Life Sciences & Health Care, Medical Device Manufacturing and Cybersecurity, A Strategy





Robin Basham, CEO, Founder, EnterpriseGRC Solutions



Agenda





Life Science and Health Care (LSHC) – Market, Players, Opportunities



Frameworks, Standards & Tools, How CISO's Address MDM Cybersecurity



Mapping and Tagging – Unification within GRC and Cybersecurity Risk Management



Integration Progress – Facilitated Compliance Management



Investment in Licenses and Partners



POLL #1



- Over the last 18 months
- A) No change in how I receive Medical Care
- B) Some technology Met via Web with Med Prof
- C) Used a device that sent info over Web
- D) Implanted a device in my body


1 Life Science and Health Care (LSHC) – Market, Players, Opportunities

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As Life Science & Health Care Industry is valued at \$173 billion -> \$208 billion in 2023 – The FDA Faces Increasing Cybersecurity Requirements







Heroes v. Innovators = Cyber-ready v. Closing Up Shop



Pfizer, BioNTech strike COVID-19 deal, commit multiple

CONSUMERS

HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS CAREERS

ABOUT ABBOTT

Content current as of:

Regulated Product(s)

10/01/2019

Medical Devices

< SEARCH

Forbes Billionaires Innovation Leadership Money Business Small Business Lifestyle Li

Abbott

BACK TO PRESS RELEASES



ABBOTT LAUNCHES MOLECULAR POINT-OF-CARE TEST TO DETECT NOVEL CORONAVIR

- Abbott will be making ID NOW COVID-19 tests available next week and expects to ramp up manufacturing to deliver 50,000 tests per day

- This is the company's second test to receive Emergency Use Authorization by the FDA for COVID-10 detection; combined, Abbott expects

- Test to run on Abbott's point-of-care ID NOW platform - a portable instrument that can be deployed where testing is needed most

- ID NOW has the largest molecular point-of-care installed base in the U.S. and is available in a wide range of healthcare settings

URGENT/11 Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities in a

Widely-Used Third-Party Software Component

May Introduce Risks During Use of Certain

f Share 🎯 Tweet in Unkedin 🛛 Email 🔒 Print

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is informing patients, health care provider.

introduce risks for certain medical devices and hospital networks. The FDA is not aware of

and facility staff, and manufacturers about cybersecurity vulnerabilities that may

Topline: Despite the coronavirus weighing heavily on the stock market-

rrent environment as more people stay al by Nick Paul Taylor | Mar 17, 2020 7, 28am

ompanies are seeing increased demand R&D sites to vaccine development

Cepheid wins emergency use nod from FDA for bedside coronavirus test

MARCH 23, 2020 BY SEAN WHOOLEY - LEAVE A COMMENT

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Danaher Corp. (NYSE:DHR) subsidiary Cepheid announced that it received emergency use authorization from the FDA for its bedside Xpert Xpress SARS-CoV-2 test for detecting the virus causing the COVID-19 outbreak

The rapid molecular diagnostic test is designed to detect the SARS-CoV-2 virus causing coronavirus while operating on any of Cepheid's GeneXpert systems worldwide, with a detection time of approximately 45 minutes, according to a news release.

Cepheid chief medical & technology officer Dr. David Persing said in the release that, in developing the COVID-19 test, the company used the design of its Xpert Xpress flue/RSV cartridge technology to target the viral genome and provide rapid detection of current and potential variants of SARS-CoV-2. The outcome is a test that offers results in multiple settings where actionable treatment information is required in a timely manner.

A Bloomberg report stated that Sunnvale, Calif, based Cepheid's test is the 13th one allowed on the market by the FDA and the first that clinicians can use at the bedside. The report also said that Cepheid plans to begin shipping tests next week. The company is joining in on the trend of companies lending a hand in the search for effective testing for the disease

"Cepheid currently has nearly 5,000 GeneXpert systems in the U.S. capable of point-of-care testing and for use in hospitals." Cepheid resident Warren Kocmond said in the news release. "Our automated systems do not require users to have specialty training to perform testing - they are capable of running 24/7, with many systems already doing so today.

FILED UNDER: DIAGNOSTICS, FEATURED, FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (FDA), GENOMICS/MOLECULAR DIAGNOSTICS, REGULATORY/COMPLIANCE TAGGED WITH: CEPHEID, CORONAVIRUS, COVID-19, DANAHER CORP., FDA

stocks that offer compelling opportuniti ling to analysts from Stifel and Credit Sui

S&P 500 to drop 15% over the last month

e healthcare space, Credit Suisse recomm afacturers like Medtronic (MDT) and I C), which stand to benefit amid higher de pat the coronavirus pandemic—the stocks hare, respectively.

her top pick from Credit Suisse is Mercl e largest pharmaceutical companies in th identifies as an ideal defensive dividend rse business climate."

the coronavirus causing more people to stay indoors and sen te, companies like AdaptHealth Corp. (AHCO), one of the st providers of home medical equipment in the U.S., "can ately benefit" from the outbreak thanks to higher demand. rding to Stifel.

 Stifel similarly likes virtual healthcare company Teladoc (TDOC). which facilitates digital doctors visits for remote natients: while the

GxP Maturity (a.k.a. Good Manufacturing Practices) Makes All The Difference in Rapid Response to Pandemic – but still is not likely to go far enough.



izer bas teamed up with BioNTech to coudevelop and distribute a mRNA vaccine against COVID. outside of China. The partners plan to use multiple R&D sites in the U.S. and Germany to elerate the progress of a vaccine that is due to begin clinical testing in humans by the end of

oNTech and Pfizer have both referred to talks about a COVID-19 partnership in recent weeks t recently vesterday when the German mRNA specialist issued a statement on the status of its accine and related deal-making. The latest advance in the partnering discussions clears BioNTech of Difzer to immediately start working together on a version against the powel SADS CoV 1

> https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeiklebniko v/2020/03/28/20-more-stock-picks-for-thecoronavirus-economy-according-to-marketexperts/#474837ea19f2

Medical Devices: FDA Safety Communication

Date Issued: October 1, 2010

which may prevent device function

- The Abbott ID NOW™ COVID-19 test brings rapid testing to the front lines

Safety Communications

any confirmed adverse events related to these vulnerabilities. However, software to evoloit these vulnerabilities is already publicly available. A security firm has identified 11 vulnerabilities, named "URGENT/11." These vulnerabilities may allow anyone to remotely take control of the medical device and change its function, cause denial of service, or cause information leaks or logical flaws

These vulnerabilities exist in IPnet, a third-party software component that supports network communications between computers. Though the IPnet software may no longer be supported by the original software vendor, some manufacturers have a license that allows them to continue to use it without support. Therefore, the software may be incorporated into other software applications, equipment, and systems which may be used





Risk & Cybersecurity Requirements: Recent mandates in the EnterpriseGRC Solutions, Inc. Medical Device Market (MDM) – Under the US FDA

"... amongst healthcare stakeholders ... where addressing medical device risk has formerly focused on <u>functional</u> safety, and safety-related risk (to the exclusion of cybersecurity) or the protection of data, multiple approaches are now actively addressing the lifecycle risks and potential harm from cybersecurity incidents.

Medical devices manufacturers (MDM) are recommended to undertake a <u>cybersecurity maturity assessment to identify and</u> <u>prioritize areas for improvement</u>. This should include product lifecycle security, stipulated in **emerging assessment schemes**, which will be articulated in **healthcare procurement**. **Mature incident response plans and processes are essential for all healthcare entities**, in anticipation of the inevitable cybersecurity event."



Cybersecurity of medical devices
Addressing patient safety and the security
of patient health information
Richard Piggin, Security Consultant, Atkins

https://www.bsigroup.com/LocalFiles/EN-AU/ISO%2013485%20Medical%20Devices/Whitepapers/White_Paper Cybersecurity_of_medical_devices.pdf

Recent FDA mandates impact Medical Device Security and EnterpriseGRC Solutions, Inc. Extend beyond GxP Good Manufacturing to full Device Lifecycle

As medical devices and healthcare environments become interconnected ... the risk of **cybersecurity vulnerabilities** impacting patient **safety** and **privacy** increases significantly. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) now takes significant steps to develop policies and guidance to assist medical device manufacturers (MDMs) addressing cybersecurity-related regulatory issues.

Stakeholders in the medical device industry closely examine how they can proactively address product security in an **ever-changing environment* to quickly and effectively reduce any risks posed to patients. FDA guidance documents emphasize that medical device cybersecurity concerns must be addressed not only during the design and development of medical devices, but also throughout the device lifecycle as potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities emerge.

*US FDA Cybersecurity Notifications page https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-health/cybersecurity#risks



Medical Device Cybersecurity Report Advancing Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure



202-828-1600 | www.mdic.org | info@mdic.org



Immediately Required Cyber Security Standards and Laws that Govern or Enable The Medical Device Market (MDM)



Term Definition

Code of Federal Regulations. The CFR is the codification of the general and permanent rules and regulations (sometimes called administrative law) CFR published in the Federal Register by the executive departments and agencies of the federal government of the United States. Cumulative term used to refer to the global regulations and guidelines that include, but are not limited to, Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP), Good GxP Laboratory Practice (GLP), Good Clinical Practices (GCP), Good Pharmacovigilance Practices (GPvP) and Good Distribution Practices (GDP) references

GAMP Good automated manufacturing practice

- GAMP[®] 5 Guide: A Risk-Based Approach to Compliant GxP Computerized Systems*
- Title 21 CFR Part 11 & Title 21 CFR Part 820 QMS Requirements
- Title 45 CFR § 164 HIPAA HITECH
- Eudralex Volume 4 Annex 11 (Others may apply)
- ISO/IEC 27001:2013 € and ISO/IEC 27002:2013 € or
- ISO/IEC 27799:2016 € and ISO/IEC 27002:2013 €
- ISO 13485:2016 MEDICAL DEVICES A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR MEDICAL DEVICES*
- ISO 14971:2019 Medical devices Application of risk management to medical devices*
- HITRUST v9.3*
- NIST Cybersecurity Framework v1.1

*Associated License Fee and <u>Necessary</u> for LSHC



Frameworks, Standards & Tools, How CISO's Address MDM Cybersecurity

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Chief Risk, Chief Security, and Chief Information Officer walk into a bar.

Bartender asks:

- Who ordered policies that control and mitigate the risk lifecycle including all supporting environments?
- Who captures, interprets and provides evidence that a control is operating effectively?
- Who aligns a Vulnerability Program as necessary to operate business and as needed for routine FDA inspection?
- Who establishes technical and manufacturing objectives that meet the needs of the LSHC stakeholders?







Poll #2




Responsibility for Medical Device Security should be controlled by:

A) IT

- B) IT & Security
- C) Product Engineering
- D) Product Engineering, Security and IT







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Mapping and Tagging – Unification within GRC and Cybersecurity Risk Management


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
Models Seek to Organize Threats, Technologies, Treatments OR Model Risk Assessment Procedure, but usually not both








Risk Models Vary by Business Role – Differ on the What, Why & How















Cyber Security – NHS Perspective

3

Security Architecture Select Tools Used and Covered in Cyber Security Risk Assessment:





EnterpriseGRC Solutions, Inc.

Look to Increase Common Threat Language as Tagging



Supply Chain Tampering	Regulations fragment the cloud
Technology adoption dramatically expands the threat landscape	Criminal capabilities expand gaps in international policing
IoT leaks	INJECTION
Algorithms compromise integrity	BROKEN AUTHENTICATION & SESSION MANAGEMENT
Rogue governments use terrorist groups to launch cyberattacks	CROSS-SITE SCRIPTING (XSS)
APT	INSECURE DIRECT OBJECT REFERENCES
	SECURITY MISCONFIGURATIONS
Unmet board expectations	MISSING FUNCTION LEVEL ACCESS CONTROL
Researchers silenced to hide security vulnerabilities	CROSS-SITE REQUEST FORGERY (CSRF)
Cyber insurance safety net is pulled away	USING COMPONENTS WITH KNOWN VULNERABILITES
Governments become increasingly interventionist	UNVALIDATED REQUESTS AND FORWARDS



4 Integration Progress – Facilitated Compliance Management

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We Leverage Mapping: HITRUST provides recommendations for mapping, which we leverage but do not reproduce commercially



TRUST CSF v9.3	21 CFR 11 45	I CFR HIPAA.BN	45 CFR HIPAA.GE	4S CFR HIPAA.PR	45 CFR HIPAA.SR	AICPA TSP 100	CCPA 1798	CIS Controls v7.1	EU GDPR	ISO/IEC 27001:2013	ISO/IEC 27002:2013	ISO/IEC 27799-2016	29100:2011 - Information technology - Security	ISO/IEC 29151:2017 - Information technology - Security techniques	NIST Cybersecurity Framework v1 -	1 NIST SP 800-171+2 (DFARS)	NIST SP 800-53 (4	PCIDSS v3.2.1
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ISO 13845:2016 used to Assess Title 21 CRF Part 820



REGULATORY COMPLIANCE ASSOCIATES® INC Wellness for Business®

Correspondence Between ISO 13485:2016 and 21 CFR 820

Correspondence Between ISO 13485:2016 and 21 CFR Part 820 QMS Requirements

https://www.rcainc.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/ISO-Comparison-Matrix-jw-mp.pdf

	ISO 13485:2016	US FDA Quality System Regulation (QSR - 21 CFR 820)
4 Qualit	ty Management System	Subpart AGeneral Provisions
4.1 Gen	neral Requirements	Sec. 820.5 Quality System.
system requirer	he organization shall document a quality management and maintain its effectiveness in accordance with the ments of this International Standard and applicable ory requirements.	Each manufacturer shall establish and maintain a quality system that is appropriate for the specific medical device(s) designed or manufactured, and that meets the requirements this part.
	anization shall establish, implement, and maintain any	Subpart BQuality System Requirements
docume	ment, procedure, activity, or arrangement required to be ented by this International Standard or applicable ory requirements.	Sec. 820.20 Management Responsibility.
The org organiz NOTE. I	anization shall document the role(s) undertaken by the ation under the applicable regulatory requirements. Roles undertaken by the organization can include	(a) Quality Policy. Management with executive responsibility shall establish its policy and objectives for, and commitment to, quality. Management with executive responsibility shall ensure that the quality policy is understood, implemented, ar maintained at all levels of the organization.
manufa distribu	icturer, authorized representative, importer, or tor.	(b) Organization. Each manufacturer shall establish and
4.1.2 Ti	he organization shall:	maintain an adequate organizational structure to ensure that devices are designed and produced in accordance with the requirements of this part.
a)	determine the processes needed for the quality management system and the application of these processes throughout the organization taking into account the roles undertaken by the organization;	(1) Responsibility and Authority. Each manufacturer shall establish the appropriate responsibility, authority, and interrelation of all personnel who manage, perform, and ass- work affecting quality, and provide the independence and
b)	apply a risk based approach to the control of the appropriate processes needed for the quality management system;	authority necessary to perform these tasks. (2) Resources, Each manufacturer shall provide adequate
c)	determine the sequence and interaction of these processes.	(2) resources, can manuacture shan prove adequate resources, including the assignment of trained personnel, for management, performance of work, and assessment activiti including internal quality audits, to meet the requirements of this part.
	or each quality management system process, the ation shall:	(3) Management Representative. Management with executi
a)	determine criteria and methods needed to ensure that both the operation and control of these processes are effective;	(3) Management Kepresentative, Management with executin responsibility shall appointment such appointment of, a member of management who, irrespective of other responsibilities, shall have established authority over and responsibility for:
b)	ensure the availability of resources and information necessary to support the operation and monitoring of these processes;	 (i) Ensuring that quality system requirements are effectively established and effectively maintained in accordance with the part; and
c)	implement actions necessary to achieve planned results and maintain the effectiveness of these processes;	(ii) Reporting on the performance of the quality system to management with executive responsibility for review.
d)		(c) Management Review. Management with executive responsibility shall review the suitability and effectiveness of the quality system at defined intervals and with sufficient frequency according to established procedures to ensure th the quality system satifies the requirements of this part and the manufacturer's established quality policy and objectives

Leverage Mapping: HITRUST, NIST800-53r5 – where we start



Assessment Universe 🛛

Control ID Domain ID Test ID	Test ID:Test_ID	Control Objective	Unified Testing Map	Control	bjective Desc	ription Unified Univer	e Mapping	Unified Testing Map:Test_ID		Unified Universe Mapping:Control Objective	
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dition or Source : California Consumer Privacy Act	of 2018 (/1)			Edition or Source	: California Co	nsumer Privacy Act of 2018 (71)					
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			A.18.22; A.18.23; IR-3.1; IR-3.2; IR GMP5_ADX_011-4.3.1; GMP5_ADX_011-4.3.2; GMP5_ADX_011-4.3.3; GMP5_ADX_011-4.3.4			11.10(a); 21 CFR Part 11.10(a) 11.10(b); Validation ensures acc 11.10(c); cecord integrity; 21 CF 11.10(c); cecord integrity; 21 CF 11.10(c); copy of necords; 21 CF 11.10(c); copy of necords; 21 CF 11.10(c); into (c); 11.10(c); copy of necords; 21 CF 11.10(c); into (c); 11.10(c); comp of necords; 21 CF 11.10(c); into (c); copy of necords; 21 CF 11.10(c); into (c); copy of necords; 21 CF	I. Part closed system alete R Part fon Part em	HT_1b; HT_1b; HT_1b; HT_1b; HT_1b; HT_1b; HT_1b; HT_1b; HT_1b; HT_1b; HT_1b; HT_2H; HT_2b; HT_2d; HT	Persons who use closed systems to create, modify, maintan, or transmittan, or	13. Like Registration, Tul, Like Proceed Amargument, BT Amargument (Like Kall, Sall, Sa	Systems; 10.02 Correct Processing in Applications; 10.03 Cryptographic Controls; 10.04
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NIST 800-53 r5 Adds KEYWORDS and Privacy Attributes



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Announcement

There is an urgent need to strengthen the trustworthiness and resilience of the information systems, component products, and services that we depend on in every critical infrastructure sector and which support the economic and national security interests of the United States.

This (final public draft) revision of NIST Special Publication 800-53 presents a proactive and systemic approach to developing comprehensive safeguarding measures for all types of computing platforms, including general purpose computing systems,

TOPICS

https://github.com/usnistgov/OSCAL/tree/master/conten awareness training & educator: contingent/volaming: t/nist.gov/SP800-53/rev5



Additional Resources that Tie Out IOT – CSA – Requires use of CSTAR Registry – Referencing Requires Explicit Permission



cloud CSA security alliance*			rk, download the "Guide to the CSA IoT Controls Framework" at: rg/artifacts/quide-to-the-iot-security-controls-framework	loT Syste	m Risk Impac	t Levels	Supplement	ntal Control Guidance	Imp	plementation Guida
Control Domain	Control ID	CCM ID	Control Specification	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Additional Direction	References / Rationale	Types of Security Controls	Control Implementation
Secure Networks SDP	SNT-09	IAM-08 IVS-06	Configure a Software-Defined Perimeter (SDP) that authenticates IoT devices prior to connection to a network, and restricts activities based on pre-approved roles and privileges.	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	The SDP approach hides the network from all devices/users. The network and applications are hidden behind gateways that reject all corner clon requests except from authorized devices/users. Devices/users must authenticate first with a controller that contains the necessary information to determine that the device/user is "pre-approved" then the controller informs the servers or gateways at occept connections from the particular user/device. Besides access to the network which nonications the device/user ac information the server of users.	https://downloads.cloudsecurityaliance.org/initiatives/sdp/SDP_Specificati on_1.0.pdf https://downloads.cloudsecurityaliance.org/assets/research/sdp/SDP- glossary.pdf Architecture document 1.0 is in process and should be finished in 2018 Specification 2.0 will be started late Dec 2018 early January 2019 An Arth-DODS apper is also in progress and will be finished 01 2019 https://www.mist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2018/08/16/waverly_rfi_r esponse.ndf	Preventive	Automatic
Secure Networks Visualization Tools	SNT-10		Use a network visualization tool to monitor the operating state and health status of IoT devices, gateways and services. Use simple heartbeat monitoring to monitor device connectivity or SMMPv3 traps for monitoring CPU utilization, memory, and other abnormal behaviors.	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate	These tools help identify network communciation and traffic issues and can also help identify a DoS attack.		Detective	Automatic
Secure Networks Wireless Network Boundaries	SNT-11		Define physical boundaries for WSNs and limit the power rating of ZigBee and ZWave devices to minimize signal leakage.	High	High	High			Preventive	Automatic
Secure Networks Segmentation	SNT-12	IVS-09	Set up Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), such as ZigBee, ZWave and Bluetooth, to be disconnected from the Internet with only authorized gateways exposing internet connectivity.	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate		CTA. Recommended Best Practices for Securing Home Systems Securing your Internet of Things from the Ground Up. Microsoft Azure White Paper.	Preventive	Manual
Secure Networks Environment Scanning	SNT-13	IVS TVM	At least quarterly, scan the physical environment to look for anomalies, such as radiofrequency (RF) attacks and rogue device insertion.	High	High	High			Detective	Automatic
Secure Networks Device Communication	SNT-14	IVS TVM MOS	Require all communications with an IoT device to be initiated by the device. Log and alert about unauthorized connection requests	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate			Preventive	Automatic
Secure Networks ZigBee Default Keys	SNT-15		Disable the default ZigBee Trust Center (TC) key and generate/use a non- default key for protecting the confidentiality of keys in transport.	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate		https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Zillner-ZigBee- Exploited-The-Good-The-Bad-And-The-Ugly-wp.pdf	Preventive	Semi-Automatic
Secure Networks ZigBee Master Keys	SNT-16		Distribute ZigBee Master Keys out of band. Never pass master keys over the network. Master keys are used to establish additional key material.	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate			Preventive	Automatic
Secure Networks ZigBee Networks Keys	SNT-17		Rotate ZigBee Network Keys at least annually, and disable prior keys upon distribution/establishment of the new network key.	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate			Preventive	Automatic
Secure Networks Zwave	SNT-18	IVS-06 IVS-12 IVS-13 IPY-04	Supplement Z-Wave networks with AES 128 cryptographic keys for authentication. Use these keys in addition to the standard 4-byte Home ID to access a Z-Wave network.	Moderate	Moderate	Moderate		CTA. Recommended Best Practices for Securing Home Systems	Preventive	Automatic



SANS IOT Internet of Things Reading Room



Written by Barbara Filkins

Advisor: Doug Wylie July 2018 Sponsored by:

ForeScout Technologies, Inc.

Reading Room Threats and Vulnerabilities Table 6. NOT Concerns over the Next Two Years A Matter of Perspective: Threats and Risks Confidence in being able to secure Response an organization's lioT infrastructure SANS Overall, the majority of respondents (59%), regardless of organization Difficulty or lack of patching IIoT devices and systems, leaving them depends on understanding the size, are only somewhat confident in their organization's ability to Internet of Things threats and risks to be faced Accidental exposures resulting from user error and system complexity 41,67% secure their lint devices. See Figure 8. especially in light of the complexity Given the current state of your security program (people, policies, cesses, controls and technology) how would you rate your organizati ability to secure your not devices? Difficulty controlling, locating, tracking, preventing and managing IioT connectivity to critical infrastructure and other mission-critical systems 39,29% interestingly, members of the OT Featuring 14 Papers as of July 3, 2019 that stems from allowing external department-the individuals who are connectivity for OT systems and Failure to incorporate good security practices into the IIOT design, build, operate and maintenance lifecycle models for systems 39,29% likely the most knowledgeable about adding a growing number of DICE and MUD Protocols for Securing IoT Devices + Overview lioT implementation-appear to be the SANS Institute Confident in current abilities to maintain security for INF devices and systems. devices that expand effort to HoT "Things" used as infection vectors to spread in the enterprise 34,52% STI Graduate Student Research L Download least confident in their organization's manage asset inventory, device and Multivendor environment without device and technology standardization 29,76% Somewhat confident, We need additional en and training to manage security as not devi ability to secure these devices, while by Muhammed Ayar - June 5, 2019 Information Security Reading Room system configuration, and change Denial of service attacks on IIoT devices and systems that cause damage or loss of IIfe 25.00% company leadership and management, management. The results are including department managers, Not at all confident, we are unprepresented in Table 6. Shortage of vendor investments to incorporate security into the design of 19.05% IIOT devices, systems and supporting products appear to be the most assured, as In line with Figure 2 (on page 8), illustrated in Figure 9. patching and product upgrades are Unable or unprepared to manage security of existing systems, let alone take on new INT devices and system responsibilities. + Overviev Practical Industrial Control System (ICS) Cybersecurity: IT and OT Have Converged - Discover and trouble spots and are expected to "Members of the OT department Defend Your Assets + Download remain so for the next two years. REST DRACTICES the individuals who are likely Analyst Paper (requires membership in SANS.org community) Coher The recognition by so many that Threats are constantly evolving, and for IT and non-HoT devices, there are instances the most knowledgeable about by Doug Wyle and Dean Parsons - September 26, 2018 DICE and MUD Protocols for where product patching could have at least raised the difficulty for an attacker to NoT implementation, appear to remain vulnerable due to lack of invertain objective For link reason, imperiorming theophilos change management, careful endpoint selection, reducing endpoint and network complexity, and closely monitoring for connections and communications an remain highly suitable recommendations, in addition to the best practice of developing and executing Securing IoT Devices be the least confident in their patching exposes how investments Associated Webcasts: Practical Industrial Control System (ICS) Cybersecurity: IT and OT Have Conversed, Discover organization's ability to secure in infrastructure hardening may and Defend Your Assets continue to be viewed as a sufficient ongoing NoT patching procedures. Given the current state of your security program (people, policies, processes, controls and technology) how would you rate your organization's ability to secure your not devices? Sponsored By: *Tenable these devices while company security strategy to adequately leadership and management, protect lioT systems. including department Table 7. Greatest Concerns for BOT Security Over Next Two Years Expartment managers The if department The Of department Company loadership and management Risk Muhammed Avar managers, appear to be the Respons PIOT - a small form factor defense for indefensible devices + Overview most assured." Respondents (48%) acknowledge that by James Levte-Vidal - August 2, 2018 ▲ Download The discrepancy in the views of Shortage or absence of adequate security considerations in IIOT product A SANS Survey management and leadership from ANS 38.1% OT in the company's capability to Pace or lack of updates for vulnerabilities to 05, firmware or other software for IIoT devices secure lloT is problematic. Such The 2018 SANS Industrial IoT Security Survey: Shaping IIoT Security Concerns + Overview Creating new attack surfaces that expose or enable additional vulnerabilities such as related to the command and control (C2) channel b a liof device and system 34,578 Analyst Paper (regu o in SANS.org ± Download challenges for the OT group's ability by Barbara Filkins - July 18, 2018 to secure budget for such investments User-introduced vulnerabilities for IIoT devices through oversight 32.1% as ongoing security skills-building. technologies and services to help Associated Webcasts: The State of Industrial IoT safeguard operations and resources Shortage or absence of adequate security considerations in system design and manufacturing Sponsored By: *Forescout Technologies BV *Accenture *Indegy 22.6% The same data may also suppest an overall leadership and ma Negative impact on system safety posture or ability to maintain safe operation or shelfdown perspective that current company security investments in iIoT somehow adequate-or at least deemed adequate enough to Building the New Network Security Architecture for the Euture + Overviev D. Lack of relevant, sensible and enforceable industry standards on IIoT devices and systems. bership in SANS.org community * Download Analyst Paper (reby Sonny Sarai - January 22, 2018 11 Other The 2018 SANS Industrial IoT SANS Analyst Program | The 2018 SANS Industrial IoT Securit 18 SANS industrial IoT Security Survey: Shaping IIoT Security Concerns This paper is from the SANS Institute Reading Room site. Reposting is not permitted without express Security Survey: written permission Shaping IIoT Security Concerns

https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/internet/dice-mudprotocols-securing-iot-devices-38980




https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/internet



What creates the threads that we can assert?





Ten normative references

Benchmark contains both descriptive Group item that can hold other items Item three types of items: <xccdf:Group>, <xccdf:Rule> and <xccdf:Value>

Model suggested scoring model for an <xccdf:Benchmark>

Profile element is a named tailoring for an <xccdf:Benchmark>

Rule the description for a single item of guidance or constraint. <xccdf:Rule> elements form the basis for testing a target platform for benchmark

compliance

Status acceptance status of an element information and structural information with an optional date attribute, which signifies the date of the status change Tailoring element holds one or more <xccdf:Profile> elements-records additional benchmark tailoring

> TestResult element encapsulates the results of a single application of an <xccdf:Benchmark> to a single target platform

> Value a named parameter that can be substituted into properties of other elements within the <xccdf:Benchmark>



Control Correlation Identifiers CCI



http://iase.disa.mil/stigs/cci/Pages/index.aspx

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We eccanage participation from the members of the Information Security Community in the OCI Flox, downing, participation (Information Security also be participation) CCI Comment Name CCI Common Annual Community of the Name Formation Containe Format (2016) (2016)					
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We encourage participation from the members of the Information Recurstly Community in the OOI effants by providing Interstand with ECX life, downing, complying and Communities and provided uning the COI Community Member CCI Community Community and Comm					

- The *Control Correlation Identifier* (CCI) provides a standard identifier and description for each of the singular, actionable statements that comprise an IA control or IA best practice.
- CCI bridges the gap between high-level policy expressions and lowlevel technical implementations. CCI allows a security requirement that is expressed in a high-level policy framework to be decomposed and explicitly associated with the low-level security setting(s) that must be assessed to determine compliance with the objectives of that specific security control.
- This ability to trace security requirements from their origin (e.g., regulations, IA frameworks) to their low-level implementation allows organizations to readily demonstrate compliance to multiple IA compliance frameworks.
- CCI also provides a means to objectively rollup and compare related compliance assessment results across disparate technologies.



Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language (OVAL)



- OVAL[®] is an information security community effort to standardize how to assess and report machine state of computer systems.
- Tools and services that use OVAL for the three steps of system assessment representing system information, expressing specific machine states, and reporting the results of an assessment — provide enterprises with accurate, consistent, and actionable information so they may improve their security.



EnterpriseGR Solutions, Ir

Possible Future Integration is working with MITRE ATT&CK EnterpriseGRC

Interfaces for Working with ATT&CK: There are two different ways for you to access the ATT&CK content:

- ATT&CK expressed in STIX 2.0 GitHub repository: There are a few different ways to interact with the ATT&CK content (<u>repo</u>). Python, the best way is to utilize <u>cti-</u> <u>python-stix2</u>. The <u>USAGE</u> doc in the repo to helps. Since STIX 2.0 is JSON that library is the programming language of choice to interact with the raw content, such as the full set of Enterprise ATT&CK content found <u>here</u>.
- TAXII Server: The TAXII server stays up to date with the content found in our GitHub repository, so consumers access the ATT&CK content there. As the TAXII Server release <u>blog post</u> states, consumers use the <u>cti-python-stix2</u> and <u>cti-taxii-client</u> to get the ATT&CK content from the TAXII server.



Investment in Licenses and Partners

286,640


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Licenses Necessary to Mapping into the LSHC World




• Strategic Partners might include Unified Compliance Network, HITRUST, Big Four such as Deloitte, Center for Internet Security, CIS*





Experience Creating CIS Partner Relationship







Thank You..