implement and evaluate	H	CCM_CEK-17.1 Are Processes, procedures		A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.12.1 Operational procedures and	• ' '	A.14.1; A.18.1;
Cloud		CEK-17 Key Deactivation	Key Deactivation	processes, procedures and technical		and technical measures to deactivate	A.14.1.2, A.18.1.5, AC-3(8), IA-5(2),	requirements of information systems: A.18.1 Compliance with le		HT_10.03; 3_P(
CCIVI V4.U	1			Define, imprement and evaluate	Ħ	CCM_CEK-18.1 Are Processes, procedures	A.10.1.2, A.13.2.2, A.14.2.7,	A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.13.2 Information transfer; A.14.2 S	ecurity in development and support	t A.14.2; A.18.1;
Cloud	뜅밤	CEK-18 Key Archival	Key Archival	processes, procedures, and technical		and technical measures to manage	A.18.1.3, SA-15(11), SC-12(1),	processes; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual require		15; SC-12; HT_
CCIVI V4.0	1			Define, implement and evaluate	Н	CCM_CEK-19.1 Are Processes, procedures	A.10.1.2, A.11.2.7, A.18.1.3,	A.8.3 Media handling; A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.11.2 Equipr	nent; A.18.1 Compliance with legal	A.18.1;
Cloud	8 B	CEK-19 Key Compromise	Key Compromise	processes, procedures, and technical		and technical measures to encrypt	ISO27701_6.5.3, SC-12(1), HT_10.g,	and contractual requirements; ISO27701_6.5 Asset management;	SC-12 Cryptographic Key	ISO27701_6.5;
CCIVI V4.U	1		V	Define, implement and evaluate	П	CCM_CEK-20.1 Are Processes, procedures		A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and co		SC-12; SC-28; S
Cloud	5   ¥	CEK-20 Key Recovery	Key Recovery	processes, procedures and technical		and technical measures to assess the	SC-12(3), SC-28(1), SI-7(6), HT_6.d,	External System Services; SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment	and Management; SC-28 Protection o	of CCPA2018-T14
CCIVITV4T.U	s <sup>1</sup>	CEK-21 Key Inventory	Key Inventor Management	Derine, împiement and evaluate		CCM_CEK-21.1 Are Processes, procedures		A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and c	ontractual requirements; SA-9	SC-12; SC-28; S
Cloud	8	Management	Key Inventory Management	processes, procedures and technical		and technical measures being defined,	SC-12(3), SC-23(5), SC-28(1), SI-	External System Services; SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment	and Management; SC-28 Protection o	of CCPA2018-T14






# **Correctly Formatted Mappings Accessible/Usable**















326


**Grand Total** 

# Are Risks Top Down or Bottom Up?

- CIS Benchmark, OWASP, MITRE ATT&CK® controls mapped according to the distinct environments used to deliver a service: should map to NIST 800-53r5 and ISO27002 which are then associated to your Cloud Environment.
- NIST 800-53r5 and ISO27002 should be tagged to each continuously monitored configuration.
- Control mapping involves how the requirement is implemented in policy, practice, contract, configuration or architecture. The map may point to a policy, for example, where this detail needs explicit statement. This could map to a CIS, OWASP benchmark that is specific to an OS or PaaS/laaS.



# Rules run on Environments -> are tagged to controls -> are interpreted by assessment models








## Imagine Regulating Federal E-Commerce Cloud Based Medical Service









# Mappers benefit by mapping technical controls to frameworks, frameworks to client domains, configurations to policy



ment Testing \$\price \text{Cryptography}

Test_ID $\vee$	Mapped testi $\vee$	Mapped testing or practices:Test_ID $$	Mapped testing or practices:Problem Metadata $\vee$	Risk Drivers $\vee$	Detail Control Description (UCF) $\vee$	Proble $\triangledown$ $\vee$	Mapped Proce $\vee$	Mapped Processe
T1468_Encrypt sensitive data at rest in the browser	A.18.1.3; AC-16(5); AC-19(4); AU-13(3); SA-4(6); SA-8(0); SC-12(3); SC-28(1); SC-28(2); SC-28(2); SI-12(2); SA-15(12); SI-19(3)	SA-9.6 Organization controlled Cryptographic Keys; SC-12.3 Asymmetric Keys; SC-28.1 Cryptographic Protection; SC-28.2 Offline Storage; SC-28.3 Cryptographic Keys; SI-12.2 Minimize Personally	CONFIGURATIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT CONFIGURATION BASELINE, USGGS, FUNCTIONS; PORTS; PROTOCUS; SERVICES; SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS; DEVELOPER PROVIDED; DEVELOPER; Security and Privacy Engineering Principles   Secure Metadata Management; CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS; EXCLUSIVE CONTROL; ASYMMETRIC KEYS; NSA-APPROVED; KEY	Storing plaintext sensitive data in client side local storage makes the data easily accessible by anyone who gains privileged access to the client system. This bypasses user authentication enforced by the application.  In addition to data leakage in shared client environments, such as a public computer's provided to the conformation of the such control of the conformation of the such control of the conformation of the conf	The mechanism for encrypting data in the browser is driven by the requirement to gain access to the data while the application is offline (i.e., a Progressive Web App).  _When offline access is not a requirement follow these steps:  Authenticate the user against the backend system	Cryptography	A10.1; A82; A94; A11.1; A12.4; A6.2; A14.2	A.10.1 Cryptographic classification; A.9.4 Sy control; A.11.1 Secur monitoring; A.6.2 M teleworking; A.14.2 S support processes
T1880_Encrypt data at rest for Lambda functions (AWS)	A.18.13; AC-16(5); AU-13(3); SA-4(5); SA-8(20); SC-12(2); SC- 28(1); SC-28(2); SC- 28(3); SI-12(2); SA- 15(12); SI-19(3)	A.18.1.3 Protection of records; AC-16.5 Attribute Displays on Objects to Be Output; AU-13.3 Unauthorized Replication of Information; SA-4.5 System, Component, and Service Configurations; SA-8.20 Secure Metadata Management; SC-12.3 Asymmetric Keys; SC-28.1 Cryptographic Protection; SC-28.2 Offline Storage; SC-28.3 Cryptographic Keys; SI-12.2 Minimize Personally Identifiable Information in Testing, Training, and Research; SA-15.12 Minimize Personally Identifiable Information; SI-19.3 Release	SECURITY ATTRIBUTE OUTPUT: OUTPUT DEVICES; PRIVACY ATTRIBUTE OUTPUT; TRUSTED DISTRIBUTION; MASTER COPY, SECURITY CONFIGURATIONS; U.S. GOVERNMENT CONFIGURATION BASELINE; USGCB; FUNCTIONS; PORTS; PROTOCOLS; SERVICES; SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS; DEVELOPER PROVIDED; DEVELOPER; Security and Privacy Engineering Principles   Secure Metadata Management: ASYMMETRIC KEYS; NOS-APPROVED; KEY MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY AND PROCESSES; PUBLIC KEY; INFRASTRUCTURE; PKI; CLASS 3; CLASS 4; FRIVATE KEY; PUBLIC KEY; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION; INFORMATION AT REST; OFF-LINE STORAGE; Protection of Information at Rest   Cryptographic Keys; PRIVACY; PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION; PII; DATA MINIMIZATION; DEVelopment Process, Standards, and Tools   Minimize Personally Identifiable Information; PRIVACY; PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION; PII	Storage devices, such as memory cards, disks, and USB devices are normally accessible by other users and processes. For example, Android external storage could be available to all the running apps. If any	Apply appropriate protections to ensure the data is encrypted at rest, if a Lambda function is responsible for storing sensitive data such as PII in cloud storage utilities.  ## Lambda /tmp Directory While it is possible to store data in the /tmp' directory of a Lambda function. This is generally considered a poor location to store persistent data, especially sensitive PII. A resource [limit of 512 MB](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/limits.html) is also applied to the	Cryptography	A.10.1; A.8.2; A.9.4; A.11.1; A.12.4; A.6.2; A.14.2; A.18.1	A.10.1 Cryptograph classification; A.9.4: control; A.11.1 Secu monitoring; A.12.4: teleworking; A.14.2: support processes; and contractual req











### If ANY of these practices are not achieved, they NEED TO FACTOR into the RMF



) т	「est_ID ∨	Mapped testi $\vee$	Mapped testing or practices:Test_ID $\vee$	Mapped testing or practices: Problem Metadata	Risk Drivers V	Detail Control Description (UCF) $\vee$	Proble $\forall \vee$	Mapped Proce $\vee$	Mapped Proces
s s	parameter store for sensitive data storage (Amazon ECS)	8(20); SC-12(3); SC- 28(1); SC-28(2); SC- 28(3); SI-12(2); SA- 15(12); SI-19(3)	Metadata Management, SC-12.3 Asymmetric Keyr, SC-28.1 Cryptographic Protection; SC-28.2 Offline Storage; SC-28.3 Cryptographic Keyr; SI-12.2 Minimize Personally Identifiable Information in Testing, Training, and Research; SA-15.12 Minimize Personally Identifiable Information; SI-19.3 Release	Principles   Secure Metadata Management; ASYMMETRIC KEYS; NSA-APPROVED; KEY MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY AND PROCESSES; PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE; PL; CLL:SS 3; CLASS 4; PRIVATE KEY, PUBLIC KEY; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION; INFORMATION AT REST; OFF-LINE STORAGE; Protection of Information at Rest   Cryptographic Keys; PRIVACY; PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION; PI; DATA MINIMIZATION; Development Process, Standards, and Tools   Minimize Personally Identifiable Information; PRIVACY; PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION; PII	format can couse format can cause sensitive information leakage and the misuse of data.	Protect sensitive data as containers are deployed to ECS clusters. AWS offers solutions out of the box to handle the injection of sensitive data into containers using either AWS Secrets Managen or AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store. These features allow containers to retrieve the sensitive data from a secure location and inject the plaintext secret value as the container is initially started.	Cryptography	A.10.1; A.8.2; A.9.4; A.11.1; A.12.4; A.6.2; A.14.2; A.18.1	control; A.11.1 Secumonitoring; A.6.2 Nateleworking; A.14.2 support processes; and contractual rec
d D r	T2046_Encrypt data stored in DynamoDB at rest (Amazon DynamoDB)	19(4); AU-13(3); SA-	A.18.1.3 Protection of records; AC-16.5 Attribute Displays on Objects to Be Output: AC-19.4 Restrictions for Classified Information; AU-13.3 Unauthorized Replication of Information; SA-4.5 System, Component, and Service Configurations; SA-8.20 Secure Metadata Management; SA-9.6 Organization-controlled Cryptographic Keys; SC-12.3 Symtems (Keys; SC-28.2 Offline Storage; SC-28.3 Cryptogon in Keys; SC-12.2 Minimize Personally Identifiable Informatio; mil. sting, Training, and Research; SA-15.12 Minimize Personally Identifiable Informatio; mil.		Data stored unencrypted on click in Oyaaroo B can can can can be studied. It is necessary to keep sen at verbala, protection as close to lite origin as possible to prevent theft by malicious third-party software or web attack.	DynamoDB encrypts all data stored in tables at rest by default but leaves the encryption key up to the administrator. DynamoDB supports either AWS managed keys or custon termanaged keys (CMK).  Utilize CMKs to give you full control over who can use the keys to access the encrypted data on DynamoDB tables.	Cryptography	A82; A10.1; A11.2; A14.1; A18.1	A.8.2 Information Cryptographic con Security requireme A.18.1 Compliance requirements
e D (a	T2048_Utilize client-side encryption for DynamoDB (Amazon DynamoDB)	A.10.1.1; A.10.1.2; A.13.1.2; A.14.1.2; A.14.1.3; A.18.1.3; AC- 17(2); AU-9(3); SA- 4(2); SI-7(6); SI-7(15); SI-10(5)	A.10.1.1 Policy on the use of control processes A.10.1.2 Key management; A.13.1.2 Key by of network services; A.14.1.2 Securing application services on page a networks; A.14.1.3 Protection of processes transactions; A.18.1.3 Protection of records; AC-17.2 PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITYNITEGRITY USING ENCRYPTION; AU-9.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION; SA-4.2 Design and Implementation Information for Controls; SI-7.5 Cryptographic Protection; SI-7.15 Code Authentication; SI-10.5 Restrict Inputs to Trusted Sources and Approved Formats	CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION; CRYPTOGRAPHICMEET ANISMS; INTEGRITY; MITTERFACE; MIT		DynamoDB gives you the ability to utilize client-side encryption to help ensure the plaintext data is protected at origin as well as over the network.  Utilize client-side encryption in DynamoDB, by including a software library with your application that can handle encryption, the signing of attribute values, and key management.	Cryptography	A.9.1; A.10.1; A.12.5; A.13.1; A.14.1; A.18.1	A.9.1 Business red A.10.1 Cryptogra operational softwanagement; A. information syste legal and contract
d re	T2056_Encrypt data stored at est (Amazon Aurora)	19(4); AU-13(3); SA-	A.18.1.3 Protection of records; AC-16.5 Attribute Displays on Objects to Be Output; AC-19.4 Restrictions for Classified Information; AU-13.3 Unauthorized Replication of Information; SA-4.5 System, Component, and Service Configurations; SA-8.20 Secure Metadata Management; SA-9.6 Organization-controlled Cryptographic Keys; SC-12.3 Asymmetric Keys; SC-28.2 Offline Storage; SC-28.3 Cryptographic Protection; SC-28.2 Offline Storage; SC-28.3 Cryptographic Keys; SI-12.2 Minimize Personally Identifiable Information in Testing, Training, and Research; SA-15.12 Minimize Personally Identifiable Information; SI-19.3 Release	CONFIGURATIONS; U.S. GOVERNMENT CONFIGURATION BASELINE; USGCB; FUNCTIONS;	Unencrypted data stored on disks in cloud environments may be stolen and misused.	Always utilize strong encryption mechanisms on Aurora instances that hancle data that is sensitive in nature. Aurora encryption is easy to anable within the AWS console and offers the ability to encrypt the data stored on the Aurora instance's underlying storage filesystem, automated backups, and snapshots. Aurora encryption is performed using AES-256 and is protected by the AWS Key Management System (KMS).  Utilize KMS Customer-Managed Keys when possible to give you full control over who can use the keys to access the encrypted data on KMS instances.	Cryptography	A10.1; A82; A94; A11.1; A124; A62; A142	A.10.1 Cryptogra classification; A.9 control; A.11.5 s monitoring; A.6.2 teleworking; A.14 support processe
u s c A	T2065_Config ure TLS for secure connections to App Service (Microsoft Azure)	A.13.2.1; AC-4(4); AC- 17(2); AC-18(1); IA- 3(1); SC-5(1); SC-7(10); SC-7(17); SC-8(1); SC- 23(5); SI-4(2)	A.13.2.1 Information transfer policies and procedures; AC-4.4 Flow Control of Encypted Information; AC-17.2 PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY/INTEGRITY USING ENCRYPTION; AC-18.1 Authentication and Encryption; IA-3.1 Cryptographic Bidirectional Authentication; SC-5.1 Retrict Ability to Atlack Other Systems; SC-7.10 Prevent Exfiltration; SC-7.17 Automated Enforcement of Protocol Formats; SC-8.1 Cryptographic Protection; SC-23.5 Allowed Certificate Authorities; SI-4.2 Automated Tools and Mechanisms for Real-time Analysis	ENCRYPTING: ALTERNATIVE PHYSICAL SAFEGUARDS, PREVENT UNALTHORIZED TO DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION, DELECT CHANGES TO INFORMATION, DELECT CHANGES TO INFORMATION, CERTIFICATE OF INFORMATION, DELECT CHANGES TO INFORMATION, CERTIFICATE OF THE ALTHORITIES CALCEPTRICATES, SECURES FOR SOCIECT, LAVE, S.S. I TRANSES OF I LAVE SECURES.	Azure Web Apps allows sites to run under both HTTP and HTTPS by default and Web apps Jasn be accussed by	Perform the following: Redirect all HTTP traffic to HTTPS in Azure App Service: Non-secure HTTP requests can be restricted and all HTTP requests redirected to the secure HTTPS port. It is recommended to enforce HTTPS-only traffic. HTTPS uses the SSL*TLS protocol to provide a secure connection, which is both encrypted and authenticated. So it is important to support HTTPS for the security benefits. Use the latest version of TLS encryption: App service currently allows the web app to set TLS versions 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2. It is highly recommended to use the latest TLS 1.2 version, which is the recommended TLS level by industry standards, such as PCI DSS, for web app secure connections. Set Cliept Lentin ates (incoming client certificates) to On: The TLS migual authentication technique in enterprise environments ensures the authenticity of clients to the server. If incoming client certain case in enabled, then only an authenticated client who has valid certificates can access the app.	Cryptography	A.10.1; A.13.2; A.14.1; A.14.2	A.10.1 Cryptogra transfer; A.14.1 S information syst development an













# The Product of Mapping is Security & Risk Program Management Enterprise GRC Solutions, Inc.



CCM v4.0			Secure Media	Establish, document, app communicate, apply, eva		CCM_DCS-04.1 Are policies and procedures a			8.3.3 Physical media transfer, ISO27701_6.5.3 Media handling service customer assets Control, MA-3.3 Prevent Unauthorized		<ul> <li>A.8.3 Media handling, CLD.8.1 Re assets, SC-30 Concealment and I</li> </ul>		ISO27001/ 27002/270			1 Will be fully		1 Minor impact			
Cloud		DCS-04 Secure Media		maintain policies and pro					ocessing and Storage Locations, 05.d Authorization Process for	,,	Internal Organization, 08.02 Equ		17/27701/	Needs		mitigated	1 Rare				
Security Alliance 6		Transportation Policy and	Policy and	secure transportation of	f physical media.		- / - / - / - //		lities, 08.m Removal of Property, 09.o Management of Remova		09.07 Media Handling, 09.08 Exc		27018/HIT	Strengther (Minor)	ning	through proje				2	2
2021	Z N	Procedures	Procedures	Review and undate the n	onlicies and	avaluated and maintained?: CCM_DCS.	N171 3 8 3 N171 3 8 5 9 6 0	Madia 09 n Disnosal of Madi	ia 09 a Information Handling Procedures 09 s Information	HT 09 08	Information N171 3 8 Media Pr	ntaction	RUST/NIST	(Minor)		actions		delivery			
2021	8 8	<u> </u>		procedures at least annu	ually.				dures, 09.u Physical Media in Transit, N171 3.8.3 Sanitize or	N171 3.8,	ISO27701 6.5 Asset managemen			5 2							
CCM v4.0		· /				_			A.S. 1.2 Ownership of assets, A.S. 2.1 Classification of information of A.S. 1.1 Access control policy, A. 1.1.2.1 Equipment siting an		<ol> <li>A.8.1 Responsibility for assets, A classification A 9.1 Business red</li> </ol>		ISO27001/			4 Largely		4 Very Significant			
Cloud		DCS-05 Assets	Assets	Character and discommend	-	- Toocamentation of physical and locical	10101.005.2.0.005.3.3.7.0.2.2.	7.O.Z.Z COOCHING OF HIGH	ion, A.9.1.1 Access control policy, A.11.2.1 Equipment siting an ition transfer policies and procedures, A.15.1.1 Information	A.11.2, A.13.2, A.15.1, A.18.1,	control, A.11.2 Equipment, A.13.		17/27701/	Needs		4 Largely uncontrollabl	e 1 Rare				
Security	S.		Classification	logical assets (e.g., applic					elationships, A.18.1.3 Protection of records, CLD.8.1.5 Remova		<ol> <li>transfer, A.15.1 Information sections.</li> </ol>		27018/HIT	Strengther		through proje				3	48
Alliance 6	N 05	Classification		the organizational busine	≀ess risk.				sets Control, ISO27701_5.6.2 Information security risk	HT_03.01,	relationships, A.18.1 Compliance		RUST/NIST	(Important	t)	actions		Delay			
2021	5 5								3 Information security risk treatment, ISO27701 6.5.2	HT 06.01,	contractual requirements, CLD.8		for 53r5/NIST1	3 4 1							
CCM v4.0									A.8.1.2 Ownership of assets, A.8.2.2 Labelling of information,		.2, A.8.1 Responsibility for assets, A		ISO27001/								
Cloud				Catalog and track all rele					ent and assets off-premises, A.12.1.1 Documented operating		M- classification, A.11.2 Equipment			Needs		1 Will be fully		5 Catastrophic			
Security		DCS-06 Assets Cataloguing		g and logical assets located CSP's sites within a secur-					val of cloud service customer assets Control, ISO27701_6.5.2	8, HT_02.04,	procedures and responsibilities		17/27701/ 27018/HIT	Strengther	ning	mitigated	3 Possibl		1 3 5	4	60
Alliance 6	/ 🗐 🖁	and Tracking	and tracking	Cor s sites within a secur	red system.				6027701_6.5.3 Media handling, CM-8.1 Updates During 2.h Return of Assets, 05.d Authorization Process for Information	HT_05.01, HT 07.01,	Responsibility for assets, CM-8 S Inventory, 02.04 Termination or		RUST/NIST	(Critical)		through proje		Costing Impact			
2021	5 8	, [							ventory of Assets, 07.b Ownership of Assets, 08.k Security of	HT 08.02,	Employment, 05.01 Internal Orga		53r5/NIST1	3 5 2		actions					
CCM v4.0				Implement physical secu	urity perimeters				, A.11.1.1 Physical security perimeter, A.11.1.2 Physical entry	A.9.1, A.11.1, AT-	3, A.9.1 Business requirements of a						$\neg$				
Cloud				to safeguard personnel, o		perimeters implemented to safeguard	A.11.1.3, A.11.1.5,	controls, A.11.1.3 Securing of	ffices, rooms and facilities, A.11.1.5 Working in secure areas,	PE-6, HT_02.04,	Secure areas, AT-3 ROLE-BASED S		PE- 27002/270			1 Will be fully		3 Significant impa	act		
Security	123	DCS-07 Controlled Access	Controlled Access						s, AC-20.4 Network Accessible Storage Devices — Prohibited U		6 Monitoring Physical Access, 02			Unestablis	shed	mitigated	1 Rare	- 0% - increases costs		5	15
Alliance @	9 6	Points	Points	security perimeters betw					trols, PE-2.1 Access by Position or Role, PE-2.2 Two Forms of	HT_09.08,	Change of Employment, 08.01 Se			0.10313511		through proje	ct 15	KTLO			
2021	8 8			administrative and busin		security perimeters established between			t Unescorted Access, PE-3.2 Facility and Systems, PE-3.3	N171_3.8,	Exchange of Information, N171_					actions					
	0 0			the data storage and pro	cessing facilities	the "administrative and business areas"	6(1), PE-6(3), PE-8(1), PE-8(3),	Continuous Guards, PE-3.4 Lo	ockable Casings, PE-3.5 Tamper Protection, PE-3.7 Physical	N171 3.10,	N171 3.10 Physical Protection, I	18027701 6.8	53r5/NIST1								
CCM v4.					4					tur	at	Not   Tag						Heat (Controllability			
Cloud					/					ity	uri 5	. E E E				Contr	CE				
Alliance	SA Test la	anguage - pre adoption/ CSA ed	dits		/	Unified Testing Map:Test_I				Mapping Cur		. 말 말 하	Risk		Risk Severity	olabil Likeli I					
2021		open		fied Testing Map		review the details of each mapped item see		ified Universe Mappi	Unified Universe Mapping:Control Objective		De GAP Effectiveness 🖁	Ce Ce	Controllability	Risk Likelihood	(impact)	ity hood	ct r	Effectiveness)	Test Procedure	External Re	source
	CM_A&A-0	-01.1 Are audit and assurance	i ISO2701_C7.	.5.3, A.5.1.1, A.5.1.2,	C.5.2 Policy; C.7.5	.5 Documented information; C.9.2 Internal	audit; A.5.1 Management		C.5.2 Policy, C.7.5 Documented information, C.9.2	ISO27001/										<list fol<="" td="" the=""><td>der</td></list>	der
CCM v4.	olicies, pr	procedures and standards	A.6.1.1, A.8.7	2.1, A.12.3.1, A.12.6.1,	, direction for infor	ormation security; A.6.1 Internal organization	ion; A.8.2 Information	A.5.1; A.6.1; A.8.2;	Internal audit, A.5.1 Management direction for	27002/270			Largely		5 Catastrophic,					where this	
		ed, documenteu, approveu,		((0), 3A-11(7), 111_0.g,	crassincation, A.s	.12.5 backup, A.12.0 recimicar vumerability	ry management, A.12.7 miorina	non 1.12.3, 1.12.5,	information security, A.O.2 internal organization,	21/21/02/	Opportunity For	L L	ıncontrollable	4 Likely - 65% -	Material - See	4 4	5 2	160	<write td="" test<="" the=""><td>evidence is</td><td></td></write>	evidence is	
Security C	ommunica	cated, appled, evaluated and	HT_6.i, HT_1	13.s, 11.6.0 RMTN,	systems audit cor	onsiderations; SA-4 Acquisition Process; 06	6.02 Compliance with Security		A.8.2 Information classification, A.12.3 Backup,	27018/HIT	Improvement	t	hrough project	85%	Costing Impact	7			procedure, the PBC	commonly	
Alliance	naintainer	.d?; CCM_A kA-01.2 Are audit /	and ISO27701_5	.2.3, ISO27701_5.7.2,	Policies and Stan	ndards, and Technical Compliance; 06.03 Ir	nformation System Audit		A.12.6 Technical vulnerability management, A.12.7	RUST/NIST		а	ictions		costing impact					maintained	(S
2021 a	ssurance	policies, procedures and	CC1.1.1, CC1	1.1.2, CC1.1.3, CC1.2.1,	, Considerations; 1	13.07 Accountability & Auditing; ISO27701	1 5.2 Context of the organization	n; HI_06.03; ms C.5.2; C.7.5; C.9.2;	Information systems audit considerations, SA-4	53r5/NIST1	4 1									mamcamed	
CCM v4.	CM_A&A-0	-02.1 Is an independent	A.12.7.1, A.1	18.2.1, A.18.2.3, CA-	C.5.2 Policy; C.7.5	.5 Documented information; C.9.2 Internal	audit; A.12.7 Information syste		C.5.2 Policy, C.7.5 Documented information, C.9.2	ISO27001/											
		ent of its audit and assurance	2(1), CA-7(1)	), CA-2(2), CA-2(3),	audit considerati	tions; A.18.2 Information security reviews;	; CA-2 Assessments; CA-7	A.12.7; A.18.2; CA-	Internal audit, A.12.7 Information systems audit	27002/270	Needs				1 Minor impact -						
Security P	rogram cc	conducted at least annually and	nd HT_5.h, HT_6	6.i, ISO27701_6.12.1,	Continuous Monif	nitoring; 05.02 External Parties; 06.03 Inform	rmation System Audit	2; CA-7; HT_05.02;	considerations, A.18.2 Information security reviews,	17/27701/	Strengthening		Unestablished	3 Possible - 35%	increased hours	5 3	1 2	30			
	ccordingt	to relevant standards?	ISO27701_6	5.15.2, 11.3.1 RMTN,	Considerations; If	ISO27701_6.12 Supplier relationships; ISO	)27701_6.15 Compliance; 11_RN	MTN HT_06.03;	CA-2 Assessments, CA-7 Continuous Monitoring,	27018/HIT	(Minor)		Onestablished	65% :	and some delay in	, ,	1	30			
2021			CC1.2.3, CC1	1.2.4, CC3.1.5, CC4.1.1,	, Regularly test ser	ecurity systems and processes.; CC1.2 COSC	O Principle 2: The board of	1502//01_6.12;	05.02 External Parties, 06.03 Information System	RUST/NIST	(MINION)				delivery						
CCM v4.			CC4.1.8		directors demons	nstrates independence from management a	and exercises oversight of the	ISO27701_6.15;	Audit Considerations, ISO27701 6.12 Supplier	53r5/NIST1 3	5 2	N									
Cloud C	CM_A&A-f	-03.1 Are independent audit ar	and A.12.7.1, A.1	16.1.4, A.18.1.2,	C.5.2 Policy; C.7.5	.5 Documented information; C.9.2 Internal	audit; A.12.7 Information syste		C.5.2 Policy, C.7.5 Documented information, C.9.2	ISO27001/											
Security E		e assessments performed				tions; A.16.1 Management of information s		A.12.7; A.16.1;	Internal audit, A.12.7 Information systems audit	27002/270	Needs	1	With be fully		1 Minor impact -					1	
Alliance	ccordingt	to risk-based plans and polici	es? 3(10), AU-4(1	1), AU-5(1), AU-5(2), AU-	- improvements; A	A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractu	ual requirements; A.18.2	A.18.1; A.18.2; AC-	considerations, A.16.1 Management of information	17/27701/	Strongthoning	п	nit gated	1 Rare - 0% -	increased hours	1 1	1 3	3		1	
2021			5(3), AU-5(4)	), AU-5(5), AU-6(1), AU-	Information secur	urity reviews; AC-2 Account Management; A	AC-3 Access Enforcement; AU-4		security incidents and improvements, A.18.1	27018/HIT	(Important)		nrough project	15% :	and some delay in					1	
			6(3), AU-6(4)	), AU-6(5), AU-6(6), AU-	Audit Storage Cap	spacity; AU-5 Response to Audit Processing	¿Failures; AU-6 Audit Review,	AU-6; AU-7; AU-9;	Compliance with legal and contractual requirements			l l	ections		delivery					1	
CCM v4.			6(7), AU-6(8)			porting; AU-7 Audit Reduction and Report G		AU-10; AU-11; AU-	A.18.2 Information security reviews, AC-2 Account	53r5/NIST1 3	4 1										
Cloud Security	CM_A&A-f	-04.1 Is compliance verified, w	with A.12.4.2, A.1	12.7.1, A.18.1.3, AC-	A.12.4 Logging an	nd monitoring; A.12.7 Information systems	s audit considerations; A.18.1		C.5.2 Policy, C.7.5 Documented information, C.9.2	ISO27001/										Ī	
Alliance	Il relevan'	nt standards, regulations,	2(4), CA-5(1)	), CM-5(1), SA-11(1), SI-	Compliance with	h legal and contractual requirements; AC-2	¿ Account Management; CA-5 Pla	an A.18.1; AC-2; CA-5;	Internal audit, A.12.4 Logging and monitoring, A.12.7		Needs	1	Will be fully		1 Minor impact -						
2021	agal/contr	tractual, and statutory	10(1), HT_6.	g, HT_6.i, HT_6.j,	of Action and Mile	lestones; CM-5 Access Restrictions for Char	inge; SA-11 Developer Security		Information systems audit considerations, A.18.1	17/27701/	Strengthening	n	nitigated	4 Likely - 65% -	increased hours	1 4	1 4	16			
	equireme	ents applicable to the audit?	HT_13.r, HT_	_13.s, N171_3.3.6,	Testing and Evalu	uation; SI-10 Information Input Validation;	, 06.02 Compliance with Security		Compliance with legal and contractual requirements	27018/HIT	(Critical)	t	hrough project	85% :	and some delay in	1 7		10			
CCM v4.			N171_3.3.8,	, N171_3.12.2,	Policies and Stan	ndards, and Technical Compliance; 06.03 Ir	Information System Audit	HT_06.03;	AC-2 Account Management, CA-5 Plan of Action and		1	а	ections		delivery						
Cloud				5.2.1, ISO27701 5.2.2,	Considerations; 1	13.07 Accountability & Auditing; N171 3.3	3 Audit and Accountability;		Milestones, CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change, SA-	53r5/NIST1 3	5 2										
Security C	CM_A&A-f	-06.1 Is a risk-based corrective	e A.12.7.1, A.1	18.2.3, AU-3(1), AU-	C.9.2 Internal aud	udit; A.12.7 Information systems audit cons	siderations; A.18.2 Information	C.9.2; A.12.7;	C.9.2 Internal audit, A.12.7 Information systems	ISO27001/											
Alliance 2021	2 0		2/21 414 4/41	humidity conditions with	nin accepted	humidity conditions (within accepted	N171_3.10.2, A1.2.1, A1.2.3,	A 18 2 AU-3 AU-4 and Notification, PE-13.4 Insp	pections, PE-14.1 Automatic Controls, PE-15.1 Automation	278027701_6.8, A1	2 A1.2 The entity authorizes, desig	ns, develops or	kusi/Nisi		1 Marrie	actions					
2021	8 8			industry standards.					inst External and Environmental Threats, 08.g Equipment Sitin	ξ	acquires, implements, operates	s, approves,	53r5/NIST1	3 5 2							
CCM v4.0									external and environmental threats, A.11.2.1 Equipment siting		A.11.1 Secure areas, A.11.2 Equi		ISO27001/								
Cloud				Secure, monitor, maintai	sin, and test				porting utilities, A.17.1.3 Verify, review and evaluate	A.17.1, CM-3, MA				Needs		3 Moderately controllable	1 Rare	1 Minor impact			
Security	ଥ	DCS-14 Secure Utilities	Secure Utilities	utilities services for conti	tinual				ity, ISO27701_6.8.2 Equipment, CM-3.2 Testing, Validation, an		Change Control, MA-4 Nonlocal N		6 17/27701/ 27019/UIT	Strengther	ning	controllable	1 Kare	-0%- increased hour	3 1 1	4	12
ľ									MA J L LUCCITION WITH DOWNLOAD MA J L				7711101011		_						

A Control area could have a minor finding – however the overall risk raised by that finding could be negligible Other OFI could reveal a situation that is unmanaged, will occur again in multiple audits, and has potential for customer facing disruptions and loss of revenue. Risk Management needs to Only Handle It Once – OHIO, but capture all the inputs, players, timing, and necessary resources for improvement












## Recap: Management Strategy First + Why r5 CCM 4 Now



- GRC Mapping strategy: **Order-of-Operations**
- Risk-> Goals-> Policies->Controls)



- Using NIST SP 800-53 r5 as the underpinning backbone assumes mapping to other major frameworks so the business "Only Handles Policy Once". OHIO
- Use NIST 800-53 r5 as the mediating framework connecting architecture CMDB to CIS/DISA STIGs/OWASP/MITRE ATT&CK
- Use ISO/IEC 27001 with Cloud, Privacy and Processing as the Policy framework — commonly mapped to NIST SP 800-53 r4/r5 as part of NIST Appendix
- Use a RMF on top of your preferred framework (Could be SOC 2, CSTAR, ISO27, \*\*HITRUST™, IMO use NIST CSF).
- Establish Categories for the Corporate Common Controls. Push those categories into Policies, Controls, Programs.









# **Summarizing and Take-Aways**



- Mapping accounts for the Risks & associated RACI of a program so groupings should align with the common job assignments that would implement them.
- Client based mapping begins with understanding the business programs and should account for domains (LOB) with isolated scope, such as Consumer, Cloud, Fed, Health & Human Service, Financial, Global, etc.
- Language matching alone, rather than mapping to the recommended implementation guidance, results in guidance that's unusable.
- Mapping accomplishes an aggregate Policy requirement that will and will always continue to be measured by product and by assessment event and will move at the pace of your slowest audit.







