



NIST SP-800-53 r5 – The Control Reference Layer: Taming the Beast beneath CCM 4.0 to NIST 800-53 Mapping Discussing the Cloud Security Alliance Working Group

Robin Basham, CEO, EnterpriseGRC Solutions
President, ISC2 East Bay Chapter
Presentation to ISACA San Francisco,
Wednesday, Aug 25 at 12:00-1:00 PM PDT

















Resources Frequently Mentioned During this presentation



	Critical Resour	ce Website link			
CYBERSECURITY & INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY	Homepage CISA	CIS Center for Internet Security (cisecurity.org)	1,	er for net Security® ence in the Connected World®	
cloud csA security alliance®	https://cloudsecurity alliance.org/	How to Become FedRAMP Authorized FedRAMP.gov	FedRAMP	ACQUISITION.GOV Home > Regulations Regulations SOFARS Chapter 99 (CAS) DEARS DEARS AGAR	19 Section 889 Regulation DOSAR DOTAR EDAR
NST	National Institute of Standards and Technology NIST	Acquisition.GOV www.acquisition.go V Location for DFARS	DEFENSE CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PROP	DEARSESI AFARS AFARS AFEARS DEAR DIAR DIAR DIAR DIAR DIAR DIAR DIAR DIAR DIAR	EPAAR FEHBAR GSAMUR HITSAR HITSAR







Research Working Groups

Security through innovation. Innovation through collaboration.

CSA security

WORKING GROUPS

PUBLICATIONS CONTRIBUTE WEBINARS


Home > Research > Working Groups

SDP and Zero Trust









Privacy

Privacy Level Agreement





People who want to join a Cloud Security Alliance Research Working Group should reach out to Cloud Controls Matrix Working Group | CSA (cloudsecurityalliance.org)

I'm very honored to be a lead among the Mapping of NIST 800-53r5 and CCM 4.0 WG

Home > Research > Working Groups > Cloud Controls Matrix

Maintaining cloud governance, risk and compliance is becoming increasingly

The more complex systems become, the less secure they become, even though security technologies improve. With the proliferation of security certifications, industry standards and regulations it is becoming increasingly challenging to keep up with the requirements to stay secure and compliant in the cloud.

Why was the CCM created?

To respond to simplify the process of assessing the overall security risk of a cloud provider, CSA created the Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) and Consensus Assessment Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ). The CCM provides a controls framework that gives detailed understanding of security concepts and principles that are aligned to the best practices outlined in the CSA Security Guidance for Cloud Computing. The CAIQ provides a set of Yes/No questions a cloud consumer and cloud auditor may wish to ask of a cloud provider to ascertain their compliance to the CCM.

Help Integrate the CCM with CRI's Financial Services Cybersecurity Profile CSA is partnering with the Cyber Risk Institute (CRI) to provide the financial community with new resources to map and integrate CSA's Cloud Controls Matrix (CCM) and CRI's Financial Services Cybersecurity Profile. The goal is to define the scope, objectives and technical specifications of the Cloud Security Framework for Financial Services. To learn more, download our group charter.

Along with releasing updated versions of the CCM and CAIQ, this working group provides addendums, control mappings and gap analysis between the CCM and other research releases, industry standards, and regulations to keep it continually up to date.

Join Group

Next Meeting

Sep 01, 2021, 08:00AM PDT Join the Meetina →



Working Group Leadership





















"We'd like to use Cloud Control Matrix & NIST SP 800-53 r5 Mapping as our Master Control List"



- RESOURCES / REASONS: Companies using NIST SP 800-53 r4, must update to Rev 5.1. Cloud Controls Matrix has recently updated to CCM 4.0 We need them both, now.
- Problem: NIST SP 800-53 as a **mediating** framework is incompletely or inaccurately mapped in products; It requires updates for CIS CSC 7.1->8.1, CCM 3.1->4.0, NIST SP 800-171 r2 & NIST SP 800-172 (Cybersecurity Enhancement), plus New Tailoring Criteria
- Opportunity: Leveraging NIST SP 800-53 r5 to complete ©AICPA SOC 2, ©HITRUST, PCI DSS 3.21, CSTAR CCM, DFARS CMMC, ©ISO/IEC 27001 plus Privacy, Processing and Cloud requires detail understanding of these frameworks i.e., experience completing engagements to do this work, but it can be done.
- Methodology: Creating *useable* cyber framework mapping is an exercise that drives common language across all Policies and Programs and is necessary to meaningful resilience and compliance.








Why Now: Cryptographic, Data Center, and Data Security Privacy Enterprise GRC Solutions, Inc.



- California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, California Privacy Rights and Enforcement Act of 2020 (CPRA) – Privacy + Cryptography
- For the ISO/IEC 27001 using ISO/IEC 27002:2013 € (Plus Privacy, Processing, Cloud)
 - *ISO/IEC 27017:2015 € 27002 for cloud services*
 - *ISO/IEC 27701:2019 € Privacy*
 - *ISO/IEC 27018:2019 € Processing*
- NIST 800-171 r2 (Controlled Unclassified Information/ DFARS)
- NIST 800-172 (Plus Cybersecurity Enhancements)
- NIST 800-53 r5 (NIST-800-53B) replaces Annex H + J.
- PCI DSS V3.2.1 Copyright © 2018 VISA (Cryptography, *Privacy*)
- TSP 100—2017 Trust Services Criteria Likely to add Cybersecurity, Healthcare, Supply Chain - Datacenter + Privacy + Cryptography greatly improve demonstration of these controls.
- HITRUST CSF v9* Privacy + Cryptography + Data Center (to operate with HITRUST contact Hitrust.org)

ARRAY OF TESTS ASSIGNED TO CLOUD SECURITY ALLIANCE CLOUD CONTROLS MATRIX V4.0



ISO/IEC 27701:2019 € Security techniques — Extension to ISO/IEC 27001 and ISO/IEC 27002 for privacy information management — Requirements and guidelines ISO/IEC 27018:2019 € Information technology — Security techniques — Code of practice for protection of personally identifiable information (PII) in public clouds acting as PII processors ISO/IEC 27017:2015 € 27002 for cloud services









Cloud Control Matrix 17 Domains, 197 Controls, 262 Tests + Implementation Guidance




	Solutions, inc.
Audit and Assurance - A&A	Audit and Assurance Policy and Procedures; Independent Assessments; Risk Based Planning Assessment; Requirements Compliance; Audit Management Process; Remediation
Application and Interface Security - AIS	Application and Interface Security Policy and Procedures; Application Security Baseline Requirements; Application Security Metrics; Secure Application Design and Development; Automated Application Security Testing; Automated Secure Application Deployment; Application Vulnerability Remediation
Business Continuity Management and Operational Resilience - BCR	Business Continuity Management Policy and Procedures; Risk Assessment and Impact Analysis; Business Continuity Strategy; Business Continuity Planning; Documentation; Business Continuity Exercises; Communication; Backup; Disaster Response Plan; Response Plan Exercise; Equipment Redundancy
Change Control and Configuration Management - CCC	Change Management Policy and Procedures; Quality Testing; Change Management Technology; Unauthorized Change Protection; Change Agreements; Change Management Baseline; Detection of Baseline Deviation; Exception Management; Change Restoration
Cryptography, Encryption and Key Management - CEK	Encryption and Key Management Policy and Procedures; CEK Roles and Responsibilities; Data Encryption; Encryption Algorithm; Encryption Change Management; Encryption Change Cost Benefit Analysis; Encryption Risk Management; CSC Key Management Capability; Encryption and Key Management Audit; Key Generation; Key Purpose; Key Rotation; Key Revocation; Key Destruction; Key Activation; Key Suspension; Key Deactivation; Key Archival; Key Compromise; Key Recovery; Key Inventory Management
Datacenter Security - DCS	Off-Site Equipment Disposal Policy and Procedures; Off-Site Transfer Authorization Policy and Procedures; Secure Area Policy and Procedures; Secure Media Transportation Policy and Procedures; Assets Classification; Assets Cataloguing and Tracking; Controlled Access Points; Equipment Identification; Secure Area Authorization; Surveillance System; Unauthorized Access Response Training; Cabling Security; Environmental Systems; Secure Utilities; Equipment Location
Data Security and Privacy Lifecycle Management - DSP	Security and Privacy Policy and Procedures; Secure Disposal; Data Inventory; Data Classification; Data Flow Documentation; Data Ownership and Stewardship; Data Protection by Design and Default; Data Privacy by Design and Default; Data Protection Impact Assessment; Sensitive Data Transfer; Personal Data Access, Reversal, Rectification and Deletion; Limitation of Purpose in Personal Data Processing; Personal Data Sub-processing; Disclosure of Data Sub-processors; Limitation of Production Data Use; Data Retention and Deletion; Sensitive Data Protection; Disclosure Notification; Data Location
Governance, Risk and Compliance - GRC	Governance Program Policy and Procedures; Risk Management Program; Organizational Policy Reviews; Policy Exception Process; Information Security Program; Governance Responsibility Model; Information System Regulatory Mapping; Special Interest Groups
Human Resources - HRS	Background Screening Policy and Procedures; Acceptable Use of Technology Policy and Procedures; Clean Desk Policy and Procedures; Remote and Home Working Policy and Procedures; Asset returns; Employment Termination; Employment Agreement Process; Employment
Identity and Access Management - IAM	Identity and Access Management Policy and Procedures; Strong Password Policy and Procedures; Identity Inventory; Separation of Duties; Least Privilege; User Access Provisioning; User Access Changes and Revocation; User Access Review; Segregation of Privileged Access Roles; Management of Privileged Access Roles; CSCs Approval for Agreed Privileged Access Roles; Safeguard Logs Integrity; Uniquely Identifiable Users; Strong Authentication; Passwords Management; Authorization Mechanisms
Interoperability and Portability - IPY	Interoperability and Portability Policy and Procedures; Application Interface Availability; Secure Interoperability and Portability Management; Data Portability Contractual Obligations
Infrastructure and Virtualization Security - IVS	Infrastructure and Virtualization Security Policy and Procedures; Capacity and Resource Planning; Network Security; OS Hardening and Base Controls; Production and Non-Production Environments; Segmentation and S
Logging and Monitoring - LOG	Logging and Monitoring Policy and Procedures; Audit Logs Protection; Security Monitoring and Alerting; Audit Logs Access and Accountability; Audit Logs Monitoring and Response; Clock Synchronization; Logging Scope; Log Records; Log Protection; Encryption Monitoring and Reporting; Transaction/Activity Logging; Access Control Logs; Failures and Anomalies Reporting
Security Incident Management, E-Discovery, and Cloud Forensics - SEF	Security Incident Management Policy and Procedures; Service Management Policy and Procedures; Incident Response Plans; Incident Response Testing; Incident Response Metrics; Event Triage Processes; Security Breach Notification; Points of Contact Maintenance
Supply Chain Management, Transparency, and Accountability - STA	SSRM Policy and Procedures; SSRM Supply Chain; SSRM Guidance; SSRM Control Ownership; SSRM Documentation Review; SSRM Control Implementation; Supply Chain Inventory; Supply Chain Risk Management; Primary Service and Contractual Agreement; Supply Chain Agreement Review; Internal Compliance Testing; Supply Chain Service Agreement Compliance; Supply Chain Governance Review; Supply Chain Data Security Assessment
Threat and Vulnerability Management - TVM	Threat and Vulnerability Management Policy and Procedures; Malware Protection Policy and Procedures; Vulnerability Remediation Schedule; Detection Updates; External Library Vulnerabilities; Penetration Testing; Vulnerability Identification; Vulnerability Prioritization; Vulnerability Management Reporting; Vulnerability Management Metrics
Universal Endpoint Management - UEM	Endpoint Devices Policy and Procedures; Application and Service Approval; Compatibility; Endpoint Inventory; Endpoint Management; Automatic Lock Screen; Operating Systems; Storage Encryption; Anti-Malware Detection and Prevention; Software Firewall; Data Loss Prevention; Remote Locate; Remote Wipe; Third-Party Endpoint Security Posture





CCM 4.0 Framework Coverage (especially Data Center, Data Security & Privacy, and Cryptography) is necessary for current Privacy, Processing and Cloud Cybersecurity Framework Controls











LEGAL Requirement - FISMA PL 113-283 NIST SP 800-53 r5, NIST SP 800-171 r2 and NIST SP 800-172



Federal Information Security Modernization Act FISMA



Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (Public Law 113-283; December 18, 2014).

The original FISMA was <u>Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002</u> (Public Law 107-347 (Title III); December 17, 2002), in the E-Government Act of 2002.

RELATED NEWS

Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements for CUI

April 27, 2021

NIST has released Draft Special Publication (SP) 800-172A, "Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements...

NISTIR 8212: ISCM Program Assessment and Tool

March 31, 202

NIST has published NISTIR 8212, "An Information Security Continuous Monitoring Program Assessment,".

NIST Publishes SP 800-172

February 2, 2021

NIST announces the release of Special Publication (SP) 800-172, "Enhanced Security Requirements for..

Draft NIST SP 800-47 Rev. 1 Available for Comment

January 26, 2021

Draft NIST SP 800-47 Revision 1, "Managing the Security of Information Exchanges," is now available.

Control Catalog and Baselines as Spreadsheets

January 26, 2021

New supplemental materials are available for SP 800-53 Rev. 5 and SP 800-53B: spreadsheets for the..

FOF

Information Security Management Act

CS

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- + identity & access management
- privacy
- + risk management
- + security & behavior
- + security measuremen
- + security programs & operations
- systems security engineering zero trust

+ Technologies

+ Applications

Laws and Regulations

+ executive documents

- laws

Cyber Security R&D Act

Cybersecurity Enhancement Act

E-Government Act

Energy Independence and Security Act

Federal Information Security Modernization Act

First Responder Network Authority

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act Help America Vote Act

+ regulations

+ Activities and Products

+ Sectors

RELATED TOPICS

Laws and Regulations: E-Government Act

Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information: Draft NIST SP 800-172A Available for Comment

April 27, 2021

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The protection of controlled unclassified information (CUI) in nonfederal systems and organizations—especially CUI associated with a critical program or high value asset—is important to federal agencies and can directly impact the ability of the Federal Government to successfully carry out its assigned missions and business operations. To determine if the enhanced security requirements in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-172, Enhanced Security Requirements for Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information: A Supplement to NIST Special Publication 800-171, have been satisfied, organizations develop assessment plans and conduct assessments.

Draft NIST SP 800-172A, Assessing Enhanced Security Requirements for Controlled Unclassified Information. provides

federal agencies and nonfederal organizations with assessment procedures that can be used to carry out assessments of the requirements in NIST SP 800-172. The generalized assessment procedures that can be used to carry out assessments of the requirements in NIST SP 800-172. The generalized assessment procedures are flexible, provide a framework and starting point to assess the enhanced security requirements, and can be tailored to the needs of organizations and assessors. Organizations tailor the assessment procedures by selecting specific assessment methods and objects to achieve the assessment objectives and by determining the scope of the assessment and the degree of rigor applied during the assessment process. The assessment procedures can be employed in self-assessments, independent third-party assessments, or assessments conducted by sponsoring organizations (e.g., government agencies). Such approaches may be specified in contracts or in agreements by participating parties. The findings and evidence produced during assessments can be used by organizations to facilitate risk-based decisions related to the CUI enhanced security requirements. In addition to developing determination statements for each enhanced security requirement. Porfx INIST SP 800-172A introduces an updated structure to incorporate organization-defined parameters into the determination statements.

NIST is seeking feedback on the assessment procedures, including the assessment objectives, determination statements, and the usefulness of the assessment objects and methods provided for each procedure. We are also interested in the approach taken to incorporate organization-defined parameters into the determination statements for the assessment objectives.

A public comment period for this document is open through June 11, 2021. See the <u>publication details</u> for a copy of the draft publication and instructions for submitting comments, preferably using the <u>comment template</u> provided. For any questions, please contact <u>sec-cert@nist.gov</u>.

NOTE: A call for patent claims is included on page Iv of this draft. For additional information, see the information Technology Laboratory (ITL) Patent Policy—Inclusion of Patents in ITL Publications.

RELATED TOPICS

Security and Privacy: controls assessment, security

Laws and Regulations: <u>Federal Information Security</u> Modernization Act, OMB Circular A-130

https://csrc.nist.gov/Topics/Laws-and-Regulations/laws/FISMA

Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations







FY 2021 IG METRICS DEPEND ON NIST SP 800-53 r5 -



https://www.cisa.gov/

FY21 FISMA

Documents | CISA

FY 2021 Inspector

General FISMA

Reporting


Measures v1.1

(cisa.gov)

2021

FY 2021 Inspector General Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) Reporting Metrics

Version 1.1 May 12,



Key Changes to the FY 2021 IG FISMA Metrics

One of the goals of the annual FISMA evaluations is to assess agencies' progress toward achieving outcomes that strengthen Federal cybersecurity, including implementing the Administration's priorities and best practices. One such area is increasing the maturity of the Federal government's Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) practices. As noted in the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018, agencies are required to assess, avoid, mitigate, accept, or transfer supply chain risks. The FY 2021 IG FISMA Reporting Metrics include a new domain on Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) within the Identify function. This new domain focuses on the maturity of agency SCRM strategies, policies and procedures, plans, and processes to ensure that products, system components, systems, and services of external providers are consistent with the organization's cybersecurity and supply chain risk management requirements. The new domain references SCRM criteria in NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-53, Rev. 5. Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations. To provide agencies with sufficient time to fully implement NIST 800-53, Rev 5., in accordance with OMB A-130, these new metrics should not be considered for the purposes of the Identify framework function rating.

EMAIL US™ CONTACT SITE MAP

Also, within the Identify function, specific metric questions have been reorganized and reworded to focus on the degree to which cyber risk management processes are integrated with enterprise risk management (ERM) processes. As an example, IGs are directed to evaluate how cybersecurity risk registers are used to communicate information at the information system, mission/business process, and organizational levels. These changes are consistent with NIST Interagency Report 8286, "Integrating Cybersecurity and Enterprise Risk Management (ERM)," which provides guidance to help organizations improve the cybersecurity risk information they provide as inputs to their enterprise ERM programs.⁴

Furthermore, OMB has issued guidance on improving vulnerability identification, management, and remediation. Specifically, Memorandum M-20-32, Improving Vulnerability Identification, Management, and Remediation, September 2, 2020, provides guidance to federal agencies on collaborating with members of the public to find and report vulnerabilities on federal information systems. In addition, DHS Binding Operational Directive 20-01, Develop and Publish a Vulnerability Disclosure Policy, September 2, 2020, provides guidance on the development and publishing of an agency's vulnerability disclosure policy and supporting handling procedures. The IG FISMA Reporting Metrics include a new question (#24) to measure the extent to which agencies utilize a vulnerability disclosure policy (VDP) as part of







Election Security




SP 800-53 R5 New Families, Attributes, and Outcomes

- Two new control families: (PT)
 Personally Identifiable Information
 Processing and Transparency, (SR)
 Supply Chain Risk Management
- Consolidates Program Management to main catalog (PM)
- Attributes: Control or control enhancement is implemented by "S" System, or "O" organization, or both "O/S"
- Integrated Privacy controls across the entire catalog notated by "P"
- ALL controls shift from descriptive to outcome - based criteria:
 - Example "The information system enforces approved" v. "Enforce approved authorization"



Transition to NIST SP 800-53 r5.1, you must.

-Yoda














NIST.GOV NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 final updates DECEMBER 2020












security and privacy programs to identify the degree of collaboration needed between security and privacy program



20 Families (Two New Domains)



The total number of tracked items since the start of NIST SP 800-53 is 1,189 items.
 That includes everything withdrawn and everything active. *Green boxes are the Control Families used for SP 800-171r2 and NIST SP 800-172.



1		NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Controls	1	NIST SP 800- 53B Control Baselines			More than editorial or administrative change?	Changed Elements	Change Details
1179	SR-5(2)	Acquisition Strategies, Tools, and Methods Assessments Prior to Selection, Acceptance, Modification, or Update					Y	New control enhancement	Perform assessments of systems, system components, or system services prior to selection, acceptance, modification, or update. Incorporates withdrawn control SA-12(7)
1180	SR-6	Supplier Assessments and Reviews			x	x	Y	New base control Adds to M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Assess and review the supply chain-related risks associated with suppliers or contractors and the system, system component, or system service they provide Incorporates withdrawn control SA-12(2)
1181	SR-6(1)	Supplier Assessments and Reviews Testing and Analysis					Y	New control enhancement	Employ specified analysis or testing of specified supply chain elements, processes, and actors associated with the system, system component, or system service Incorporates withdrawn control SA-12(11)
1182	SR-7	Supply Chain Operations Security					Υ	New base control	Employ specified OPSEC controls to protect supply chain-related information Incorporates withdrawn control SA-12(9)
1183	SR-8	Notification Agreements		x	x	x	Y	New base control Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-538)	Establish agreements and procedures with entities involved in the supply chain Incorporates withdrawn control SA-12(12)
1184	SR-9	Tamper Resistance and Detection				x	Y	New base control Adds to H Security Control Baseline (SP 800- 53B)	Addresses the need to implement a tamper protection program. Incorporates withdrawn control SA-18
1185	SR-9(1)	Tamper Resistance and Detection Multiple Stages of System Development Life Cycle				x	Υ	New control enhancement Adds to H Security Control Baseline (SP 800- 53B)	Employ anti-tamper technologies, tools, and techniques throughout the system development life cycle Incorporates withdrawn control SA-18(1)
1186	SR-10	Inspection of Systems or Components		x	x	x	Υ	New base control Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Inspect specified systems or system components to detect tampering Incorporates withdrawn control SA-18(2)
1187	SR-11	Component Authenticity		x	x	x	Υ	New base control Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Addresses the need to develop and implement anti-counterfeit policy and procedures, to include reporting counterfeit system components Incorporates withdrawn control SA-19
1188	SR-11(1)	Component Authenticity Anti- Counterfeit Training		x	x	x	Υ	New control enhancement Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Addresses need to train personnel to detect counterfeit system components Incorporates withdrawn control SA-19(1)
1189	SR-11(2)	Component Authenticity Configuration Control for Component Service and Repair		x	x	x	Y	New control enhancement Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-538)	Maintain configuration control over specified system components awaiting service or repair and serviced or repaired components awaiting return to service incorporates withdrawn control SA-19(2)
1190	SR-11(3)	Component Authenticity Anti- Counterfeit Scanning					Υ	New control enhancement	Periodically scan for counterfeit system components Incorporates withdrawn control SA-19(4)
1191	SR-12	Component Disposal		x	х	х	Υ	New base control Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-538)	Dispose of specified data, documentation, tools, or system components using the specified techniques and methods Incorporates withdrawn control SA-19(3)

- Big Domains/Families 20
- Medium Controls/Universe 298
- Small Tests Enhancements Detail 710











Some of the New Controls Affect the SSP Baselines Some Controls Do Not appear in any Baseline











These Controls Are Not Part of any Baseline



Ctrl ID	Control Name				
AC-9	Previous Logon Notification	PE-22	Component Marking	SC-40	Wireless Link Protection
AC-16	Security and Privacy Attributes	PE-23	Facility Location	SC-41	Port and I/O Device Access
AC-23	Data Mining Protection	PL-7	Concept of Operations	SC-42	Sensor Capability and Data
AC-24	Access Control Decisions	RA-6	Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Survey	SC-43	Usage Restrictions
AC-25	Reference Monitor	RA-10	Threat Hunting	SC-44	Detonation Chambers
AT-6	Training Feedback	SA-20	Customized Development of Critical Components	SC-45	System Time Synchronization
AU-13	Monitoring for Information Disclosure	SA-23	Specialization	SC-46	Cross Domain Policy Enforcement
AU-14	Session Audit	SC-6	Resource Availability	SC-47	Alternate Communications Paths
AU-16	Cross-organizational Audit Logging	SC-11	Trusted Path	SC-48	Sensor Relocation
CM-13	Data Action Mapping	SC-16	Transmission of Security and Privacy Attributes	SC-49	Hardware-enforced Separation and Policy Enforcement
CM-14	Signed Components	SC-25	Thin Nodes	SC-50	Software-enforced Separation and Policy Enforcement
CP-11	Alternate Communications Protocols	SC-26	Decoys	SC-51	Hardware-based Protection
CP-12	Safe Mode	SC-27	Platform-independent Applications	SI-13	Predictable Failure Prevention
CP-13	Alternative Security Mechanisms	SC-29	Heterogeneity	SI-14	Non-persistence
IA-9	Service Identification and Authentication	SC-30	Concealment and Misdirection	SI-15	Information Output Filtering
IA-10	Adaptive Authentication	SC-31	Covert Channel Analysis	SI-17	Fail-safe Procedures
IR-9	Information Spillage Response	SC-32	System Partitioning	SI-20	Tainting
MA-7	Field Maintenance	SC-34	Non-modifiable Executable Programs	SI-21	Information Refresh
MP-8	Media Downgrading	SC-35	External Malicious Code Identification	SI-22	Information Diversity
PE-19	Information Leakage	SC-36	Distributed Processing and Storage	SI-23	Information Fragmentation
PE-20	Asset Monitoring and Tracking	SC-37	Out-of-band Channels	SR-4	Provenance
PE-21	Electromagnetic Pulse Protection	SC-38	Operations Security	SR-7	Supply Chain Operations Security







These Controls & Enhancements are withdrawn / replaced



CTRL ID	Control Name				
AT-3.4	AT-3.4 Suspicious Communications and Anomalous System Behavior	IA-9.2	IA-9.2 Transmission of Decisions	SA-12.15	SA-12.15 Processes to Address Weaknesses or Deficiencies
AU-2.3	AU-2.3 Reviews and Updates	IR-9.1	IR-9.1 Responsible Personnel	SA-18.1	SA-18.1 Multiple Phases of System Development Life Cycle
AU-3.2	AU-3.2 Centralized Management of Planned Audit Record Content	PE-5.1	PE-5.1 Access to Output by Authorized Individuals	SA-18.2	SA-18.2 Inspection of Systems or Components
AU-7.2	AU-7.2 Automatic Sort and Search	PE-5.3	PE-5.3 Marking Output Devices	SA-19.1	SA-19.1 Anti-counterfeit Training
AU-8.1	AU-8.1 Synchronization with Authoritative Time Source	ource PE-18.1 PE-18.1 Facility Site SA-		SA-19.2	SA-19.2 Configuration Control for Component Service and Repair
AU-8.2	AU-8.2 Secondary Authoritative Time Source	PL-2.3 Plan and Coordinate with Other Organizational Entities		SA-19.3	SA-19.3 Component Disposal
AU-14.2	AU-14.2 Capture and Record Content	SA-12.1	SA-12.1 Acquisition Strategies / Tools / Methods	SA-19.4	SA-19.4 Anti-counterfeit Scanning
CA-3.1	CA-3.1 Unclassified National Security System Connections	SA-12.2	SA-12.2 Supplier Reviews	SA-22.1	SA-22.1 Alternative Sources for Continued Support
CA-3.2	CA-3.2 Classified National Security System Connections	SA-12.5	SA-12.5 Limitation of Harm	SC-34.3	SC-34.3 Hardware-based Protection
CA-3.3	CA-3.3 Unclassified Non-national Security System Connections	SA-12.7	SA-12.7 Assessments Prior to Selection / Acceptance / Update	SC-42.3	SC-42.3 Prohibit Use of Devices
CA-3.4	CA-3.4 Connections to Public Networks	SA-12.8	SA-12.8 Use of All-source Intelligence	SI-2.1	SI-2.1 Central Management
CA-3.5	CA-3.5 Restrictions on External System Connections	SA-12.9	SA-12.9 Operations Security	SI-3.1	SI-3.1 Central Management
CM-5.2	CM-5.2 Review System Changes	SA-12.10	SA-12.10 Validate as Genuine and Not Altered	SI-3.9	SI-3.9 Authenticate Remote Commands
CM-5.3	CM-5.3 Signed Components	SA-12.11	SA-12.11 Penetration Testing / Analysis of Elements, Processes, and Actors	SI-7.11	SI-7.11 Confined Environments with Limited Privileges
CM-8.5	CM-8.5 No Duplicate Accounting of Components	SA-12.12	SA-12.12 Inter-organizational Agreements	SI-7.13	SI-7.13 Code Execution in Protected Environments
CP-2.4	CP-2.4 Resume All Mission and Business Functions	SA-12.14	SA-12.14 Identity and Traceability	SI-7.14	SI-7.14 Binary or Machine Executable Code
IA-9.1	IA-9.1 Information Exchange			SI-8.1	SI-8.1 Central Management







268 New & Substantially changed Enhancements and Controls EnterpriseGRC Solutions, Inc.

- 20 (Big) Family Domains PT, SR
- 298 (Medium) Control Family /Universe (example AC-2)
- 710 (Child Small) Tests
 Enhancements (example AC-2(3))



Α	В	С	D	Е	F	G	н	I .
Rev 5 Update	NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Controls	53 B	ST S B C Base	ont line	rol es	More than editorial or administrative change? (Y/N)	Changed Elements	Change Details
CA-3(6)	Information Exchange Transfer Authorizations				x	Y	New control enhancement Adds to H Security Control Baseline (SP 800- 53B)	Verify that individuals or systems transferring data between interconnecting systems have the requisite authorizations
CA-3(7)	Information Exchange Transitive Information Exchanges					Υ	New control enhancement	Identify transitive (downstream) information exchanges with other systems and take measures to ensure that transitive information exchanges cease when the controls cannot be verified or validated
CA-6(1)	Authorization Joint Authorization — Intra - Organization		Y		Y	New control enhancement	Employ a joint authorization process that includes multiple authorizing officials from the same organization	
CA-6(2)	Authorization Joint Authorization — Inter - Organizations					Y	New control enhancement	Employ a joint authorization process that includes multiple authorizing officials with at least one authorizing official from an organization external to the organization conducting the authorization
CA-7(4)	Continuous Monitoring Risk Monitoring	х	х	x	x	Y	New control enhancement Adds to Privacy Control Baseline (SP 800-53B) Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Ensure risk monitoring is an integral part of the continuous monitoring strategy
CA-7(5)	Continuous Monitoring Consistency Analysis					Y	New control enhancement	Employ specific actions to validate that policies are established and implemented controls operate in a consistent manner
CA-7(6)	Continuous Monitoring Automation Support for Monitoring					Y	New control enhancement	Ensure the accuracy, currency, and availability of monitoring results for the system using specified automated mechanisms
CA-8(3)	Penetration Testing Facility Penetration Testing					Y	New control enhancement	Employ a penetration testing process that includes defined frequency of announced and unannounced attempts to bypass or circumvent physical access point controls
CM-3(7)	Configuration Change Control Review System Changes					Y	New control enhancement	Review changes to the system at a specific frequency or for specific circumstances to determine whether unauthorized changes have occurred Incorporates withdrawn control CM-5(2)
CM-3(8)	Configuration Change Control Prevent or Restrict Configuration Changes					Y	New control enhancement	Prevent or restrict changes to the configuration of the system under the specific circumstances
CM-7(6)	Least Functionality Confined Environments With Limited Privileges					Y	New control enhancement	Requires specified user-installed software execute in a confined physical or virtual machine environment with limited privileges Incorporates withdrawn control SI-7(11)









75 Changes have implications in the Baselines, NIST 800-53B



- Privacy Attribute (P)
- Part of Low, Medium, High
- Changes to details and modifications to the baselines used for FedRamp
- Addition of S/O/SO attribute
- Associated Tailoring Criteria

Rev 5 Update	NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Controls	NIST SP 800- 53B Control Baselines			rol	More than editorial or administrative change? (Y/N)	Changed Elements	Change Details
AC-3(14)	Access Enforcement Individual Access	х				Υ	New control enhancement Adds to Privacy Control Baseline (SP 800-53B)	Mechanisms for individuals to have access to PII Incorporates individual access elements of withdrawn App J control IP-2
AT-2(3)	Literacy Training and Awareness Social Engineering and Mining			x	х	Υ	New control enhancement Adds to M and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Provide literacy training on recognizing and reporting potential and actual instances of social engineering and social mining
AT-3(5)	Role-Based Training Processing Personally Identifiable Information	X				Υ	New control enhancement Adds to Privacy Control Baseline (SP 800-538)	Provide specific personnel or roles with initial and at a specific frequency training in the employment and operation of PII processing and transparency controls Incorporates training elements of withdrawn App J control UL-2
AU-3(3)	Content of Audit Records Limit Personally Identifiable Information Elements	x				Υ	New control enhancement Adds to Privacy Control Baseline (SP 800-53B)	Limit PII contained in audit records to the specific elements identified in the privacy risk assessment
CA-3(6)	Information Exchange Transfer Authorizations	er X Y		Υ	New control enhancement Adds to H Security Control Baseline (SP 800- 53B)	Verify that individuals or systems transferring data between interconnecting systems have the requisite authorizations		
CA-7(4)	Continuous Monitoring Risk Monitoring	x	x	x	x	Υ	New control enhancement Adds to Privacy Control Baseline (SP 800-53B) Adds to L, M, and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Ensure risk monitoring is an integral part of the continuous monitoring strategy
CM-12	Information Location			х	х	Υ	New base control Adds to M and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Identify and document the location of specific information and the specific system components on which the information resides; the users who have access; and changes to the location where the information resides
CM-12(1)	Information Location Automated Tools to Support Information Location			x	x	Υ	New control enhancement Adds to M and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Use automated tools to identify specific information by information type on specific system components to ensure controls are in place to protect organizational information and individual privacy
CP-9(8)	System Backup Cryptographic Protection	X X Y A		Y	New control enhancement Adds to M and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Requires implementing cryptographic mechanisms to prevent unauthorized disclosure and modification of specified backup information		
IA-12	Identity Proofing	x x Y		Y	New base control Adds to M and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Identity proof users for logical access based on identity assurance level requirements		
IA-12(2)	Identity Proofing Identity Evidence	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		х	Υ	New control enhancement Adds to M and H Security Control Baselines (SP 800-53B)	Requiring evidence of individual identification be presented to the registration authority reduces the likelihood of individuals using fraudulent identification to establish an identity	







Three Tiers – Domain, Control, Test



															Solutions, Inc.						
Assessm	Assess	Assessme	Assess	Assessment	Assessment	Assessment	Assessment	Assessment	Assessme	Assessme	Assessmen	Assessme	Assessm	Assessme	Assessme	Assessme	Assessment	Assessment	Assessment Testing. Detail Control Description (UCF)	Assessment	Assessment Assessment
ent	ment	nt	ment	Universe.Control	Universe.Control	Universe.Risk	Universe.TestingPro	Universe.Test ID	nt	nt	t	nt	ent	nt	nt	nt	Testing.Test_ID	Testing.Detail		Testing.Problem	Testing.Privac Testing.Assurance
Edition	Domai	Domain	Contr	Control Objective	Control Objective	Risk	TestingProcedure	Test ID	Unified	Unified	Privacy	IMPLEME	Assuranc	Baseline	Baseline	Baseline	Test_ID	Detail Control	Detail Control Description (UCF)	Problem Metadata	Privacy Assurance
or	n ID	Name	ol ID		Description				Testing	Universe	Control	NTED BY	e	Low	Medium	High		Objective			
Source									Map	Mapping	Baseline										
			Y		Y .		· · · · · · · ·	_	4	_ Y					· · ·		×		· ·	Y	<u> </u>
2.5	DE	ACCESS	//0-2	Delian and	oi Control.	Discussion. Access	1521 [50 000 178]		A.5.1.2,	A.C.1		/	Ô	AC 2	A						At issue in
53 r5	33-03	CONTROL		Policy and Procedures	 Develop, document, and 	procedures	162], [SP 800-178], [SP 800-192].			A.9.1.											At 1330C III
		CONTROL		riocedules	disseminate to	address the	[37 800-152].		A.9.1.1,												
					[Assignment:	controls in the AC			A.12.1.1,												mapping:
NIST 800	AC 800-	AC-	AC-2	AC-2 Account	Control:	Discussion:		AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC		A.9.2, AC-		0		AC-2	AC-2	AC-2	AC-2.1 Automated	AC-2.1 Automated	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT	AUTOMATIC	110
53 r5	53-R5	ACCESS		Manageont	a. Define and	Examples of system	References:		A.9.2.2,		/						System Account	System Account	MANAGEMENT	NOTIFICATION;	Source
_		CONTROL			document the types		[PRIVACT], [OMB A-		A.9.2.3,	AC-6, AC-	'						Management	Management	Employ automated mechanisms to support the	MONITOR ACCOUNT	Jource
					of system accounts	include individual,	130], [SP 800-57-1],	2(7), AC-2(8), AC-	A.9.2.5,	17, AC-18,								\ '/	management of system accounts.	USAGE; TELEPHONE	Desimonts
					an owed for use	shared, group,	[SP 800-57-2], [SP	2(9), AC-2(11), AC-	A.9.2.6	AC-20 AC-									Supplemental Guidance: The use of automated	NOTIFICATION; EMAIL	Documents
NIST 800	AC 800-	AC-	AC-2	AC-2 Account	Cont. ol:	Discussion:		AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC	- A.9.2.1,	A.9.2 AC-		0		AC-2	AC-2	AC-2	AC-2.2 Automated	AC-2.7 Automated	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT REMOVAL OF TEMPORARY AND	AUTOMATICALLY	
53 r5	53-R5			Management	a. Define and	Examples of system		2(3), AC-2(4), AC-		3, A -5,							Temporary and	Tem orary and	EMERGENCY ACCOUNTS	REMOVE;	Control ID v.
		CONTROL			documen the types	account types	[PRIVACT], [OMB A-		A.9.2.3,	AC-5, AC-							Emergency Account	Emertency Accoun	Automatically [Selection: remove; disable] temporary	AUTOMATICALLY	COLLEGE ID V.
/							130], [SP 800-57-1],		A.9.2.5,	17 AC-18,							Management	Mahalement	and emergency accounts after [Assignment: organization		Tub an ac mac at
/ 					allowed for use	shared, group,	[SP 800-57-2], [SP		A.9.2.6	A -20, AC-		_						./\	defined time-period for each type of account].	ACCOUNTS	Enhancement –
53 r5	AC 800-		AC-2	AC-2 Account	Control: a. Define and	Discussion: Examples of system		AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC 2(3), AC-2(4), AC-		9.2, AC- , AC-5,		0		AC-2	AC-2	AC-2	AC-2.3 Disable	A /-2.3 hisable	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT DISABLE ACCOUNTS Automatically disable accounts when the accounts:	AUTOMATICALLY	
55 15	55-K5	CONTROL		Management			[PRIVACT], [OMB A-		A.9.2.2, A.9.2.3.	, AC-5, C-6, AC-							Accounts	A counts	(a) Have expired;	DISABLE; INACTIVE ACCOUNTS	Detail IDs
		CONTROL			of system accounts		130], [SP 800-57-1],		A.9.2.5, A.9.2.5,	17. AC-18.								<i>I</i> 1	(b) Are no longer associated to a user;	ACCOUNTS	Detail 123
					allowed for use	shared, group,		2(9), AC-2(11), AC-	A.9.2.6	AC-20, AC-									(c) Are in violation of organizational policy;		without
NIST 800	AC 800-	AC-	AC-2	AC-2 Account	Control:	Discussion:	[01 000-57-2], [01	AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC		A.9.2, AC-		0		AC-2	AC-2	AC-2	AC-2.4 Automated	C-2.4 At tomated	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT AUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONS	AUTOMATED AUDIT:	WILLIOUL
53 r5				Management	a. Define and	Examples of system	References:	2(3), AC-2(4), AC-	A.9.2.2,	3, AC-5,		_					Audit Actions	udit Act ons	Automatically audit account creation, modification,	ACCOUNT CREATION;	
		CONTROL			document the types		[PRIVACT], [OMB A-		A.9.2.3,	AC-6, AC-									enabling, disabling, and removal actions, and notify	ACCOUNT	meaningful
					of system accounts	include individual,	130], [SP 800-57-1],	2(7), AC-2(8), AC-	A.9.2.5,	17, AC-18,								N I	[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles].	MODIFICATION;	
					allowed for use	shared, group,	[SP 800-57-2], [SP	2(9), AC-2(11), AC-	A.9.2.6	AC-20, AC-									Supplemental Guidance: None.	ACCOUNT ENABLING;	identifiers
	AC 800-		AC-2	AC-2 Account	Control:	Discussion:		AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC	- A.9.2.1,	.9.2, AC-		0		AC-2	AC-2	AC-2	AC-2.5 Inactivity	AC 2.5 I activity	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT INACTIVITY LOGOUT	INACTIVITY; LOGOUT	identifiers
53 r5	53-R5	ACCESS		Management	a. Define and	Examples of system		2(3), AC-2(4), AC-	A.9.2.2,	AC-5,							Logout	Logout	Require that users log out when [Assignment:		
		CONTROL			document the types		[PRIVACT], [OMB A-		A.9.2.3,	AC-6, AC-								\ \	organization-defined time-period of expected inactivity		Attributes
							130], [SP 800-57-1],		A 9.2.5,	13 AC-18,								V	or description of when to log out].		1 1001 110 01 000
					allowed for use	shared, group,	[SP 800-57-2], [SP	2(9), AC-2(11), AC-	A.9.2.6	AC 20, AC-		_							Supplemental Guidance: This control enhancement is		added under
	AC 800-	ACCESS	AC-2	AC-2 Account	Control:	Discussion:	D (AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC 2(3), AC-2(4), AC-	- A.9.2.1,	A.912, AC-		0		AC-2	AC-2	AC-2	AC-2.6 Dynamic	AC-2 6 Lynamic	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT DYNAMIC PRIVILEGE MANAGEMENT	DYNAMIC PRIVILEGE	added dildei
51 (5	53-K5	CONTROL		Management	a. Defi le and	Examples of system	[PRIVACT], [OMB A-	212111111111111111111111111111111111111	A.9.2.2,	Adds,							Privilege	Privilege		MANAGEMENT;	
		CONTROL			document the types				A.9.2.5, A.9.2.5,	17. AC 8.							Management	Managem nt	Implement the following dynamic privilege management capabilities: [Assignment: organization-defined list of	DYNAMIC ACCESS CONTROL; RESILIENCY;	certification
				ie Par	all twill for use	include individual,	[SP 8 JC-57 2], SP	2(5), AC-2(8), AC-	A.9.2.5, A.9.2.6	AC-20, A									dynamic privilege management capabilities].	RESILIENCE;	
NIST 800	AC 800	AC-	AC-2	AC-2 Account	Control:	Discussion:	[3F 6 J. +37 2], \3F	AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC		A.9.2. AC-		0		AC-2	AC-2	AC-2	AC-2.7 Privileged	AC-2.7 Privilege	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT ROLE-BASED SCHEMES	PRIVILEGED USER	conditions, v.
53 65		ACCESS		Macagement	a. Defire and	Exa noles of system	References:		A.9.2.2,								User Accounts	User Accounts	Establish and administer privileged user accounts in	ACCOUNTS;	conditions, v.
		CONTROL			document her you		[PRIVACT], [OMB A-		A.9.2.3.	AC-6, A2									ccordance with a role-based access scheme that	PRIVILEGED ROLE	
							130], [SP 800-57-1],	2(7), AC-2(8), AC-	A.9.2.5,	17, AC-18,									organizes allowed system access and privileges into	ASSIGNMENTS; ROLE	core control
					allowed for use	shared, group,	[SP 800-57-2], [SP	2(9), AC-2(11), AC-	A.9.2.6	AC-20, AC-									roles,	BASED ACCESS	
NIST 800	AC 800-	AC-	AC-2	AC-2 Account	Control:	Discussion:		AC-2(1), AC-2(2), AC	A.9.2.1,	A.9.2, AC-		0		AC-2	AC-2	AC-2	AC-2.8 Dynamic	AC-2.8 Dynamic	ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT DYNAMIC ACCOUNT	DYNAMIC ACCOUNT	statement
53 r5	53-R5			Management	a. Define and	Examples of system		2(3), AC-2(4), AC-	A.9.2.2,	3, AC-5,							Account	Account	MANAGEMENT	CREATION; TRUST	Statement
		CONTROL			document the types		[PRIVACT], [OMB A-		A 2.2.3,	AC-6, AC-							Management	Management	Create, activate, manage, and deactivate [Assignment:	RELATIONSHIPS;	
						include individual,	130], [SP 800-57-1],		A.9.2.5,	17, AC-18,									organization-defined system accounts] dynamically.	RESILIENCY;	
NUCT DOG					allowed for use	shared, group,	[SP 800-57-2], [SP	2(9), AC-2(11), AC-		AC-20, AC-		_				100	****	****	Supplemental Guidance: Approaches for dynamically	RESILIENCE	
																			TOTAL OF THE PROPERTY OF THE P		










You CANNOT do this by hand - OSCAL (nist.gov)





Providing control-related information in machine-readable formats.

NIST, in collaboration with industry, is developing the Open Security Controls Assessment Language (OSCAL). OSCAL is a set of formats expressed in XML, JSON, and YAML. These formats provide machine-readable representations of control catalogs, control baselines, system security plans, and assessment plans and results.

Layers and Models Reference (nist.gov)

Concepts Used in OSCAL (nist.gov)











Attribute Changes Manual & Automation Resources



Tailoring Criteria for NIST 171 Depend Upon 800-53

- (171r2) security controls are taken from NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4. These tables will be updated upon publication of [SP 800-53B] which will provide an update to the moderate security control baseline consistent with NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5. Changes to the moderate baseline will affect future updates to the basic and derived security requirements
- The same tailoring criteria were applied to the security requirements in [FIPS 200] resulting in the CUI basic security requirements
- There is a close relationship between the security objectives of confidentiality and integrity. Therefore, the security controls in the [SP 800-53] moderate baseline that support protection against unauthorized disclosure also support protection against unauthorized modification.
- 39 The security controls tailored out of the moderate baseline (i.e., controls specifically marked as either NCO or NFO and highlighted in the darker blue shading in Tables E-1 through E-17), are often included as part of an organization's comprehensive security program.

FedRAMP OSCAL Resources and Templates

FedRAMP has published resources to aid stakeholders and vendors in the digitization of FedRAMP authorization package content. Located on the FedRAMP Automation GitHub Repository, these include:

- New Guide to OSCAL-based FedRAMP <u>Content</u>. Guidance and concepts common to all FedRAMP deliverables when using OSCAL.
- Revised Guide to OSCAL-based FedRAMP System Security Plans (SSP).
- New Guide to OSCAL-based FedRAMP Security Assessment Plans (SAP).
- New Guide to OSCAL-based FedRAMP Security Assessment Reports (SAR).
- New Guide to OSCAL-based FedRAMP Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M).
- Revised Updated FedRAMP OSCAL Registry.
 Revised OSCAL-based FedRAMP SSP Templates/Samples.
 FedRAMP SSP Template in both XML and JSON formats.
- New OSCAL-based FedRAMP <u>Templates/Samples</u>.
 There are now three additional templates/samples covering the SAP, SAR, and POA&M. These exist in both XML and JSON formats.
- Revised FedRAMP <u>Baselines</u>. (XML and JSON formats)
 The baselines now include a "CORE" property, enabling tools to identify the FedRAMP core controls; as well as the assessment objectives and methods (Examine, Interview, Test) found in a blank test case workbook (TCW).
- New Experimental Resources.
 FedRAMP is offering additional support files to aid tool developers. These provide content in XML and JSON that is relevant to FedRAMP authorization packages yet does not fit in the official OSCAL syntax.









CSF Tools Depends upon Framework **Updates**

FRAMEWORKS AND CONTROLS

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

CSF Version 1.1 [Summary]

NIST Special Publication 800-53

NIST SP 800-53, Revision

4 [Summary]

NIST SP 800-53, Revision

5 [Summary]

CSA Cloud Controls Matrix

Cloud Controls Matrix

v3.0.1 [Summary] (Update to CCM

4 in process)

CIS Critical Security Controls

Critical Security Controls

v7.1 [Summary] (Update to CSC 8.1

in process)

STRIDE-LM Threat Model












Welcome to CSF Tools



FRAMEWORKS AND CONTROLS

NIST Cybersecurity Framework

Search ...

- CSF Version 1.1 [Summary]
- NIST Special Publication 800-53
- NIST SP 800-53, Revision 4 [Summary]
- NIST SP 800-53, Revision 5 [Summary]
- · CSA Cloud Controls Matrix
- · Cloud Controls Matrix v3.0.1 [Summary]
- · CIS Critical Security Controls
- Critical Security Controls v7.1 [Summary]
- · STRIDE-LM Threat Model



NIST Cyber Security Framework CSF

Control Enhancements

RA-5(2): Update Vulnerabilities to Be Scanned

BASELINE(S): Low Moderate High

Update the system vulnerabilities to be scanned [Assignment (one or more): [Assignment: organization-defined frequency], prior to a new scan, when new vulnerabilities are identified and reported].

RA-5(3): Breadth and Depth of Coverage

BASELINE(S): (Not part of any baseline)

Define the breadth and depth of vulnerability scanning coverage.

RA-5(4): Discoverable Information

BASELINE(S): High

Determine information about the system that is discoverable and take [Assignment: organization-defined corrective actions].

RA-5(5): Privileged Access

BASELINE(S): Moderate High

Implement privileged access authorization to [Assignment: organizationdefined system components] for [Assignment: organization-defined vulnerability scanning activities].

RA-5(6): Automated Trend Analyses

BASELINE(S): (Not part of any baseline)

Compare the results of multiple vulnerability scans using [Assignment: organization-defined automated mechanisms].

RA-5(8): Review Historic Audit Logs

BASELINE(S): (Not part of any baseline)

Review historic audit logs to determine if a vulnerability identified in a [Assignment: organization-defined system] has been previously exploited within an [Assignment: organization-defined time period].

RA-5(10): Correlate Scanning Information

BASELINE(S): (Not part of any baseline)

Correlate the output from vulnerability scanning tools to determine the presence of multi-vulnerability and multi-hop attack vectors.

RA-5(11): Public Disclosure Program

BASELINE(S): Low Moderate High

Establish a public reporting channel for receiving reports of vulnerabilities in organizational systems and system components.

Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning – CSF Tools

NIST Special Publication 800-53 > NIST SP 800-53, Revision 5 > RA: Risk Assessment

RA-5: Vulnerability Monitoring and Scanning

Control Family: Risk Assessment

CSF Relationships: ID.RA-1: Asset vulnerabilities are identified and documented

PR.IP-12: A vulnerability management plan is developed and implemented

DE.AE-2: Detected events are analyzed to understand attack targets...

DE.CM-8: Vulnerability scans are performed

DE.DP-4: Event detection information is communicated DE.DP-5: Detection processes are continuously improved RS.AN-1: Notifications from detection systems are investigated

RS.MI-3: Newly identified vulnerabilities are mitigated or documented...

Baselines: Low RA-5(2)(11)

> Moderate RA-5 (2) (5) (11) High RA-5(2)(4)(5)(11)

Privacy N/A

Previous Version: NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 (RA-5)



Incorporates the following control from the previous version: RA-5 (1): Update Tool

Capability.

Control

- a. Monitor and scan for vulnerabilities in the system and hosted applications [Assignment: organization-defined frequency and/or randomly in accordance with organization-defined process] and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the system are identified and reported;
- b. Employ vulnerability monitoring tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using standards for:



Search




FRAMEWORKS AND CONTROLS

- · NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- CSF Version 1.1 [Summary]
- NIST Special Publication 800-53
- NIST SP 800-53, Revision 4 [Summary]
- NIST SP 800-53, Revision 5 [Summary]
- AC: Access Control
- AT: Awareness and Training
- AU: Audit and Accountability
- CA: Assessment, Authorization, and Monitoring
- CM: Configuration Management
- CP: Contingency Planning
- IA: Identification and Authentication
- IR: Incident Response













STRIDE – CSF
Tool Depends
Upon Updates
to NIST SP
800-53 Rev 5,
CSA CCM 4.0,
CIS CSC 8.1

Spoofing Tampering

NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5

This page contains an overview of the controls provided by NIST to protect organization personnel and assets. NIST includes baselines for various security levels. The "Low" security level is applicable to all assets.







FRAMEWORKS AND CONTROLS

- · NIST Cybersecurity Framework
- CSF Version 1.1 [Summary]
- NIST Special Publication 800–53
- NIST SP 800-53, Revision 4 [Summary]
- NIST SP 800-53, Revision 5 [Summary]
- · CSA Cloud Controls Matrix
- Cloud Controls Matrix v3.0.1 [Summary]
- · CIS Critical Security Controls
 - Critical Security Controls v7.1 [Summary]
- · STRIDE-LM Threat Model









What's so hard about mapping?










How to map

EnterpriseGRC Solutions, Inc.

- Have a workplan
- Identify what sources and domains should map line up the full schema
- Iterate
- Finalize
- Negative Map (what should have but didn't)
- Map the Missing
- QA
- Communicate back to content owners







For Each Control Statement gather keywords, concepts and suitable common domains




- Search for list of testable items based on keywords and common terms, including global spelling. Consider more than "does it" by asking if the implied understanding of the control is that it "should".
- Prepare a list of probable matches likely 1-2% of total population.
- Consider overuse and reduce the number of times we use same items
- Consider that the client may use multiple controls to accomplish a same objective. This exercise may result in client customization to their written policies and program objectives.





Mapping Plan -> Records need sufficient legal rights to put into a searchable system.











Encryption – Let's discuss –Transition to CCM 4.0 ASAP



	_			F Lis			Robin Basham (robin@enterprisegro	c.com) is signed i
				r po	ol			
				p ic	cy CSA Test language - pre adoption/ CSA edits		Unified Testing Map:Test_ID	
Source V4.U	▼ Client ID	Control Objective Control Objective	Control Objective Description Establish, document, approve,	1	▼ open ▼	Unified Testing Map	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	ified Universe
	CEK-01 Encryption and		communicate, apply, evaluate and		CCM_CEK-1.1 A re cryptography ,	A.10.1.1, A.10.1.2, A.13.2.1,	C.5.2 Policy; C.8.3 Information security risk treatment; A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.13.2 Information	ISO27701_6.5;
CCIVI V4.U	. OFF OR OFF D. I.	icy Procedures	Derine and implement cryptographic,	\vdash	encryption and key management	A.13.2.2, A.18.1.3, A.18.1.5,	transfer; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual requirements; ISO27701_6.5 Asset	
Cloud	CEK-02 CEK Roles and	CEK Roles and Responsibilities	encryption and key management roles		CCM_CEK-2.1 Are cryptography ,		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	A.18.1; CLD.6.3
Ccrvrv4to	B Responsibilities		Provide cryptographic protection to data-	+	encryption and key management roles	A.13.1.3, A.13.2.1, A.18.1.3,	Network security management; A.13.2 Information transfer; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and A.6.2 Mobile devices and teleworking: A.8.3 Media handling: A.10.1 Cryotographic controls: A.13.2	A.13.2; A.14.1;
Cloud	돌 불 CEK-03 Data Encryptio	n Data Encryption	at-rest and in-transit, using		CCM_CEK-3.1 Are data at-rest and in- transit cryptographically protected using	, , , ,	Information transfer; A.14.1 Security requirements of information systems; A.18.1 Compliance with	A.18.1; AC-19;
			use encryption argorithms that are	Н	CCM CEK-4.1 Are appropriate encryption		A.8.2 Information classification; A.8.3 Media handling; A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.14.1 Security	A.14.1; A.18.1;
Cloud	CEK-04 Encryption Algorithm	Encryption Algorithm	appropriate for data protection,		algorithms used for data protection,	A.14.1.2. A.14.1.3. A.18.1.3.	requirements of information systems; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual requirements; SA	
CCIVI V4.0	CEN OF Farmentian Ch	ange.	Estabilish a standard change f d	Н	CCM_CEK-5.1 Are standard change		A.8.2 Information classification; A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.12.1 Operational procedures and	A.14.2; A.18.1;
Cloud	CEK-05 Encryption Ch	Encryption Change Management	management procedure, to		management procedures established to		responsibilities; A.14.2 Security in development and support processes; A.18.1 Compliance with legal	
CCIVI V4.U	CEV OF Framentian Ch		manage and adopt changes to*	Н			C.6.1 Actions to address risks & opportunities; A.6.1 Internal organization; A.10.1 Cryptographic	A.12.1; A.13.2;
Cloud	CEK-06 Encryption Ch Cost Benefit Analysis	Encryption Change Cost Benefit Analysis	cryptography-, encryption-, and key		, encryption- and key management-	A.18.1.3, ISO27701_6.7.1,	controls; A.12.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities; A.13.2 Information transfer; A.14.2	A.14.2; HT_09.
Ccrvrv4:u	CEN 03 Francisco Pia	l.	Establish and maintain an encryption	\vdash	- ''			ISO27701_6.7;
Cloud	CEK-07 Encryption Ris	Encryption Risk Management	and key management risk program that		CCM_CEK-7.1 Is a cryptographic, encryption and key management risk		A.6.1 Internal organization; A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual requirements; ISO27701 6.7 Cryptography; CM-3 Configuration Change Control; SA-9	3; SA-9; SC-8; S
CCIVI V4.U	CEN OR CCC N		CSP's must provide the capability for	\vdash				CLD.6.3; CLD.1
Cloud	CEK-08 CSC Key Management Capabil	CSC Key Management Capability	CSCs to manage their own data		CCM_CEK-8.1 Are CSC's provided the	A.10.1.2, A.15.1.2, A.15.1.3, CLD.6.3.1, CLD.12.1.5, CA-6(2), CP-	A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.15.1 Information security in supplier relationships; CLD.6.3	CCPA2018-T12-
Ccrvrv4:u	o Management Capabil	ity	Aŭāīt encryption and key management	H	capability to manage their own data		Relationship between cloud service customer and cloud service provider; CLD.12.1 Operational	A.18.2; C.9.2;
Cloud	CEK-09 Encryption and Key Management Au	Encryption and Key Management Audit	systems, policies, and processes with a		CCM_CEK-9.1 Are encryption and key	CCPA12.1.4 1798.140(d), 2.3.0 BMSN, 3.6.5 PCD, 3.6.6 PCD,	A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.12.7 Information systems audit considerations; A.18.2 Information security reviews; C.9.2 Internal audit; ISO27701_6.7 Cryptography; N171_3.14 System and Information	ISO27701_6.7;
CCIVITV4T.U	ರ Key Management Au	lit	Generate Chyptographic keys using	Н	management systems, policies, and			10; SC-12; SC-2
Cloud	돌 날 CEK-10 Key Generatio	n Key Generation	industry-accepted cryptographic		CCM_CEK-10.1 Are cryptographic keys		A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual requirements; SA-10	
Ccrvrv4t.u			ivlanage cryptographic secret and	₩	being generated using industry		Developer Configuration Management; SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management; SC-	HT_10.03; 3_P
Cloud	돌 날 CEK-11 Key Purpose	Key Purpose	private keys that are provisioned for a		CCM_CEK-11.1 Are cryptographic secret	A.9.2.4, A.9.3.1, A.10.1.1, A.10.1.2,	A.9.2 User access management; A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; 10.03 Cryptographic Controls; 3_PCD	5; SC-12; CC6.1
Ccrvrv4to (Kötäte cryptograpnic keys in accordance	Н	and private keys that are provisioned fo		Protect Stored Data; IA-5 Authenticator Management; SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and	ISO27701_6.7;
	돌 보 CEK-12 Key Rotation	Key Rotation	with the calculated cryptoperiod, which		CCM_CEK-12.1 Are cryptographic keys	A.10.1.1, A.10.1.2, A.12.4.1,	A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.12.4 Logging and monitoring; ISO27701_6.7 Cryptography; N171_3.5	
Ccrvrv4to			Define, imprement and evaluate	H	rotated based on a cryptoperiod	ISO27701_6.7.1, N172_3.5.2e,	Identification and Authentication; 6_MVMP Develop and Maintain Secure Systems and Applications.;	A.10.1; A.11.2;
Cloud	돌 '	n Key Revocation	processes, procedures and technical		CCM_CEK-13.1 Are cryptographic keys	11.300(b), A.10.1.1, A.10.1.2,	Sec. 11.300 Controls for identification codes/passwords; A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.11.2	A.10.1; A.11.2; A.12.1; A.15.1;
Ccrvrv4to C			Derine, implement and evaluate	Н	revoked and removed prior to the end of		Equipment; A.12.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities; A.15.1 Information security in	A.18.1; CLD.12.
Cloud	돌 남 CEK-14 Key Destructio	n Key Destruction	processes, procedures, and technical				A.8.1 Responsibility for assets; A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.11.2 Equipment; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual requirements; CLD.12.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities; 10.03	
Ccrvrv4to (Define, imprement and evaluate	Н	and technical measures to destroy keys	· - · ·		A.14.1; A.18.1;
Cloud	돌 불 CEK-15 Key Activation	Key Activation	processes, procedures, and technical		CCM_CEK-15.1 Are Processes, procedures		A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.12.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities; A.14.1 Security	CLD.12.1; HT_1
Ccroroidto G			Define, implement and evaluate	Н-	and technical measures to create keys	CLD.12.1.5, AC-3(8), IA-5(2), SA-	requirements of information systems; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual requirements;	
Cloud	돌 불 CEK-16 Key Suspensio	n Key Suspension	processes, procedures, and technical		CCM_CEK-16.1 Are Processes, procedures		A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.14.1 Security requirements of information systems; CM-3 Configuration	
Ccrvrv4t.u	3 8 ' '		Define, implement and evaluate	Н-	and technical measures to monitor,	3(6), MP-6(1), HT_6.d, HT_6.g,	,	
	E CEK-17 Key Deactivat	on Key Deactivation	processes, procedures and technical		CCM_CEK-17.1 Are Processes, procedures		A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.12.1 Operational procedures and responsibilities; A.14.1 Security	A.14.1; A.18.1;
Ccrvrv4t.u	3 8 '		Define, imprement and evaluate	Н-	and technical measures to deactivate		requirements of information systems; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual requirements;	HT_10.03; 3_P(
Cloud	E KEK-18 Key Archival	Key Archival	processes, procedures, and technical		CCM_CEK-18.1 Are Processes, procedures		A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.13.2 Information transfer; A.14.2 Security in development and support	
CCIVI V4.0	3 8		Derine, implement and evaluate	Н.	and technical measures to manage	A.18.1.3, SA-15(11), SC-12(1),	processes; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual requirements; SA-15 Development Process,	15; SC-12; HT_
	E CEK-19 Key Comprom	ise Key Compromise	processes, procedures, and technical		CCM_CEK-19.1 Are Processes, procedures		A.8.3 Media handling; A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.11.2 Equipment; A.18.1 Compliance with legal	A.18.1;
Ccrvrv4:u	3 8		Derine, implement and evaluate	Н.	and technical measures to encrypt		and contractual requirements; ISO27701_6.5 Asset management; SC-12 Cryptographic Key	ISO27701_6.5;
	S CEK-20 Key Recovery	Key Recovery	processes, procedures and technical				, A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual requirements; SA-9	SC-12; SC-28; S
CCIVI V4.0		,,	Derine, implement and evaluate	Щ.	and technical measures to assess the	SC-12(3), SC-28(1), SI-7(6), HT_6.d,		of CCPA2018-T14
	CEK-21 Key Inventory	Key Inventory Management	processes, procedures and technical				, A.10.1 Cryptographic controls; A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual requirements; SA-9	SC-12; SC-28; S
	Management	· · · ·		Ш	and technical measures being defined,	SC-12(3), SC-23(5), SC-28(1), SI-	External System Services; SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management; SC-28 Protection o	of UCPAZU18-114-









Correctly Formatted Mappings Accessible/Usable













Mappers benefit by mapping technical controls to frameworks, frameworks to client domains, configurations to policy



ment Testing ☆ > Cryptography

Test_ID ∨	Mapped testi \vee	Mapped testing or practices:Test_ID \vee	Mapped testing or practices:Problem Metadata \vee	Risk Drivers ∨	Detail Control Description (UCF) ∨	Proble ▽ ∨	Mapped Proce ∨	Mapped Process
T1468_Encrypt sensitive data at rest in the browser	A.18.1.3; AC-16(5); AC-19(4); AU-13(3); SA-4(6); SA-8(20); SA-9(6); SC-12(3); SC-28(1); SC-28(2); SC-28(3); S1-12(2); SA-15(12); S1-19(3)	A.18.1.3 Protection of records; AC-16.5 Attribute Displays on Objects to Be Output; AC-19.4 Restrictions for Classified Information; AU-13.3 Unauthorized Replication of Information; SA-4.5 System, Component, and Service Configurations; SA-8.00 Secure Metadata Management; SA-9.6 Organization Controlled Cryptographic Keys; SC-12.3 Official Storage; SC-28.3 Cryptographic Reys; SI-12.2 Minimize Personally Identifiable Information in Testing, Training, and Research; SA-15.12 Minimize Personally Identifiable Information; SI-19.3 Release	PORTS: PROTOCOLS: SERVICES: SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS: DEVELOPER PROVIDED: DEVELOPER: Security and Privacy Engineering Principles Secure Metadata Management; CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS: EXCLUSIVE CONTROL: ASYMMETRIC KEYS: NSA-APPROVED; KEY	Storing plaintext sensitive data in client side local storage makes the data easily accessible by anyone who gains privileged access to the client system. This bypasses user authentication enforced by the application. In addition to data leakage in shared client environments, such as a public computer's browser, a cross-site scripting (YSS) flaw allows attackers to easily access sensitive data.	The mechanism for encrypting data in the browser is driven by the requirement to gain access to the data while the application is offline (i.e., a Progressive Web App). _When offline access is not a requirement follow these steps: * Authenticate the user against the backend system Request a salt from the client (see notes below) * Use the salt to generate a symmetric encryption key * Send the key to the client (see, notes below) * Use the client key to encrypte data follow these steps again using the existing salt. _*Note:_ More detail is available in HOWTO section (Encrypt using a key obtained from the server) of this task. _When offline access is a requirement follow these steps: * Generate or retrieve a salt on the client (see notes below) * Prompt the user for a passphrase to initialize the encryption/decryption key * Use the user's passphrase and salt to generate a symmetric encryption key * Passphrases can be turned into cryptographic keys using a Password-Based Key Derivation Function (PBKDF) * PBKDF2 is a widely appointed function that achieve this: * Use the key to encrypt and decrypt data at rest. * To regain access to encrypted data follow these steps; * To regain access to encrypted data follow these steps; * To regain access to encrypted data follow these steps; * To regain access to encrypted data follow these steps; * To regain secess to encrypted data follow these steps; * To regain access to encrypted data follow these steps; * To regain access to encrypted data follow these steps; * To regain access to encrypted data follow these steps; * To regain access to encrypted data follow these steps; * To regain access to encrypted data follow these steps; * To regain access to encrypted data follow these steps; * To regain access to encrypted data follow these steps; * To steps here only concern access to encrypted data. User authentication against backend systems is a crucial part of a PWA running in online mode. * The key is used in the browser to encrypt and decrypt l	Cryptography	A.10.1; A.8.2; A.9.4; A.11.1; A.12.4; A.6.2; A.14.2	A.10.1 Cryptograph classification; A.9.4 control; A.11.1 Sec conditioning; A.6.2 N teleworking; A.14.2 support processes
T1880 Encrypt data at rest for Lambda functions (AWS)	A.18.1.3; AC-16(5); AU-13(3); SA-4(5); SA- 8(20); SC-12(3); SC- 28(1); SC-28(2); SC- 28(3); S1-12(2); SA- 15(12); SI-19(3)	A.18.1.3 Protection of records; AC-16.5 Attribute Displays on Objects to Be Output; AU-13.3 Unauthorized Replication of Information; SA-4.5 System, Component, and Service Configurations; SA-8.20 Secure Metadata Management; SC-12.3 Asymmetric Keyr; SC-28.1 Cryptographic Protection; SC-28.2 Offline Storage; SC-28.3 Cryptographic Keyr; SI-12.4 Wilminize Personally Identifiable Information in Testing, Training, and Research; SA-15.12 Minimize Personally Identifiable Information; SI-19.3 Release	SECURITY ATTRIBUTE OUTPUT: OUTPUT DEVICES; PRIVACY ATTRIBUTE OUTPUT: TRUSTED DISTRIBUTION; MASTER COPY; SECURITY CONFIGURATIONS; U.S. GOVERNMENT CONFIGURATION BASELINE; USGCB; FUNCTIONS; PORTS; PROTOCOLS; SERVICES; SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS; DEVELOPER ROVIDED; DEVELOPER; Security and Privacy Engineering Principles Secure Metadata Management; ASYMMETRIC KEYS; NSA-APPROVED; KEY MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY AND PROCESSES; PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE; RK; CLASS 3; CLASS 4; PRIVATE KEY, PUBLIC KEY; CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION; INFORMATION AT REST; OFF-LINE STORAGE; Protection of Information at Rest Cryptographic Keys; PRIVACY; PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION; PII (DATA MINIMIZATION; Development Process, Standards, and Tools Minimize Personally Identifiable Information; PRIVACY; PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION; PII	memory cards, disks, and	Apply appropriate protections to ensure the data is encrypted at rest, if a Lambda function is responsible for storing sensitive data such as PII	Cryptography	A.10.1; A.8.2; A.9.4; A.11.1; A.12.4; A.6.2; A.14.2; A.18.1	A.10.1 Cryptograpic classification; A.9.4 control; A.11.1 Sec monitoring; A.6.2 teleworking; A.14. support processes; and contractual ret









If ANY of these practices are not achieved, they NEED TO FACTOR into the RMF



)	Test_ID ∨	Mapped testi \vee	Mapped testing or practices:Test_ID \vee	Mapped testing or practices:Problem Metadata V	Risk Drivers V	Detail Control Description (UCF) V	Proble $\forall \vee$	Mapped Proce \vee	Mapped Process
	parameter store for sensitive data storage (Amazon ECS)	8(20); SC-12(3); SC- 28(1); SC-28(2); SC- 28(3); SI-12(2); SA- 15(12); SI-19(3)	Metadata Management, SC-123 Asymmetric Keys; SC-28.1 Cryptographic Protection; SC-28.2 Offline Storage; SC-28.3 Cryptographic Keys; S1-122 Minimize Personally Identifiable Information in Testing, Training, and Research; SA-1.512 Minimize Personally Identifiable Information; SI-19.3 Release	Principles Secure Metadata: Management; ASYMMETRIC KEYS; NSA-APPROVED; KEY MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGY AND PROCESSES; PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE; PK; CLASS 3; CLASS 4; PRIVATE KEY, PUBLIC KEY; CREVTORAPHIC PROTECTION; INFORMATION AT REST; OFF-LINE STORAGE; Protection of Information at Rest; [Cryptographic Keys; PRIVACY; PERSONALLY IDENTIFICABLE INFORMATION; PI; DATA MINIMIZATION; Development Process, Standards, an a Tools Minimize Personally Identifiable Information; PRIVACY; PERSONALLY IDENTIFICABLE INFORMATION; PII	format canceage sensitive information leakage and the misuse of data.	Protect sensitive data as containers are deployed to ECS clusters. AWS offers solutions out of the box to handle the injection of sensitive data into containers using either AWS Secrets Manageh or AWS Systems Manager Parameter Store. These features allow containers to retrieve the sensitive data from a secure location and inject the plaintext secret value as the container is initially started.	Cryptography	A.10.1; A.8.2; A.9.4; A.11.1; A.12.4; A.6.2; A.14.2; A.18.1	control; A.11.1 Sec monitoring; A.6.2 M teleworking; A.14.2 support processes; and contractual rec
	T2046_Encrypt data stored in DynamoDB at rest (Amazon DynamoDB)	19(4); AU-13(3); SA-	A.18.1.3 Protection of records; AC-16.5 Attribute Displays on Objects to 8 e Output; AC-19.4 Restrictions for Classified Information; AU-13.3 Unauthorized Replication of Information; SA-45 System, Compound, and Service Configurations; SA-8.20 Secure Metadata Management; SA-96 Organization-controlled Cryptographic Yeekys; SC-12.3 Asymmetric, Keys; SC-28.1 Cyptographic Protection; SC-28.2 Offline Storage; SC-28.3 Cryptographic Protection; SC-28.2 Offl	PORTS; PROTOCOLS; SERVICES; SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS; DEVELOPER PROVIDED; DEVELOPER; Security and Privacy Engil eering Principles Secure Metadata Management; CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYS; EXCLUSIVE CONTROL; ASYMMETRIC KEYS; NSA-APPROVED; KEY	Data stored unencrypted on disk in Oynemo DB can De stulie hand missised. It is necessary to keep sensitive tilata protection as close to litt angin as possible to prevent theft by malicious third-party software or web attack.	DynamoDB encrypts all data stored in tables at rest by default but leaves the encryption key up to the administrator. DynamoDB supports either AWS managed keys or custon enmanaged keys (CMK). Utilize CMKs to give you full control one who can use the keys to access the encrypted data on DynamoDB tables.	Cryptography	A.8.2; A.10.1; A.11.2; A.14.1; A.18.1	A.8.2 Information Cryptographic cor Security requirem A.18.1 Compliance requirements
	T2048_Utilize client-side encryption for DynamoDB (Amazon DynamoDB)	A.10.1.1; A.10.1.2; A.13.1.2; A.14.1.2; A.14.1.3; A.18.1.3; AC- 17(2); AU-9(3); SA- 4(2); SI-7(6); SI-7(15); SI-10(5)	A.10.1.1 Policy on its use of contocoachic controls: A.10.1.2 Fermanagement; A.13.1.3 Feet by of network services; A.14.1.2 Securing application services on page in networks; A.14.1.3 Protecting application services transactions; A.16.1.3 Protection of records; AC-172.PROTECTION of CONIDENTIALITY/INTEGRITY USING ENCRYPTON; AU-9.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION; S.4.4.2 Design and Implementation Information for Controls; SI-7.6 Cryptographic Protection; SI-7.15 Code Authentication; SI-10.5 Restrict Inputs to Trusted Sources and Approved Formats	CRYPTOGRAPHIC GYOTECTION; CRYPTOGRAPHICMEPT ANISMS; INTEGRITY; MPLEMENTATION INFORMATION; SCRUPTY - RELEVANT EXTRANAL SYSTEM INTERFACE; HIGH - LEVEL DESIGN; LOW-LEVEL DESIGN; SOUPCACODE; HARDWARESCHEN, LATTICS; DEVELOPER PROVIDED; DEVELOPER RESILIENCY; CRYPTOGRAPHIC, PROTECTION MECHANISMS; RESILIENCY; RESILIENCY; CRYPTOGRAPHIC CRYPTOGRAPHIC AUTHENTICATION; DIGITAL SIGNATURES; RESTRICT INPUTS; WHITELISTING; TRUSTED SOURCES; ACCEPTABLE FORMATS; RESILIENCY; RESILIENCY; RESILIENCY; RESILIENCY; RESILIENCY, RES	Data stored unencrypt of unusk in pyramobe can be stolen and misused. It is necessary to keep sensitive data not educe a close to its origin as 7 possible to prevent thefr by maccoust made as 7 contrare or well as 1 feet	Utilize client-side encryption in DynamoDB, by including a software library with your application that can handle encryption, the signing of attribute values, and key management.	Cryptography	A.9.1; A.10.1; A.12.5; A.13.1; A.14.1; A.18.1	A.9.1 Business req A.10.1 Cryptograp operational softw management; A.1- information system legal and contract
	T2056_Encrypt data stored at rest (Amazon Aurora)	19(4); AU-13(3); SA-	A.18.1.3 Protection of records; AC-16.5 Attribute Displays on Objects to Be Output; AC-19.4 Restrictions for Classified Information; AU-13.3 Unauthorized Replication of Information; SA-4.5 System, Component, and Service Configurations; SA-8.20 Secure Metadata Management; AS-9.6 Organization-controlled Cryptographic Protection; SC-28.2 Offlic Storage; SC-28.3 Cryptographic Protection; SC-28.2 Offlic Storage; SC-28.3 Cryptographic Keys; SI-12.2 Minimize Personally Identifiable Information in Testing, Training, and Research; SA-15.12 Minimize Personally Identifiable Information; SI-19.3 Release	CONFIGURATIONS; U.S. GOVERNMENT CONFIGURATION BASELINE; USGCE; FUNCTIONS;	Unencrypted data stored on disks in cloud environments may be stolen and misused.	Always utilize strong encryption mechanisms on Aurora instances that hancile data that is sensitive in nature. Aurora encryption is easy to anable within the AWS console and offers the ability to encrypt the data stored on the Aurora instance's underlying storage filesystem, automated backups, and snapshots. Aurora encryption is performed using AES-256 and is protected by the AWS Key Management System (KMS). Utilize KMS Customer-Managed Keys when possible to give you full control over who can use the keys to access the encrypted data on KMS instances.	Cryptography	A.10.1; A.8.2; A.9.4; A.11.1; A.12.4; A.6.2; A.14.2	A.10.1 Cryptograp classification; A.9. control; A.1.1 se monitoring; A.6.2 teleworking; A.14 support processe
	T2065_Config ure TLS for secure connections to App Service (Microsoft Azure)	A.13.2.1; AC-4(4); AC- 17(2); AC-18(1); IA- 3(1); SC-5(1); SC-7(10); SC-7(17); SC-8(1); SC- 23(5); SI-4(2)	A.13.2.1 Information transfer policies and procedures; AC-4.4 Flow Control of Encrypted Information; AC-17.2 PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY/INTEGRIPY USING ENCRYPTON; AC-18.1 Authentication and Encryption; IA-3.1 Cryptographic Bidirectional Authentication; SC-5.1 Restrict Ability to Attack Other Systems; SC-7.10 Prevent Edifiration; SC-7.17 Automated Enforcement of Protocol Formats; SC-8.1 Cryptographic Protection; SC-23.5 Allowed Certificate Authorities; II-4.2 Automated Tools and Mechanisms for Real-time Analysis	ENFORCE PROJUCE FORMATS AUTOMATED ANY JOSEAPHIC MECHANISMS: ENCRYPTING, ALTERNATIVE PHYSICAL SAFGUARDS, PREVENT UNALITHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION; DELECT CHANGES TO INFORMATION; CERTIFICATE IT ALITHORITIES, CA. CERTIFICATES, SECIUES FORKET LAWS, SS. I TRAINSO RIST LAWS HE GIBT	Azure Web Apps allows Sites to run under both HTTP and HTTPS by default and Web apps	Redirect all HTTP traffic to HTTPS in Azure App Senice: Hon-secure HTTP requests can be restricted and all HTTP requests redirected to the secure HTTPS port. It is recommended to enforce HTTPS-only traffic. In TTPS uses the SSLYTES protocol or provide a secure connection, which is both encrypted and authenticated. So it is important to support HTTPS for the security is nefts. Use the latest version of TLS encryption: App service currently allows the web app to set TLS versions 1.0, 1.1 and 1.2. It is highly recommended to use the latest TLS 1.2 version, which is the recommended TLS level by industry standards, such as PCI DSS, for web app secure connections. Set Client Certificates (Incoming client certificates) to "On: The TLS rigusal subtentication technique in enterprise environments ensures the authenticity of clients to the server. If incoming client	Cryptography	A.10.1; A.13.2; A.14.1; A.14.2	A.10.1 Cryptogra transfer; A.14.1 S information syst development an











The Product of Mapping is Security & Risk Program Management Enterprise GRC Solutions, Inc.



CCM v4.0 Cloud Security Alliance © 2021	8 _	Transportation Policy and	Secure Media Transportation Policy and Procedures	Establish, document, approve, communicate, apply, evaluate and maintain policies and procedures fo secure transportation of physical management and undate the policies and series and undate the policies and series and se	for the secure transportation for the media established, docume I media. approved, communicated, availuated and maintained.	tation of physical umented, ed, enforced,	CLD.8.1.5, MA-3(3), SC-30(3), HT_5.d, HT_8.m, HT_9.o, HT_9.p, HT_9.q, HT_9.s, HT_9.u, N171 3.8.3 N171 3.8.5 9.6.0 M	CLD.8.1.5 Removal of cloud se Removal, SC-30.3 Change Proc Information Assets and Facilit Media. Og o Disposal of Media	1.8.3.3 Physical media transfer, ISO27701_6.5.3 Media ha service customer assets Control, MA-3.3 Prevent Unauth rocessing and Storage Locations, 05.d Authorization Proc litties, 08.m Benoval of Property, 05.0 Management of Ra dia. 09.a Information Handline Procedures, 09.s Informat	thorized 30, HT_05.01, cess for HT_08.02, Removable HT_09.07,	1, asse Inter 09.0	sets, SC-30 Concealment and Misdirect ternal Organization, 08.02 Equipment S 1.07 Media Handling, 09.08 Exchange of formation, N171, 3.8 Madia Protection	tion, 05.01 Security,	17/27701/ 27018/HIT RUST/NIST	Needs Strengti (Minor)	hening	mitig throu	ll be fully gated ugh project ons	1 Rare - 0% - 15%	1 Minor impact - increased hours and some delay in delivery	1 1	1 2	2
CCM v4.0 Cloud Security Alliance © 2021	ଯ		Assets	logical assets (e.g., applications) ba the organizational business risk.	0.4.2 Are policies and proce CCM_DCS-05.1 Is the classif documentation of physical based on assets based on the organia business risk?	ssification and cal and logical anizational	7.2.2 ISACM, 9.6.1 ISACM, 12.2.0 A MISP, CG3.2.6, CG3.3.3, A.8.1.1 A A.8.1.2, A.8.2.1, A.8.2.2, A.9.1.1, A.11.2.1, A.13.2.1, A.15.1.1, A.18.1.3, CLD.8.1.5, of	A.8.1.1 Inventory of assets, A. A.8.2.2 Labelling of informatio protection, A.13.2.1 Informati security policy for supplier rel of cloud service customer asse	adures, 09.0 Physical Media in Transit, N171 3.8.3 Sanit. A 5.1.2 Ownership of assets, A.8.2.1 Classification of info. tion. A.9.1.1 Access control policy. A.11.2.1 Eaulioments is attent transfer policies and procedures, A.15.1.1 Information station transfer policies and procedures, A.15.1.1 Information security risk treatments, 10.27701.5.6.2 information security risk treatment, 10.027701.6.5.2 information security risk treatment, 10.027701.6.5.2.	formation, A.8.1, A.8.2, A.9 siting and A.11.2, A.13.2, ation A.15.1, A.18.1, Removal CLD.8.1, HT_01	A.9.1, A.8.1 2. class 1, cont 01.07, trans	227701 6.5 Asset management, 9 ISAG 8.1 Responsibility for assets, A.8.2 Infor- assification. A.9.1 Business requiremen- ntrol, A.11.2 Equipment, A.13.2 Informi- ansfer, A.15.1 Information security in sul- lationships, A.18.1 Compliance with leg- intractual requirements, CLD.8.1 Respo-	ormation nts of acces nation supplier egal and	ISO27001/ 27002/270 17/27701/ 27018/HIT RUST/NIST	Needs Strengti (Import		unco	rgely ontrollable ugh project ons	1 Rare - 0% - 15%	4 Very Significant - Visible Enterprise Level Customer Delay	4 1	4 3	48
CCM v4.0 Cloud Security Alliance © 2021	8		Assets Cataloguing	Catalog and track all relevant physic and logical assets located at all of the CSP's sites within a secured system.	of the CSP's sites (within a secure	elevant physical ed at all of the ured system), ?	A.8.1.1, A.8.1.2, A.8.2.2, A.11.2.6, A.12.1.1, CLD.8.1.5, ISO27701_6.5.2, ISO27701_6.5.3, CM-8[1], HT_2.h, HT_5.d, HT_7.a, HT_7.b, HT_8.k, HT_9.a, HT_9.a,	A.8.1.1 Inventory of assets, A. A.11.2.6 Security of equipmen procedures, CLD.8.1.5 Removi Information classification, ISO Installation and Removal, O2.1	A.S.1.2 Ownership of assets, A.S.2.2 Labelling of informa ent and assets off-premises, A.12.1.1 Documented operational of close device customer assets Control, ISO27701, ISO27701, S.3. Media handling, CM-8.1 Updates During 2.N Return of Assets, OS.6 Authorization Process for Informetrory of Assets, 07.5 Ownership of Assets, OS.8. Securi	A8.1, A.8.2, A.1 rating A.12.1, CLD.8.1 L_6.5.2 8, HT_02.04, HT_05.01, htmation HT_07.01,	A.11.2, A.8.1 8.1, CM- class proc Resp Inver	8.1 Responsibility for assets, A.8.2 Infor assification, A.11.2 Equipment, A.12.1 C ocedures and responsibilities, CLD.8.1 asponsibility for assets, CM-8 System Coventory, 02.04 Termination or Change of a polyment, 05.01 Internal Organization	ormation Operationa I component of	ISO27001/ nai 27002/270 17/27701/	Needs Strengti (Critical		mitig	II be fully gated ugh project ons	3 Possible - 35% 65%	5 Catastrophic, Material - See Costing Impact	1 3	5 4	60
CCM v4.0 Cloud Security Alliance © 2021	8		Controlled Access Points	Implement physical security perime to safeguard personnel, data, and information systems. Establish phys security perimeters between the administrative and business areas: the data storage and processing fac	d perimeters implemented to hysical personnel, data, and inform systems?; CCM_DCS-07.2 Ar as and security perimeters establi	ical security ed to safeguard formation 2 Are physical ablished between	A.9.1.1, A.11.1.1, A.11.1.2, A.11.1.3, A.11.1.5, ISO27701_6.8.1, AC-20(4), AT-3(2), ISPE-2(1), PE-2(2), PE-3(2), PE- 3(3), PE-3(4), PE-3(5), PE-3(7), PE-	A.9.1.1 Access control policy, controls, A.11.1.3 Securing off ISO27701_6.8.1 Secure areas, AT-3.2 Physical Security Control Identification, PE-2.3 Restrict	y, A.11.1.1 Physical security perimeter, A.11.1.2 Physical of properties, prome and facilities, A.11.1.5 Working in secure a ss, A.C-20.4 Network Accessible Storage Devices — Prohibi strois, PE-2.1 Access by Position or Role, PE-2.2 Two Form ct Unescorted Access, PE-3.2 Facility and Systems, PE-3.3 lockable Casines, PE-3.5 Tamper Protection, PE-3.7 Physis	A.9.1, A.11.1, A pe-6, HT_02.04, ibited Use, HT_08.01, ns of HT_09.08, N171_3.8,	I, AT-3, A.9.1 O4, Secu 6 Mo Char Exch	9.1 Business requirements of access co cure areas, AT-3 ROLE-BASED SECURITY 1 Monitoring Physical Access, 02.04 Term aange of Employment, 08.01 Secure Are change of Information, N171_3.8 Media 171_3.10 Physical Protection, ISO27701	ontrol, A.11 TRAINING, I mination or mas, 09.08 ia Protectio	g, PE- 27002/270 or 17/27701/ B 27018/HIT		blished	mitig throu	ll be fully gated ugh project ons	1 Rare - 0% - 15%	3 Significant impact - increases costs to KTLO		3 5	15
2021		language - pre adoption/ CSA edi open	Unifie	ified Testing Map	(to review the details of each m		see the All Mapping Tab)	ified Universe Mappi	Unified Universe Mapping: Control Objectiv C.S.2 Policy, C.7.5 Documented information, C.5	Mapping Cur ve Status rer	tur at ity uri Cur ty ren De GAI		Target to be in place	Risk Controllability	Risk Likelihood	Risk Severity (impact)		Likeli Impa hood ct	CE * Likel	(Controllability elihood * Impact * Control ffectiveness)	Test Procedure	re Ex	xternal Resource
CCM v4. po Cloud es Security co Alliance 2021	olicies, pro stablished ommunica naintained	A-01.1 Are audit and assurance procedures and standards sed, docume near approved, icated, appl ed, evaluated and ed?; CCM_A k-01.2 Are audit are epolicies, procedures and	A.6.1.1, A.8.2 A.12.7.1, SA-1 Id HT_6.i, HT_13 t and ISO27701_5.2	8.2.1, A.12.3.1, A.12.6.1, direction (10), 30.11(7), 111.0.5, 123.11(7), 123.	Policy; C.7.5 Documented information; ion for information security; A.6.1 Intended information security; A.6.1 Intended information, A.2.2.5 Beckup, A.2.2.5 B	nternal organization inicar vomerability isition Process; 06 mpliance; 06.03 Ir	ation; A.8.2 Information Try management, A.12.7 mormatic D6.02 Compliance with Security Information System Audit	A.5.1; A.6.1; A.8.2; A.12.7; SA-4; HT_06.02; n: H1 06.03;	C.S.2 Policy, C.7.5 Documented information, C.S. Internal audit, A.S.1 Management direction for morniston security, A.S.2 Information classification, A.12.5 Backup, A.12.6 Technical vulnerability management, A.1 Information systems audit considerations, SA-4	27002/270 30, 27018/HIT 12.7 RUST/NIST		Opportunity For Improvement	ur th	4 Largely uncontrollable through project actions	4 Likely - 65% - 85%	5 Catastrophic, Material - See Costing Impact	4	4 5	2	160	write the test rocedure, the P	PBC> when	ist the folder nere this idence is mmonly aintained>
CCM v4. Cloud as Security pri Alliance ac 2021	CM_A&A-0 ssessmen rogram co	A-02.1 Is an independent ent of its audit and assurance conducted at least annually and g to relevant standards?	A.12.7.1, A.18 2(1), CA-7(1), and HT_5.h, HT_6 ISO27701_6.	18.2.1, A.18.2.3, CA- 1), CA-2(2), CA-2(3), audit cor 16.1, ISO27701_6.12.1, Continuo 16.15.2, 11.3.1 RMTN, Consider 17.2.4, CC3.1.5, CC4.1.1, Regularly	Policy; C.7.5 Documented information; considerations; A.18.2 Information secunous Monitoring; 05.02 External Parti derations; ISO27701_6.12 Supplier reliarly test security systems and processors demonstrates independence from	on; C.9.2 Internal security reviews; arties; 06.03 Inforr relationships; ISO esses.; CC1.2 COSO	al audit; A.12.7 Information system s; CA-2 Assessments; CA-7 ormation System Audit 8027701_6.15 Compliance; 11_RM1 ISO Principle 2: The board of	C.5.2; C.7.5; C.9.2; A.12.7; A.18.2; CA- 2; CA-7; HT_05.02; HT_06.03; ISO27701_6.12;	C.5.2 Policy, C.7.5 Documented information, C.5 Internal audit, A.12.7 Information systems audit considerations, A.18.2 Information security rev CA-2 Assessments, CA-7 Continuous Monitoring, 05.00 External Parties, 06.03 Information System Audit Considerations, 18027701 6.12 Supplier	9.2 ISO27001/ dit 27002/270 views, 17/27701/ g, 27018/HIT em RUST/NIST	3 5	Needs Strengthening (Minor)	5	5 Unestablished	3 Possible - 35% 65%	1 Minor impact - increased hours and some delay ir delivery	5	3 1	2	30			
Security as Alliance ac 2021	ssurance a	A-03.1 Are independent audit an e assessments performed g to risk-based plans and policie	A.12.7.1, A.10 A.18.2.2, A.13 cies? 3(10), AU-4(1 5(3), AU-5(4), 6(3), AU-6(4),	16.1.4, A.18.1.2, 18.2.3, AC-2(13), AC-4(1), AU-5(1), AU-5(2), AU-4), AU-5(5), AU-6(1), AU-41, AU-6(5), AU-6(6), AU-40 audit Sto	ons demonstrates independented information, considerations; A.16.1 Management o vements; A.18.1 Compliance with lega nation security reviews; AC-2 Account I Storage Capacity; AU-5 Response to Au sis. and Reporting: AU-7 Audit Reduction	on; C.9.2 Internal nt of information so egal and contractu nt Management; A Audit Processing	al audit; A.12.7 Information system I security incidents and ctual requirements; A.18.2 I; AC-3 Access Enforcement; AU-4 Ing Failures; AU-6 Audit Review,	C.5.2; C.7.5; C.9.2; A.12.7; A.16.1; A.18.1; A.18.2; AC- 2; AC-3; AU-4; AU-5; AU-6; AU-7; AU-9;	C.5.2 Policy, C.7.5 Documented information, C.5 Internal audit, A.12.7 Information systems audit considerations, A.16.1 Management of informal security incidents and improvements, A.18.1 Compliance with legal and contractual require A.18.2 Information security reviews, A.C.2 Accou	9.2 ISO27001/ dit 27002/270 ation 17/27701/ 27018/HIT ements, RUST/NIST	3 4	Needs (Important)		1 White fully mir gated actions	1 Rare - 0% - 15%	1 Minor impact- increased hours and some delay ir delivery	1	1 1	3	3			
Alliance 2021	II relevant	A-04.1 is compliance verified, wi int standards, regulations, itractual, and statutory ients applicable to the audit?	with A.12.4.2, A.1: 2(4), CA-5(1), 10(1), HT_6.g HT_13.r, HT_1 N171_3.3.8, I	X.12.7.1, A.18.1.3, AC- 1), CM-5(1), SA-11(1), SI- 5.g, HT_6.i, HT_6.i, of Action T_13.s, N171_3.3.6, Testing a 8, N171_3.12.2, Policies:	ass, and neporting; AUP Audit neduction to Logging and monitoring; A.12.7 Inform liance with legal and contractual requi on and Milestones; CM-5 Access Restring and Evaluation; SI-10 Information Ing as and Standards, and Technical Comp derations; 13.07 Accountability & Audit	ormation systems equirements; AC-2 estrictions for Char Input Validation; mpliance; 06.03 Ir	ns audit considerations; A. 18.1 -2 Account Management; CA-5 Plan lange; SA-11 Developer Security n; 06.02 Compliance with Security I Information System Audit	A.12.4; A.12.7; A.18.1; AC-2; CA-5; CM-5; SA-11; SI-10; HT_06.02; HT_06.03; HT_13.07;	A.15. Information accurity reviews, Act Account (C.5.2 Policy, C.7.5 Documented information, C.5 Internal audit, A.12.4 Logging and monitoring, A.1 Information systems audit considerations, A.1 Compliance with legal and contractual requirer AC-2 Account Management, CA-5 Plan of Action in Milestones, CM-5 Access Restrictions for Chang	9.2 ISO27001/ A.12.7 27002/270 8.1 17/27701/ ements, 27018/HIT	3 5	Needs Strengthening (Critical)	m th	1 Will be fully mitigated through project actions	4 Likely - 65% - 85%	1 Minor impact- increased hours and some delay ir delivery	1	4 1	4	16			
Alliance 2021 CCM v4.0 Cloud Security	CCM	A-06.1 Is a risk-based corrective	A.12.7.1, A.13	.18.2.3, AU-3(1), AU- Rümlülly conditions within accepted industry standards. Secure, monitor, maintain, and test utilities services for continual	nternal audit; A.12.7 Information system humidity conditions (within industry standards), impler CCM_DCS-14.1 Are utilities.	ystems audit cons thin accepted plemented and ites services aintained and vals for continual	nsiderations; A.18.2 Information 1171_3.10.2, A1.2.1, A1.2.3, an A1.2.5, A1.2.6 St A.11.1.4, A.11.2.1, A.11.2.2, A A.17.1.3, ISO27701_6.8.2, CM-3(2), an MA-3(2), MA-3(5), MA-3(6), MA-4(3), in	C.9.2; A.12.7; A.18.2-ALI-3-ALI-4- and Notification, PE-13-4 Insp Support, O.8.d Protecting Against A.11.1.4 Protecting against ex and protection, A.11.2.2 Supp information security continuit	C.9.2 Internal audit, A.1.2.7 Information systems psections, PEL4 1 Automatic Confirmation systems psections, PEL4 1 Automatic Confirmity PEL5 1 Automatic State and antivornmental Threats, C.8.2.6 Equipment external and environmental threats, A.1.2.1.2 Equipment porting utilities, A.17.1.3 Verify, view and evaluate uity, ISO27701, S.8.2 Equipment, C.M.3.2 Testing, Validations, C.M.3.2 Testing, Validations, C.M.3.3 Confirmity	ISO27001/ stion	2, A.11 3, MA-4, Infor	2 The entity authorizes, designs, deve quires, implements, operates, approve 11.1 Secure areas, A11.2 Equipment, A formation security continuity, CM-3 Cor lange Control, MA-4 Nonlocal Maintena Annual Maintenace (A) 0.7 Equipment Securement	A.17.1 enfiguration ance, MA-6		Needs	hening		ons oderately rollable	1 Rare - 0% -	1 Minor impact- increased hours	3 1	1 4	12

A Control area could have a minor finding – however the overall risk raised by that finding could be negligible Other OFI could reveal a situation that is unmanaged, will occur again in multiple audits, and has potential for customer facing disruptions and loss of revenue. Risk Management needs to Only Handle It Once – OHIO, but capture all the inputs, players, timing, and necessary resources for improvement












Recap: Management Strategy First + Why r5 CCM 4 Now



- GRC Mapping strategy:Order-of-Operations
- Risk-> Goals-> Policies->Controls)



- Using NIST SP 800-53 r5 as the underpinning backbone assumes mapping to other major frameworks so the business "Only Handles Policy Once". OHIO
- Use NIST 800-53 r5 as the mediating framework connecting architecture CMDB to CIS/DISA STIGs/OWASP/MITRE ATT&CK
- Use ISO/IEC 27001 with Cloud, Privacy and Processing as the Policy framework – commonly mapped to NIST SP 800-53 r4/r5 as part of NIST Appendix
- Use a RMF on top of your preferred framework (Could be SOC 2, CSTAR, ISO27, **HITRUST™, IMO use NIST CSF).
- Establish Categories for the Corporate Common Controls.
 Push those categories into Policies, Controls, Programs.











Summarizing and Take-Aways



- Mapping accounts for the Risks & associated RACI of a program so groupings should align with the common job assignments that would implement them.
- Client based mapping begins with understanding the business programs and should account for domains (LOB) with isolated scope, such as Consumer, Cloud, Fed, Health & Human Service, Financial, Global, etc.
- Language matching alone, rather than mapping to the recommended implementation guidance, results in guidance that's unusable.
- Mapping accomplishes an aggregate Policy requirement that will and will always continue to be measured by product and by assessment event and will move at the pace of your slowest audit.





