

Mobile Device Security

Pen testing and Ethical Hacking

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Overview

- ▶ Mobile Devices are prevalent
- ▶ Security models are different by platform
- ▶ Analysis of Mobile Device Applications
- ▶ Analysis of Mobile Device Ecosystem

Mobile Devices are everywhere

- ▶ Resistance is futile! If management blocks them, users will find a way
 - ▶ Don't be the problem your users solve
- ▶ It is important to understand how they are being used
 - ▶ Where is the data?
- ▶ It is important to understand the major device architecture and security
 - ▶ How is your information accessible?
 - ▶ How can your protections be circumvented?
- ▶ Based on that knowledge, coupled with your information protection requirements, you can start to assess.

Mobile Device Security

- ▶ IOS Security
 - ▶ Hardware Encrypted with passcode
 - ▶ Up to 4 year device support
 - ▶ No MO value added software. OS updates directly from Apple
 - ▶ Applications only installed iTunes App store
 - ▶ Applications announce optional security settings
- ▶ Android Security
 - ▶ Hardware Encryption inconsistent
 - ▶ Devices supported 6-12 months.
 - ▶ Handset alliance suggest 18 months
 - ▶ MO value add and testing delay OS updates
 - ▶ By Default Applications installed from Google Play only, can add multiple sources.
 - ▶ Applications announce security settings
 - ▶ All or nothing

Analysis of Mobile Devices

- ▶ Need to understand network connections and security
- ▶ Illegal to intercept/manipulate 3G/4G/LTE networks
- ▶ Must assume Wi-Fi network connections/behavior identical to Cellular network
- ▶ Need to be MiTM with the mobile device
 - ▶ Configure Proxy
 - ▶ ARP Posoing
 - ▶ AVD Emulator

Application Analysis

- ▶ IOS Applications
 - ▶ Written in Objective C
 - ▶ Encrypted
 - ▶ Multiple hardware architecture in single application binary
 - ▶ Need GDB to extract binary from memory
 - ▶ Very difficult to change and repackage without source.
- ▶ Android Applications
 - ▶ Written in Java
 - ▶ .APK file is compressed (Zipped) Java
 - ▶ Runs in Dalvik interpreter
 - ▶ Can Decompile into Java for analysis
 - ▶ Can Decompile into Smali (Dalvik bytecode) for alteration
 - ▶ Altered code can be assembled and distributed as the original package

iOS Decompilation/Manipulation

- ▶ Obtain unencrypted binary
 - ▶ Use Otool and GDB on JB iPhone
 - ▶ Use Rasticrac on JB iPhone
- ▶ Thin application to current architecture
 - ▶ Use lipo on OSX with Xcode installed to extract desired binary. E.g. ARMv7
 - ▶ Use class-dump-z to extract class files, headers pretty accurate
 - ▶ Otool for review of shared libraries
- ▶ Cannot recreate (modified) app
- ▶ Runtime Manipulation
 - ▶ Connect to running app with Cycrypt
 - ▶ Cycrypt sits on Cydia Substrate
 - ▶ Manipulate application in memory
 - ▶ Dynamically access methods and variables
 - ▶ Is a testing/developer tool

Android Decompilation/Manipulation

- ▶ Use Apktool to decompile into SMALI interpreter
 - ▶ `Apktool d helloworld.apk`
- ▶ Use text editor for small changes
 - ▶ E.g. Hello World becomes Hello Joe!
- ▶ Use Eclipse for larger changes
 - ▶ E.g. New functionality
- ▶ Reassemble with apktool
 - ▶ `Apktool b helloworld.apk`
 - ▶ Must sign before usable
- ▶ Digitally sign the new APK
 - ▶ Create signature
 - ▶ `Jdk\jdk-ver\bin\keytool.exe -genkey -keystore keys/helloworld.keystore -alias HelloWorld -keyalg RSA -validity 10000`
 - ▶ Create values when prompted
 - ▶ Sign APK
 - ▶ `Jdk\jdk-ver\bin\jarsigner.exe -keystore keys\helloworld.keystore helloworld\dist\helloworld\HelloWorld`
 - ▶ Signature not checked by Android; can deploy many ways

Mobile Device Ecosystem

- ▶ Lots of services used when mobile
 - ▶ Devices
 - ▶ Web servers
 - ▶ Mobile path may be less secure
 - ▶ FB mobile used to use <http://m.facebook.com> rather than <https://...>
 - ▶ Desktops
 - ▶ Mobile applications
 - ▶ Mobile sharing/syncing
 - ▶ DropBox
 - ▶ Google Drive
 - ▶ Etc.
- ▶ Analysis of Mobile device risks and threats are complex and require flexibility
- ▶ Devices accessing, processing and storing data outside your traditional boundaries
- ▶ Pentesting tricky as multiple factors involved, and you may not have or be able to get permission to pentest all of them

Mobile Device Pen Testing is complex

- ▶ Mobile Device Pen Testing building blocks:
 - ▶ Network pen testing
 - ▶ Wireless pen testing
 - ▶ Web pen testing
- ▶ Diversity of environment drives flexibility
- ▶ New tools emerging to help
- ▶ Old tools packaged to help
 - ▶ PWN Pad/Phone/PI

Pen Testing Mobile Applications

- ▶ Understand the application
 - ▶ Some are really a web site
 - ▶ Many are simply web pages rendered in an application
 - ▶ Others really are an application
- ▶ Questions to ask
 - ▶ Where is the data
 - ▶ How is it protected
 - ▶ How is access governed
 - ▶ Who owns what
 - ▶ Do you have a backup and can you restore it
- ▶ Once you know these, now go prove, or disprove
- ▶ What happens when you intercept and change parameters
 - ▶ Session timeout, cryptographic or other checks may thwart
- ▶ Can you replay transactions
 - ▶ Message Integrity Check may not prevent this
 - ▶ Transaction serialization helps
- ▶ Are apps susceptible to XSS
- ▶ Are apps susceptible to SQL Injection

Staying Current

- ▶ Field constantly changing
 - ▶ New devices
 - ▶ Constant OS Updates
 - ▶ New features = new vulnerabilities
- ▶ Get plugged into Security Data Feeds
 - ▶ US-CERT
 - ▶ Twitter:
 - ▶ ios security
 - ▶ android security
- ▶ Try your own hand pen testing known vulnerable apps
- ▶ CarnalOwnage Vulnerable Android Apps
 - ▶ <http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2013/08/want-to-break-some-android-apps.html>

Questions?



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