Running A Successful Crowdsourced Security Program: Tips On How Not To Fail...

Grant McCracken @ ISC^2 - 10/10/19

Agenda

- About
- Crowdsourced security?
 - What is it?
 - **Flavors**
 - Bug bounty
 - VDP (Vulnerability Disclosure Program)
- Components of a program
- What makes for an (un)successful program?
- Things to think about
- Thought exercises/recap
- Questions?

About


NEW PHONE



- Grant McCracken
 - Director of Solutions @ Bugcrowd
 - Done a *lot* of bug bounty...
 - Past appsec engineer; OSCP
 - Appsec USA/EU, misc bsides and meetups, etc

First, the basics

Crowdsourced security:



- What is it?
 - Strength in numbers
 - With a large enough pool, the right people are out there
- Bug Bounty (active)
 - Pay per bug/impact
 - Public/private

- VDP (passive)
 - See something, say something
- The future...
 - Using the crowd for more

Components to a crowdsourced program






Setting clear expectations from the get-go around...

- Scope
 - What can/cannot researchers test?
 - Where do they report everything else?
- Rewards
 - How much can a researcher expect to get paid for what?

- A centralized place to ingest/track vulnerabilities
 - Internal process(es)
- Ratings
 - Taxonomy
- Information
 - Including any details needed to be successful.
 - We want to find bugs!
 - Safe harbor

Setting up for success



- Build a competitive and engaging program
 - Competitive rewards + leveraging the VRT
 - A clear and attractive program scope (pretend you're the researcher)
 - Ensure adequate resources are assigned for rapid rewards/validation
- Understand how your program will grow over time

- Remember: we want researchers to find bugs!
 - Ensure that we're giving testers the tools to succeed (e.g. credentials/access/PII)
 - Work with researchers; not against them.
 - Providing fresh meat/changelogs, etc.
- Where to report findings against other assets?

Tips for program ownership



F-R-U-I-T

- Fair
 - Rewarding in line with set expectations.
 - The brief is a contract!
- **R**esponsive
 - Quick to reward and answer questions.
- Understanding
 - Recognizing researchers are here to help, and are human.

- Invested
 - The program is a priority; not a burden.
- Transparent
 - Honest, open, and clear with researchers

Worst Practices...

- Slow to review, respond, and reward findings (months, if ever). Age subs like a fine wine.
- List a massive reward range, and then only pay out at the low end.
- Low-key sneak-fix bugs and claim they never existed.
- Run a "black box" program. No scope = no vulns; no vulns = super secure!
- Leave the brief as ambiguous as possible. Keep em' guessing.
- Sneak-edits to the rules of engagement "nope, the rules say..." (great way to get out of paying)
- Never update the program or show appreciation.

- Be sure to remember researchers are the enemy they're hackers, right?
- Threaten to sue everyone. Who doesn't love getting sued?
- Forget that you have a program.
- Give broken documentation or credentials. They're hackers, they can figure it out...
- Forget to tell researchers about things that you know about (systemic issues).
- If it's not critical, who cares?
- Include obtuse and arbitrary restrictions on involvement. The harder it is to participate, the less vulns will be found, and less vulns - more secure!
- Ignore researchers; they don't have feelings.

Thought exercises/recap...

Imagine you're:

- A researcher...
 - Does this make sense to you?
 - Are there good expectations around what to test, and compensation?
 - Would you be incentivized to test against this target? If not, why? Be sure to address those points before asking why researchers won't.

- An attacker...
 - How would you realistically attack your org/assets? When considering scope, it helps to put things into perspective. Bad actors rarely come in through the front door.

• A contractor...

 Do you want to work for the group that pays quickly and fairly, or for slow and unfairly?

- If exploited in the wild...
 - When questioning the dollar value of a finding, ask yourself what it would cost if this got exploited in the wild.
 Odds are that learning about it as part of a bounty is cheaper than in the wild.

